INDIA.

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Indiana.

The defeat of the Government in the House of Commons on June 21st may have important and far-reaching effects in Indian affairs. At the time of writing, Mr. Fowler, in common with his colleagues, has resigned office, although he and they continue to act as ministers until the appointment of their successors. The people of India will rejoice to learn that the retiring Government has, in the words of the *Daily News*, "been able to place to its credit a resolution to abandon Chitral." Whoever may be Mr. Fowler's successor—whether Lord Lansdowne, Mr. G. N. Curzon, or another—he will hardly dare to ignore this resolution, and to permit the advocates of the "forward" policy to play fast and loose with the finances of India. Mr. Fowler's decision, which comes better late than never, is in accordance with the explicit undertakings of the Viceroy in his proclamation against Umra Khan, and it will perhaps serve to cover a multitude of shortcomings in Mr. Fowler's record at the India Office. It is worth noting that the *Times*, in its issue of June 24th, wrote that Mr. Fowler

> "is perhaps happy in the occasion of his political death, as we fear he contemplated a fatal surrender in the matter of Chitral."

There is obviously no doubt as to Mr. Fowler's intentions, backed as they are by the weight of expert opinion. In these circumstances, his successor will incur a very grave responsibility if he reverses the policy now laid down.

"All's well that ends well." During the past month frequent attempts were made, by means of questions put in the House of Commons, to obtain information as to the Government's intentions or, failing that, an opportunity of public discussion. But these questions were for the most part met with evasive answers. Indeed, when Sir W. Wedderburn asked Sir W. Harcourt whether, before taking action, the Government would afford the House of Commons an opportunity of expressing its opinions on the subject of Chitral, Sir W. Harcourt replied, in effect, that no communication would be made to the House of Commons until the Government had determined its policy. The incident illustrated anew some of the perils with which representative institutions are threatened by distant empire. Meantime, the advocates of occupation, official and non-official, have not been idle. The *Times*, in particular, has carried on an eager and persistent campaign on behalf of the "forward" policy—a campaign in which suppression or delay of communications *per contra* have been minor, though instructive, incidents. There have, it is true, been two voices from Simla speaking in the columns of the *Times*. If we were assured one day that the Government of India had advised the occupation of Chitral and the construction of a road thither, we heard a few days later that the Government had, after all, resolved to withdraw. These discrepancies may have indicated only the uncertainty of the writer, or, as is probable, the later message may have been intended to arouse the advocates of the "forward" policy to greater activity in Whitehall

and Printing-house Square. Mr. W. C. Bonnerjee, as will be seen from the account of an "interview" which is printed elsewhere, was inclined to take a despondent view and to believe that not only the present act, but future acts of aggression also, would be sanctioned by the Imperial Government. But perhaps Mr. Bonnerjee is disposed, as he may well be, to underrate the strength of the forces in the United Kingdom which, appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, still make for "peace, retrenchment and reform."

It is, however, highly disappointing that Liberal newspapers in the United Kingdom have paid so little attention to so signal a departure from Liberal policy as that which was threatened. There are, it is true, some honourable exceptions. The *Manchester Guardian*, for example, whose influence is second to that of no Liberal journal in the country, has in a series of admirable articles deprecated the policy of occupation, and for Mr. Fowler's daring to be wise the *Manchester Guardian* deserves much of the credit. The *Spectator* also, whose well known Anglo-Indian adviser has taken the right line, has done good service. Passages from these journals are reproduced on another page. But what had become of the vigour of the *Daily Chronicle*, and why was the *Daily News* so silent? It is to be feared that wrong-headed ideas of Imperial expansion have, especially under Lord Rosebery's ill-starred leadership, found their way into the Liberal party, while the Government's lease of life in the House of Commons was of so precarious a tenure that forty righteous Liberals could not be found who would move the adjournment of the House in order to call attention to this matter of urgent importance. These circumstances, however, only increased Mr. Fowler's responsibility as they added to his power. If he had decided in favour of occupation his decision would have been contrary to the opinions of the majority, and the best, of the experts, whether military or financial. Even Sir Lepel Griffin has joined with General Sir Neville Chamberlain, General Lord Chelmsford, General Sir John Adye, General Sir Charles Gough, Sir Auckland Colvin and Sir David Barbour in opposing a policy which, while it offers no advantage whatever, is already responsible for the financial embarrassments of the Government of India.

The terms of reference to the Royal Commission on Indian Expenditure are, as they appear in the *London Gazette*, slightly different from the original announcement. The later version is as follows:

"To enquire into the administration and management of the military and civil expenditure incurred under the authority of the Secretary of State for India in Council, or of the Government of India, and the apportionment of charge between the Governments of the United Kingdom and of India for purposes in which both are interested."

The Commission meets for the first time on Wednesday, June 26th, at the India Office, and one of the most important questions which it will then be called upon to decide is whether or not its proceedings shall be conducted with closed doors. A rumour was current some time ago that Mr. Fowler had decided to exclude the press. Mr. Seymour Keay put a question on this all-important matter in the House of Commons on June 20th. The reply was that no decision had yet been taken, and that the matter rested with the Commissioners themselves. It is almost inconceivable that the Commission, packed though it is with officials, will deliberately fly in the face of precedent and resolve itself into a hole-and-corner enquiry. Already the terms of reference have been so contrived, and the *personnel* of the Commission has been so arranged, as to give the minimum of opportunity to the advocates of retrenchment. Their last hope will be gone if representatives of the newspapers are to be excluded from the sittings of the Commission. I anticipate no such result; but if so untoward a decision should be taken, it would probably become a question for the representatives of the Indian people whether they could continue to serve on the Commission at all and, by their presence, lend their approval to a secret enquiry conducted by officials for officials.

On the assumption that the sittings of the Royal Commission are held, as they ought to be held, in public, the first business of the non-official members will be to direct its enquiries into the most useful channel. Human nature is much the same on Royal Commissions as elsewhere, and it is likely that the first definite suggestions which are offered as to procedure will be gratefully accepted. If this belief be well-grounded, it would be well for the non-official members to draw up, say, a series of questions for immediate investigation and to lay the document, with some adequate evidence, before their colleagues at the first meeting. Otherwise there is a danger that the officials may, from the first, get the enquiry very much under their own control and keep it there. In that case it would be rash to expect that any great advantage would accrue to the taxpayers of India from the recommendations of the Commission. It must also be borne in mind that, however vehemently Mr. Fowler in speeches delivered in the House of Commons may have deprecated any enquiry into policy, the deliberations of the Commission are limited not by Mr. Fowler's desires but only by the terms of reference. Now, the terms of reference speak of the "administration" and "management" of Indian expenditure. What is administration?

What is management? What is the difference between the two? How much is capable of inclusion under the correlative terms, maladministration and mismanagement? Here, I cannot help thinking, is some opportunity not indeed for any discussion of high Imperial policy but for close scrutiny of the financial prudence of particular schemes which the Government of India has from to time approved as means to particular ends.

Moreover, enquiry into the administration and management of expenditure can hardly be complete if it ignores the preliminary question whether any part of the expenditure has been illegal. Hence the Commission may well find itself called upon to examine what it is precisely that is Indian expenditure—whether, for example, in aggressive operations and the occupation or absorption of territories beyond the frontier, the Government of India has at any time transgressed the statutory regulations which determine its power. The fate of the Opium Commission, also, should put members of Lord Welby's Commission on their guard. There must be no official revision, selection, or filtration of evidence, and care must be taken that those persons are called who are really able to tender the most useful evidence. Finally, there is a danger that the deliberations of the Commission may cover so wide a field that the issue of a report may be long delayed, or even rendered impossible. A suggestion has been made, and it is worth repeating, that *interim* reports might conveniently be issued upon the various organic sections of the subject-matter.

An instructive light is thrown upon the various uses to which the accounts of the Government of India can be put by a recent controversy between Sir Auckland Colvin, an ex-Finance Minister, and Sir Henry Waterfield, Secretary in the Financial Department of the India Office. In the debate on the Opium Commission, Mr. Fowler said that in 1887, excluding loss by exchange, Indian army expenditure amounted to nineteen millions and was considerably under twenty millions in 1893.

> "Apart from the exchange," he added, "there has been no great increase in the army expenditure in India for a number of years. The real increase of expenditure lay in Exchange . . . . it does not lie in increased military expenditure."

This is, as everybody knows, the orthodox official theory. But it has not the advantage of being supported by facts. Sir Auckland Colvin at once pointed out that, according to the Parliamentary Return dated, June 8, 1894, the Indian Army Expenditure, *minus* Exchange, was £18,845,923 in 1887-88; £20,477,885 in 1892-93; and £20,382,528 in 1893-94. The increase which these figures show since 1887 is £1,536,705. But this figure is illusory. For the figures for 1887-88 include £1,475,300 on account of the pacification of Upper Burma besides other "exceptional payments." What we are concerned with is, as Sir Auckland Colvin said, the scale of normal Army Expenditure. Omitting, therefore, "exceptional payments" and loss by exchange one finds that the figures are £17,352,304 in 1887-88 as compared with £19,882,628 in 1893-94. In other words, apart from exchange and apart from the cost of military defence works and strategic railways, the increase in Army Expenditure from 1887 to 1893 was about two and a-half millions. Yet Mr. Fowler speaks of "no great increase." So much for the expenditure; but what of the exchange, upon which the officials rely? In 1887-88 the charge for exchange on the military expenditure was £1,572,011. In 1893 it was £2,870,969—an increase of a little over a million and a quarter. It is, then, this million and a quarter which accounts for the "real increase," and not the two millions and a-half disclosed above? It is the one-third and not the two-thirds which makes the difference? Yet there was a time when Mr. Fowler used to criticise Mr. Goschen's surpluses.

Of course Sir Henry Waterfield, as in duty bound, rushed to Mr. Fowler's rescue. But what was his excuse? It was characteristic: "The figures are taken from different returns, compiled in a different manner." The sentence recalls Mr. A. J. Wilson's emphatic and well-grounded condemnation, in our last number, of the modes in which India accounts are presented. Whatever may be the intentions of those who draw them up, they undoubtedly serve the double purpose of rendering criticism difficult and supplying an easy official answer. Officials in India are only too apt to make their figures serve this purpose, and the bad habit is encouraged, instead of being checked, at the India Office. Sir Henry Waterfield produced a fresh batch of figures. But these, again, were vitiated by the inclusion of such exceptional items as the charges for Burma. Sir Auckland Colvin, however, took the new figures, and, by means of them, demonstrated again the truth of his contentions that, (1) apart from war and other exceptional charges, there has been between 1887-8 and 1893-4 a great increase in normal military expenditure in India; and (2) that this increase is greater than the increase due to exchange. Another interesting feature of the correspondence was that Sir H. Waterfield invited comparison between the expenditure of 1887-8 and "the revised estimates of 1894-5. "He need not be reminded," was Sir Auckland Colvin's caustic reply, "that comparisons of actuals with estimates is apt to be misleading." It is high time that these misleading comparisons, and the peculiar diversity of methods

which renders them possible, were abandoned. It may suit the Government of India so to mystify the man in the street that he loses, if he ever found, any interest in Indian questions. But such mystification will not expedite retrenchment, nor is it creditable to those who produce it. As for the precious theory that exchange is responsible for the increase in military charges, it has been shown, not once but twenty times, to be false. But even if it were true, the Government of India and the Secretary of State would not be free from blame. The exchange-value of the rupee has been falling for the past twenty, and especially during the past ten, years. It was, and is, the duty of the Government of India to take this loss into account, and to cut its coat according to its cloth. Mr. Fowler knows perfectly well that, whether expenditure be shown in this Parliamentary Return or in that, whether it be due to exchange or not, it has to be met by the Indian taxpayer.

Could anything be more amazing than the announcement, lately made by the Secretary of State for India, that the expenses of the Shahzada's visit to England are to be defrayed by the Government—that is to say, by the taxpayers—of India? The proposal will be strenuously resisted not only by the Indian Parliamentary Committee but also, I believe, by many Lancashire members who are concerned for the speedy removal of the cotton duties. The Shahzada came to England on no Indian errand, nor at the suggestion of the Indian people. The matter should be thrashed out in the debate on the Indian Budget, as to which there will be need for the utmost vigilance on the part of the Indian Parliamentary Committee in view of the change of Government.

A series of important memorials from British Indian subjects resident in the South African Republic raises a question which demands the immediate attention of all the authorities concerned. Although, under the Queen's Proclamation of 1858, Indians were definitely admitted to the rights and *status* of the other subjects of the Crown, attempts are being made in South Africa to treat them as an outcast and uncleanly race, to drive them from their houses, to rob them of their occupations, and to herd them together in a place apart. The ostensible pretext for this scandalous and high-handed proceeding is that the habits of the British Indian residents in South Africa are filthy and their practices immoral. But, of course, as the writer on "Indian Affairs" points out in the *Times*:

"It is needless to say that the Indian Hindus and Mussulmans stand out as examples of bodily cleanliness among Asiatic races, and, we may add, among the races of the world. The ablutions of the Hindu have passed into a proverb. His religion demands them, and the custom of ages has made them a prime necessity of his daily life. As regards their religion teaching 'them to consider all women as soulless and Christians as natural prey,' the Indian memorial to the Secretary of State indignantly remarks: 'Your petitioners ask, can there be a grosser libel on the great faiths prevailing in India or a greater insult to the Indian nation?'"

Ample medical evidence proves the absurdity of the sanitary plea. The true cause of the hostility to the Indians is to be found in the influence which, with their abstemious diet and simple life, they are able to exercise upon prices. A more unworthy or more disgraceful attack upon a section of her Majesty's subjects it is hardly possible to conceive.

The importance of the question in the South African Republic alone may be gauged from the fact that it contains some 200 firms of British Indian subjects, with an aggregate capital of about £100,000; some 2,000 petty traders and boxwallahs of the same race; and about 1,500 others who are employed as shop-assistants, servants, laborers, and so forth. The influential writer to whom I have just referred sums up the whole question in these terms:

"Are Her Majesty's Indian subjects to be treated as a degraded and an outcast race by a friendly Government, or are they to have the same rights and *status* as other British subjects enjoy? Are leading Muhammadan merchants, who might sit in the Legislative Council at Bombay, to be liable to indignities and outrage in the South African Republic? We are continually telling our Indian subjects that the economic future of their country depends on their ability to spread themselves out and to develop their foreign trade. What answer can our Indian Government give them if it fails to secure to them the same protection abroad which is secured to the subjects of every other dependency of the Crown? The awakening of Asia, to which recent events in Japan have given so powerful an impulse, has already reacted upon India. It will probably result in a large, although gradual, expansion of Indian foreign trade, conducted by Indian capital and by merchants of British-Indian nationality. But it is a mockery to urge our Indian fellow-subjects to embark on external commerce, if the moment they leave India they lose their rights as British subjects, and can be treated by foreign Governments as a degraded and an outcast race."

The matter has already been brought to the notice of Lord Ripon, whose career affords the best possible guarantee that he will deal with it according to the dictates of justice and humanity. If the matter is not settled before Lord Ripon leaves the Colonial Office, the British Committee of the Indian National Congress, who are rightly exerting themselves on behalf of the memorialists, may find themselves called upon to enter into communication with the new Secretary for the Colonies, Mr. Joseph Chamberlain.

A Bankipur correspondent writes:—Scarcely a month passes in which we do not hear of a soldier shooting a native, or killing a native in some less scientific way, and it is found in these cases that the aggressor gets off almost always scot-free. If the cause of death or injury is a gunshot, the shot is always accidental; and if it be a kick, the sufferer

is always proved on medical examination to have had a bad spleen. The very uniformity of plea and verdict in these cases is rather curious, and of a kind to give rise to natural suspicion as to the genuineness of the one and the reasonableness of the other. The impression is fast becoming deep and widespread that these cases represent signal failures of justice, and the conviction that the claims of justice and fairness, in cases where a European is guilty and a native seeks redress for injuries, are set aside, is settling deep in the minds of the people. The conviction is not unnatural if one considers the circumstances that are generally connected with these cases. In almost all these conflicts between natives and Europeans, the natives belong to the lower classes, and often they are peasants living in the villages—people who are least likely to offer gratuitous provocation to Europeans, and who are the most helpless in the country owing to their ignorance and want of means. I will cite you a case which recently occurred near Lucknow, in the North-Western Provinces. Two soldiers were out on a shooting expedition and, passing by a village, shot down some pigeons from a pigeon roost. One of them tried to climb a wall to reach the roof of a house on which a pigeon had fallen. The story told by the prosecution was that the owner of the house raised an outcry, suspecting that the soldier intended to violate the privacy of the house. This brought to the scene an angry crowd, and an altercation took place between the soldiers and the villagers, in the course of which one of the soldiers struck a villager with a stick and the other shot one of the villagers through the arm, which had afterwards to be amputated. When matters had reached this stage, the soldiers sought safety by flight, and kept back the pursuing villagers by more shots, and more villagers were injured. A village policeman, however, succeeded in snatching from one of the soldiers his helmet, by which he was afterwards identified. The plea put forward by the defence was that in the course of the altercation a scuffle took place, and the gun went off accidentally. The only material witness on the side of defence was one of the two soldiers mentioned above. The jury consisted entirely of Europeans, and pronounced a unanimous verdict of "not guilty," in which the presiding judge, who also was a European, fully concurred.

I have (my correspondent continues) watched some of the cases, and my opinion is that the failure of justice is due, (i) to the constitution of the trying tribunal; (ii) to the constitution of the jury; and (iii) to the unhappy circumstance that the public prosecutor is a European, and therefore not conversant with the feelings and ways of his client. I do not, in the slightest degree, mean to impugn the integrity of the court or throw any slur upon the conscience of the jury. I believe there are natural disqualifications both in the judge and the jury which are responsible for the miscarriage of justice. There is a wide gulf between the High Court judge and the peasant villager which cannot be bridged over by any degree of enthusiasm for justice or judicial intelligence that can be brought to bear upon the evidence. This natural disqualification is not so fraught with political dangers when the judge has to decide a case between native and native. But in trying a case in which the interests of the ruling and the ruled classes are in conflict, the danger is a serious one, and unscrupulous minds are not unlikely to fall into the temptation of attributing unfair motives to the judge. The jury, again, work under a besetting difficulty, namely, race prejudice, whether they are conscious or unconscious of any such influence. I should be most reluctant to believe that the jurors are ever led by conscious prejudice, but I believe that unconscious prejudice is more dangerous. I believe that in cases like the above the court ought to be a mixed court, *i.e.*, one of the judges ought to be a native and the other European; and that the jury should be half European and half native. This is the only practical means by which a great scandal in our administration of justice can be removed and a serious political danger obviated.

It may or may not be generally known that the East India Association, probably because of that financial pressure which troubles so many public institutions, has suspended the publication of its *Journal*—intermittent though that used to be. By way of partially meeting the difficulty, I understand that such of the Association's "proceedings" as its Chairman and Council deem it desirable to publish will now appear in the *Asiatic Quarterly Review*. Two reports of recent proceedings of the Association will, accordingly, be printed in the July number of that valuable review. One of these will be found to possess peculiar importance, as bearing on some of the origins and present influences concerned in that fatal breaking of bounds by the Indian Government under the Salisbury-Lytton *avatar* in 1875-6. The paper to which I allude was read by Mr. T. H. Thornton, C.S.I., D.C.L., at a meeting of the East India Association early in May. It consists mainly of a review of the career and characteristics of the late Colonel Sir Robert Sandeman, whose biography Mr. Thornton has just published through Mr. John Murray. Both the paper itself and the volume will be found attractive not less because of Mr. Thornton's literary skill, than from the, in many respects, attractive qualities of the hero of this political romance. But I am bound

to put my readers on their guard against the beguiling sophistication which unconsciously pervaded Mr. Thornton's paper as read before the influential meeting at the Westminster Town Hall.

The argument comes to this: Personal ability in dealing with the tribes and small States beyond the Indian border is everything; Sandeman displayed that ability in remarkable degree in certain circumstances, when he was eminently successful in promoting the then rising movement whereby the Indian Government, abetted by the authorities here, has spread its military strength, extended its political aggressions, and expended many millions of the Indian people's resources in the barren regions beyond the frontier; therefore, this movement—characterised by Mr. Thornton himself as a "revolutionary policy"—is worthy of all acceptation, and as the authorities (Mr. Fowler excluded) are committed to it, we must necessarily call it grand, and thus Philistia should cast its shoe over High Asia. As to the logic of this argument, readers may not think much of it. My purpose is to put them on their guard against being beguiled by the literary skill and personal glamour in which it is enveloped.

As to the other valuable excerpt of the Association's proceedings which is likely to appear in the same *Review*, it consists mainly, I understand, of Sir Richard Temple's valedictory address in retiring from the Presidency of the Association. From what I can gather of the drift of the allocution, it will be found (*a*) to exhibit *in excelsis* the superficial optimism regarding Indian affairs so affectionately cherished by that talented partisan; and (*b*) a choice diatribe against the Indian National Congress and everybody connected therewith.

Mr. H. Morgan Browne, Barrister-at-Law, who has so ably filled the post of Secretary to the British Committee of the Indian National Congress, is about to relinquish his office, as he contemplates taking up professional work at the close of this year. Much as the Committee regret his loss, they still hope that he will be able in his new position to aid in many ways the cause of the people of India, and he has promised, before settling down to practice in India, to revisit as many as possible of the Standing Committees, adjust as far as may be the accounts relating to this journal, and put all these Committees in possession of the British Committee's views as to the present position of affairs in London. Madras is the Presidency in which Mr. Morgan Browne expects to settle, and wherever he does settle he has kindly consented to act as a general agent to the British Committee, for all India, in matters relating to this journal. In the case of non-receipt of copies and the like, all the Committees can refer to him, and he, under instructions from the British Committee, with whom he will be in regular weekly communication, will refer to them about non-receipt of subscriptions and other matters relating to the circulation of this paper. The duties of Secretary to the British Committee will, from October 1st, be jointly discharged by Mr. Gordon Hewart and Mr. W. Douglas Hall. FIDUS.

SIR J. WESTLAND'S BUDGET.

WE beg to direct the attention of our readers to the important Note on Sir J. Westland's Budget which is issued in the form of a special supplement to the present number of INDIA. The Note has been prepared by the British Committee of the Indian National Congress, and forwarded to Mr. Fowler by the Indian Parliamentary Committee, together with a covering letter which is reprinted on another page. It is unnecessary to discuss here the conclusions of the Note or the evidence upon which they are based. We shall return to them when the Indian Budget comes up for discussion in the House of Commons—a discussion which, it is earnestly to be hoped, will not be postponed or curtailed by the recent change of Administration. The Note is a sequel to a similar document which was prepared on the Budget of last year, and issued with INDIA for last August. The main contentions throughout are that the Government of India is in error in maintaining that exchange is the sole, or even the principal, cause of Indian financial difficulties, and that the true cause is to be found in the excessive growth of military and civil expenditure. Sir James Westland, unlike Mr. Fowler, referred to the Committee's Note of last year in the recent Budget debate. But his reference to it can hardly be regarded as satisfactory in matter or in manner. In stating that Mr. Fowler had treated the Note with contempt, Sir James Westland was making an unfounded charge against the urbanity of the Secretary of State. In dwelling upon a slight mistake for which he was himself largely responsible, and which did not affect the validity of the argument, Sir James Westland pursued the familiar and inexpensive device of ignoring the real question. The present Note, like its predecessor, goes back to the average of 1882-3 to 1884-5. These years were, as Sir W. Wedderburn shows, a good starting point because they were years of financial equilibrium when the old standard of military expenditure still prevailed. Even if, as Sir James Westland desires, the accounts of 1888-9 be taken as the starting point, the argument of the

British Committee still holds good. The increase of expenditure during that period amounts to more than Rx. 7,000,000, whereas the increase due to exchange amounts to less than Rx. 3,000,000. As for Sir James Westland's amazing demonstration—by the conversion of Indian income and expenditure into pounds sterling instead of rupees—that the burden of the Indian taxpayer has been lightened during the past twelve years, the wonder is that any intelligent audience could have received it with patience. If, as is expected, the change of Government replaces Mr. Fowler at the India Office by an exponent of the "forward" school, whether Lord Lansdowne or Mr. G. N. Curzon, he will have no excuse, with this Note before his eyes, for continuing the costly policy of trans-frontier aggression.

RESULTS IN WAZIRISTAN.

THE Waziristan Field Force returned to India in the middle of March, bringing to an end the war which had begun in October last, and Sir W. Lockhart's despatch, published in the *Gazette of India* of May 11th, reports the operations which were carried on by that force under his command. Our hostilities with the Waziris, however, are of long standing, having commenced fourteen years ago under the following circumstances. The interruptions from floods and landslips to which the Sind-Pishin railway is liable suggested the project of constructing an alternative line to Pishin from Dehra-Ismail-Khan through the Gumâl pass and the Zhôb valley. As the execution of this scheme required the subjugation of the adjacent country, a Waziri Field Force of some 10,000 troops under General Kennedy invaded the tribal territory in 1881. But it failed to subjugate the inhabitants, and the Sherani expedition in 1882, the attempt to survey the Gumâl pass in 1888, and Sir Robert Sandeman's advance from Baluchistan in 1889 were all equally unsuccessful in their attempts to reduce the tribes to submission. In 1890 Sir R. Sandeman, accompanied by the Zhôb Field Force under Major-General Sir George White, succeeded, through negotiations stipulating for the payment of subsidies to several local chiefs, in establishing a post at Apozai, which has been named Fort Sandeman. The tribesmen of the surrounding country, however, repudiated the arrangement, and protested against the presence of our troops in their territory by persistent night-firing into the British camp, by cutting off our soldiers when they strayed from their lines, by attacking our detached parties and by plundering our convoys. We complained of these annoyances to the Amír of Kabul, and endeavoured to induce him, by promises, threats and other diplomatic means, to restrain the hostility of the Waziris. But we succeeded only in obtaining an undertaking from him, in November, 1893, that he would afford no aid and no encouragement to the tribesmen in their resistance to the extension of British rule over their territory as far as Domandi—a spot which we assumed to be on the limit of his own kingdom. The Amír assented at the same time to the south-eastern boundary of his territory being marked out by British and Afghan Commissioners.

The tribesmen, however, regardless of our complaints continued with increasing activity their attacks on our posts, convoys and communications, and as the troops we had on the spot proved unable to prevent these attacks we determined in September 1894 to send an expedition for coercing the tribes into complete submission. A British force under Brigadier-General Turner entered Waziristan for the purpose towards the end of October. On November 3rd his camp was stormed at 5.36 in the morning by three bodies of tribesmen who hamstrung some hundreds of our transport mules, and retired at 6.15, carrying away horses, arms and treasure which they had captured during that short attack. The British loss on the occasion was heavy, our casualties having amounted to 45 killed and 75 wounded, and active operations were stopped, pending the arrival of re-inforcements. The Waziristan Field Force, mentioned above, was then organised, and it commenced its operations on December 17th. These operations consisted in traversing the Waziri country from end to end, in destroying many tribal villages and towers, and in capturing grain, fodder, herds and flocks. The country was covered with snow, and the villagers, taken by surprise, could offer no resistance to the soldiers employed in carrying on these depredations. A number of tribesmen, however, fired stray shots at our pickets and rear-guard, and at one of our foraging parties. Our casualties were trivial, amounting during the three months to only 4 killed and 20 wounded. "But," as Sir W. Lockhart states in his despatch, "the losses entailed by severe work "and exposure were considerable, 171 deaths having "occurred from pneumonia alone."

As to the results of this campaign, they have in no way improved our situation. A heavy burden has been cast on the Indian Exchequer, seriously aggravating its difficulties, while our troops may not unreasonably resent being subjected to excessive work and cruel exposure in an enterprise predestined to failure and offering scarcely any chance of achieving military glory and distinction. At the same time the prospects and the career of many of our soldiers has been marred by pulmonary disease and invalidation. A semi-official journal, the *Pioneer*, remarked on May 15th that "although the loss of "life on our side was deplorably heavy solely by "reason of the inclement weather, the tribesmen "have been taught a lesson which will have a "lasting effect." Doubtless hatred for the British and thirst for revenge at our unprovoked aggression will long animate our tribal neighbours; but as regards other effects of the alleged "lesson," recent telegrams show that the tribesmen, far from being cowed by the injury we inflicted on their property and their families, have continued to threaten our posts, and the conviction seems at last to have dawned on the Government of India that their project of a railway through the Gumâl pass, for the execution of which they have expended so much blood and treasure, must now be definitively abandoned.

MR. FOWLER AT THE INDIA OFFICE.

[FROM A PARLIAMENTARY CORRESPONDENT.]

IT cannot be said that Mr. Fowler, who will shortly cease to be Secretary of State for India, has been a success at the India Office. The question which was being asked before the present political crisis arose was "How long shall we have to wait for Mr. Fowler to show in the management of Indian affairs, some of the qualities with which he was credited in English politics?" So vast and intricate is the business of governing India, and so powerful and obstinate is the highly organised hierarchy of permanent officials who control it, that one is always prepared to allow a new Secretary of State a long probationary period during which he may master the situation before beginning to assert himself. The very qualities which gave us high hopes of Mr. Fowler undoubtedly increased the difficulties in his way, and his critics were patient. They well knew that Mr. Fowler, in the course of a long public life, had earned a high reputation as an earnest Liberal, as a strong man of affairs, as the political embodiment of English nonconformity. The qualities which differentiated him from almost all other Ministers and ex-Ministers, and without exception from all previous Secretaries of State for India, were that he was a man of the people; that he was not even remotely connected with that section of the nation which has the instincts and the faults of a governing class; and that he was born and trained among those who make righteousness and conscience their supreme guide even in the competition of trade, the struggles of the law courts, and the manœuvres of political strife. Mr. Fowler's training had brought him into equal comradeship with the poor and oppressed and with those who held religious, social, and political opinions despised by the once dominant class. From such material the noblest and bravest instincts of the English race have sprung, and it has provided the backbone of British democracy at home and the salt of righteousness in British policy abroad. It was in the opinion of many a hazardous experiment to take a provincial lawyer, a man trained in the council chamber of a second-rate municipality and the class-room of a Methodist chapel and make him the ruler of the Indian Empire. But it was an experiment which, in the man selected, promised to supply the corrective to nearly all the evils which soil the fame of the Indian Government. We were prepared to welcome the experiment with hope and almost confident expectation. We watched it with growing apprehension. We waited patiently till at last we were crying with the despairing psalmist, "How long, O Lord, how long?"

Mr. Fowler had had, before the defeat of the Government led to its resignation, a fairly long experience of the India Office—long enough to be seated firmly in the saddle. His period of office was more than usually full and varied. Half a dozen great issues had come to the front, each providing a strong man with an opportunity of showing his power to initiate a new policy or to stand firmly for a great and righteous principle. Is there any instance, besides the tardy decision in regard to Chitral, in which we can say that Mr. Fowler has done well? On all the minor questions of administrative reform, on specific cases of maladministration, he has obediently re-echoed the stereotyped reply of the Indian official. On the question of Simultaneous Examinations he has allowed the House of Commons to be ignored and overridden. In regard to the Enquiry into Indian Expenditure he has apparently been a willing tool in the hands of those who are interested in preventing the only effective enquiry. On the Opium question he trampled with scorn and contumely upon men from whom he might fairly differ in opinion but whose honest aims and noble principles he, more than any man in the whole hierarchy of Indian officialism, ought to have understood and respected.

But it is useless to multiply instances, and we cannot discuss them in detail now. On any instance taken singly Mr. Fowler might perhaps claim a suspense of judgment. It is the accumulated evidence of one great tendency which constitutes the irrefutable testimony of weakness. It is not perhaps so much in great state decisions as in daily conduct and manner that the individual mind is disclosed. It was Mr. Fowler's personal method which first aroused and gradually increased the apprehension of those who are interested in the welfare of India. The strength of noncomformity in public affairs is its moral fervour. The danger which moral fervour incurs in public life is that it may become a habit rather than a passion, a ready and powerful form of political rhetoric rather than a spiritual instinct controlling conduct. At present there is but little room for the "nonconformist conscience" in the Government of India. An official who would be popular with his colleagues must purge himself of that. But there is plenty of scope for a fine display of a rhetorical moral fervour in defence of its blunders and its crimes. Mr. Fowler seemed to place all the great powers of his eloquence and the panoply of his emotional rhetoric at the service of the Simla authorities. If we were inclined to dissect Mr. Fowler's character and conscience it would be an interesting enquiry whether this was due to some inherent flaw in his Liberalism and his human sympathies or whether he was seduced by the pride of power. Observers in the House of Commons hold that the most remarkable transformation recently witnessed upon the political stage was the change which was taking place in the statesman who had been the champion of the humble and oppressed in England, and who was becoming the eloquent apologist for official despotism and irresponsibility in India. Mr. Fowler usually spoke amid the amazement of his former comrades and to the music of Tory cheers led by Sir R. Temple and the extreme Anglo-Indians. He poured the vials of eloquent moral indignation upon the life-long and disinterested advocates of moral reform. His complacent approval of official actions made his speeches on the Budget and general topics one long peroration of eloquent optimism to the tune set by the reports of officials upon their own work. Where was this to end? We supposed, we expected, we hoped that it was a passing phase. We waited for it to pass away. It

seemed to be hardening into a settled habit—a gospel of tyranny preached with the fervour of a prophet by a democratic evangelist! Mr. Fowler's career at the India Office has been terminated with dramatic suddenness, and everybody must rejoice that, before he actually retired from office, he had the courage to formulate a decision hostile to the policy of annexation in Chitral. This decision will be regarded by many as the one redeeming feature in Mr. Fowler's record at the India Office.

THE BHOUSLA FUND.

[From a Correspondent.]

On the 5th of March last certain questions were asked in the House of Commons, and replies given by the Secretary of State for India, regarding the case of Rája Raghoji Rao Bhousla, of Nagpur, India, the grandson of the late Rája of Nagpur. These questions and replies had reference to two matters: the palace site of the Bhouslas at Nagpur and what was known as the Bhousla Fund. In November, 1862, some years after the annexation of Nagpur by the British Government, the Government of India wrote to the Local Government at Nagpur: "It is optional with the members of the Bhousla family to occupy the palace on the condition of keeping it in repair;" and in the same letter: "The British Government has no intention of disturbing their occupancy so long as the barley-corn rent and the future repairs are attended to by them." In January, 1864, or a little more than a year after the above letter was written, the palace was nearly destroyed by an accidental fire. Instead of allowing the Rája some time to repair and reconstruct the building in accordance with the above letter, Government took possession, and quickly utilised the "Khasgi" office, called the "Gol" bungalow, as an honorary magistrate's court-house, the stables were converted into a market, and the "Nagarkhana" into police lines. Since that time, owing to the minority of the present Rája, his estate has been managed by the Court of Wards. Certain proposals were made by the Court of Wards to repair and rebuild the palace at the Rája's expense, but they fell through. The present Rája came of age in 1893. Almost simultaneously with that event the Chief Commissioner laid the foundation stone of a Town Hall, to be built on the ancient palace site of the Bhousla family. The Rája was naturally absent from this ceremony, and also declined to be a member of the Town Hall Construction Committee. Before he had attained his majority, however, the Court of Wards obtained the minor's formal consent to a subscription of Rs. 10,000 towards the construction of the Town Hall on the site of his ancestral palace. The Rája and his family have been living ever since the fire in 1862 in a house erected on the site of one of the out-houses of the ancient palace. This the Secretary of State in his replies in the House of Commons calls "a new palace."

At the time of the annexation of Nagpur, the private property of the Rája and his family, consisting chiefly of ornaments, was seized by Government, and sold by auction for less than half its value. The proceeds, amounting to nearly 29 lakhs of rupees, were converted into what was called the Bhousla Fund. In 1871, in a letter declining to forward a petition addressed by Rája Janoji to the Viceroy, Colonel Keatinge, then the Chief Commissioner of the Central Provinces, makes the following remarks:

> "It is undoubtedly the case that there existed at one time a fund known as the Bhousla Fund. It was created in 1854, and consisted of the proceeds of the sale of jewels, furniture, and other property belonging to the deceased Ruler of Nagpur."

And in the same letter:

> "The gross amount realised by the sale of the property amounted to Rs. 28,77,212; but many charges had to be defrayed from this amount, and down to the close of 1860-61, Rs. 10,77,531 had already been devoted to meeting these demands. The Fund was finally credited to Government Revenues, and ceased to exist as a separate fund."

This Fund, it is needless to say, was originally intended for the benefit of the family. But more than one-third of the capital was spent by Government in a few years in payment, it was said, of political pensions and allowances to the survivors of the late Nagpur Court. These pensions and allowances were fixed by Government and paid without reference to the Rája. It is difficult to understand why the Bhousla Fund should have been burdened with these payments. The Bhousla family after the annexation had no longer any political existence, and yet the British Government, which had just annexed the Nagpur State, instead of itself paying the political pensions, paid them out of the proceeds of the private property of the Bhousla family. Eventually, as stated in the above letter, Government appropriated the whole of the balance of the Fund, and credited it to its own revenues. These facts were calmly stated by the Secretary of State for India in his replies in the House of Commons without any attempt to explain away their obvious injustice.

But neither of these two matters is the Rája's principal grievance. His chief grievance is that he has never been granted a hearing, nor has any impartial enquiry been made regarding these matters. If any representations were made on his behalf during his minority, they were made by the Court of Wards, which consists of a Govermnent officer, who is practically a defendant in the case. If the Rája himself presented a petition, the Local Government declined to forward it to the Government of India or to grant him a hearing. Even recently, when he in turn petitioned the Local Government, the Government of India, and the Secretary of State, each of these authorities declined in writing to grant him a hearing. Their orders were based solely upon the reports made on the petitions by Government officers who, as already stated, were practically defendants in the case, and the Rája was not granted an opportunity of reply. In short, at no time either before the Local Government, the Government of India, or the Secretary of State, has the Rája been allowed a hearing or an impartial enquiry. All that he desires is that he may be heard in his own case, that a fair, impartial enquiry may be ordered, and an account or explanation of the expenditure of the Bhousla Fund may be called for.

OUR LONDON LETTER.

Politically, the United Kingdom was suddenly thrown into confusion and bewilderment by the defeat of Lord Rosebery's Government on Friday, June 21st.

The immediate occasion of the defeat was an amendment moved by Mr. Brodrick on the vote for the War Office, in Committee of Supply on the Army Estimates. Alleging inadequacy in the store of small arms ammunition, he maintained that the policy pursued by the Government of taking only just sufficient money to meet the wants of the year constituted a grave national danger. On a sudden outbreak of hostilities it would, he argued, be discovered that warlike stores could not be procured in a hurry. By way of protest against the existing system he moved to reduce the salary of the Secretary of State for War by the sum of £100.

In spite of the emphatic declarations of Mr. Campbell-Bannerman and Mr. Woodall, on the authority of the responsible military advisers of the War Office, the motion for the reduction of the Vote was carried by 132 votes to 125.

In consequence of this vote Mr. Campbell-Bannerman resigned the post of Secretary for War, and at a prolonged meeting held on Saturday, June 22, Lord Rosebery's Cabinet determined upon resignation. Lord Salisbury was summoned by the Queen and, apparently after some hesitation, accepted office.

Lord Salisbury has become Prime Minister for the third time—almost on the anniversary of the day ten years ago (June 24, 1885), when he assumed that office for the first time. The only other Ministers of the century who have held the highest office in the State as often are Mr. Gladstone (four times Prime Minister) and Lord Derby (three times).

At the time of writing the new Ministry is not yet complete. But the following appointments have been officially announced: Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary, the Marquess of Salisbury; President of the Council, the Duke of Devonshire; First Lord of the Treasury, Mr. A. J. Balfour; Secretary for the Colonies, Mr. Chamberlain; Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir Michael Hicks-Beach; First Lord of the Admiralty, Mr. Goschen.

The Unionist card is understood to be a dissolution at the earliest possible moment, and the campaign of the General Election has already begun on the Unionist side. The sudden development of events is regarded as highly fortunate for Mr. Chamberlain, who is said to have organised the defeat of the Government at this particular moment somewhat to the annoyance of Lord Salisbury and Mr. Balfour.

It is still difficult to determine the date of the dissolution. It may be much more in the control of the Liberal party than the Unionists are disposed to admit. There is on the Liberal benches a strong feeling that not only should the spokesmen of the new Ministry in the Commons be heckled severely as to their intentions with respect to the powder supply which brought about the crisis, but that they should be compelled to disclose their policy on several other important questions before the appeal to the country is permitted. Should Mr. Balfour, when he returns to the House show any signs of treating requests for reasonable information as to policy with contempt, it is probable that there will be protests from the Radical benches when the votes are under consideration.

Precedents for going to the country without passing the Appropriation Bill, and obtaining from the new Parliament an Act of Indemnity, are being paraded in the *Times*, but it is scarcely conceivable that even Lord Salisbury will enter upon a course so full of danger. In some quarters the dissolution is fixed for a few days hence, but the *Times* is perhaps nearest the mark when it suggests that the dissolution will take place at the end of the second or the beginning of the third week in July.

The *Westminster Gazette* for June 26th contained the following editorial note:—We read with astonishment the following statement in the *St. James's Gazette* of yesterday:—

> The Unionists are very much better prepared in the matter of candidates throughout the Midland counties than are the supporters of the Government in the seventy-two constituencies comprising the area of the Midland Union of Conservative Associations. A Unionist candidate is ready to contest every seat held by a supporter of the Government, with the exception of East Wolverhampton, where Mr. Fowler will not be opposed, on condition that Sir Alfred Hickman is allowed to retain his seat in the Western Division.

There was nothing which weakened the Liberals more in the Midlands at the last election than the silence of Mr. Fowler and the rumour that some sort of deal had been made between parties at Wolverhampton. But it is, of course, incredible that Mr. Fowler, now a leader of the Liberal party, should enter into any arrangement for averting opposition to himself on condition that Sir Alfred Hickman should not be opposed. Mr. Fowler is perfectly safe in East Wolverhampton, and it would be a pity if Sir Alfred Hickman's seat were not most stubbornly fought. Other Unionist papers take liberties with Mr. Fowler this morning, and allege that he is going to the House of Lords. This, also, we trust is a *canard*, for Mr. Fowler is one of the best platform men we have, and we shall all expect him to take a a leading part in the Midlands during the next few weeks.

Mr. Dadabhai Naoroji, M.P., was among the guests at the Earl of Rosebery's dinner party on June 13th. The other guests were Sir John Austin, Mr. J. W. Benn, Mr. Conybeare, Mr. Cozens-Hardy, Sir Francis Evans, Mr. Fenwick, Mr. J. C. Frye, Mr. Munro-Ferguson, Mr. Hopwood, Mr. Hutton, Mr. Kearley, Mr. Roby, Sir Thomas Roe, Mr. Roundell, Canon MacColl and Mr. J. E. Taylor.

Mr. P. E. Percival, the nephew of Sir W. Wedderburn, M.P., who lately obtained a high place in the competition for the Indian Civil Service, proposed the other day in the prinicipal Debating Society at Balliol College, Oxford, a motion to the effect that "the Indian National Congress is a movement deserving of hearty support." Mr. Percival was supported by a Hindu and a Muhammadan, while the chief speaker on the other side was an

Indian civilian on furlough. When the division was taken the votes were equal, but, by the casting vote of the president, the motion was carried.

The Dowager Marchioness of Lansdowne is lying dangerously ill at Meiklour House, her seat in Perthshire. Lady Lansdowne, who is in her seventy-sixth year, is the mother of the present Marquess of Lansdowne. Lady Lansdowne, who is Baroness Nairne in her own right, and who owns a large estate in Perthshire, is the eldest daughter of the Comte de Flahault by his marriage with the Baroness Keith and Nairne.

At Oxford on June 4th, the hon. degree of M.A. was conferred by a Decree of Convocation upon Sir Charles Umpherston Aitchison, late Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab and member of the Council of the Governor-General of India. Sir C. Aitchison was presented for the degree by the Public Orator.

Mr. and Mrs. Rudyard Kipling are to sail for India in the autumn. It is stated that Mr. Kipling is collecting materials for a series of articles to be published in the *Cosmopolitan Magazine*, and that he is meditating a book upon life in the backwoods of America.

BRITISH RULE IN INDIA.

INTERVIEW WITH MR. W. C. BONNERJEE.

There is no need (writes a representative of India who has "interviewed" Mr. W. C. Bonnerjee) to explain to my Indian readers who and what Mr. Bonnerjee is. But some of the English readers of India may be ignorant that, throughout the length and breadth of India, there is no man who is more highly respected or more implicitly trusted and loved by the Indian people. One of the leaders of the Calcutta Bar, President not once but twice, of the Indian National Congress, and a politician and speaker of high order, Mr. W. C. Bonnerjee is able, as few others are, to indicate the authentic drift of Indian public opinion upon matters of current importance. Needless to add, Mr. Bonnerjee is a highly-cultivated gentleman who knows English affairs and speaks the English language as well as an educated Englishman. Our conversation took place while the Government's decision in regard to the future of Chitral still hung in the balance though it was commonly believed that the decision, when it was announced, would prove to be another victory for the "forward" school. This was naturally the first topic which I broached.

"The Expedition to Chitral," Mr. Bonnerjee replied at once, "has been a colossal blunder from the outset. We have no business to be there at all. The Government of India had no business to send Dr. Robertson there. But it is impossible to keep military officers, especially the younger ones, in check. Our frontier has been extended not because of, but in spite of, good resolutions on the part of the Government both in India and in this country. Ambitious military officers pick quarrels with the tribesmen beyond the British-Indian frontier; then British dignity says that chastisement must follow; and the result is annexation of territory as a matter of course. This series of incidents has been repeated for years past, and I fear that we shall resist in vain until we have reached the Hindu Kush."

"Is not that too despairing a view, when there are military experts like General Sir Neville Chamberlain, General Lord Chelmsford, General Sir John Adye, and General Sir Charles Gough on our side; when, too, we fined financial authorities like Sir Auckland Colvin and Sir David Barbour frankly ascribing the financial embarrassments of the Government of India to the 'perilous growth' of military expenditure?"

"These authorities may be on our side, but so also was Lord Lawrence. Yet his policy was overthrown. What else can we expect? We have had weak rulers in India who have been controlled either by ambitious statesmen in London or by restless soldiers in India. The 'forward' policy costs an enormous amount of money, and does no good whatever? I agree. But does the Viceroy understand that? Why, from the very moment of Lord Elgin's arrival in India, his judgment has been taken captive by the dominant military clique. Colonel Durand is his Military Secretary, and is strongly supported by his brother, Sir Mortimer Durand. Both of them inherit the prestige of their father's name. Lord Mayo, with all his faults, knew his own mind, but so much cannot be said for some of his successors."

"But what of the force of public opinion in this country, and the opposition offered by such journals as the *Spectator*, the *Daily Chronicle*, and the *Manchester Guardian* to the demands of the 'forward' school?"

"Where is the force? Frankly, I do not see its effects either here or in India. The journals you mention have taken a wise line. They perceive the danger which the 'forward' frontier policy would involve in case Russia were to invade India—an invasion, by the way, which I do not think will ever take place. They perceive also that the moment the Chitralis, the Swatis, and the other tribesmen realise that the 'forward' policy is inspired by fear of Russia, they will assume that we are weak and give us trouble. But I have no real hope that the 'forward' policy will be permanently checked. See what is happening in Uganda. A few irresponsible people create the situation; they are in great danger; you must go to their rescue, and the annexation of territory follows. Lord Rosebery has boasted that under Queen Victoria there has been a greater accession of territory to the British Empire than in any previous reign. We Indians believe in the honesty of British statesmen, but all of us view with the greatest apprehension the military policy which is being pursued. Public works are neglected, and education is starved—and for what? India will never reap any benefit from the 'forward' policy, and the advocates of that policy forget that contentment in India would be the best of all barriers against the advance of Russia. The truth is, I suppose, that few Governments have the courage to incur the odium of a policy of 'scuttle'. Our statesmen lack Mr. Gladstone's moral courage. They can make speeches, but somehow they do not give effect

to their opinions. Expressions of opinion in the House of Commons have very little effect upon the military officers who are out on the frontier."

"Are you satisfied with Mr. Fowler?"

"By no means. India is greatly disappointed in him, and his meaningless rhetoric about the members of the House of Commons being 'members for India.' He and officials like him talk of the 'dumb millions' of India, and then brush aside Indians who are not dumb. They forget that educated Indians are drawn from the ranks of the people themselves. We have educated men in the big towns in India who come from the villages. Each of them represents his friends, his relatives, and his own village. Hence the strength of the Indian National Congress. I see that it has been stated that the Congress is becoming less representative. Nothing could be further from the truth. It is natural that, when the Congress meets in Madras, many Madrasis should attend, and, when it meets in Calcutta, many Bengalis. One has to remember the long distances which representatives from other parts of India have to travel."

"You do not hold with the orthodox official theory that the financial embarrassments of India are due to loss by exchange?"

"Certainly not. Our embarrassments are due to extravagant policy, and, if it had not been for this policy, the loss by exchange would not have been serious. The exchange compensation allowance is based on a rotten principle. Ever since 1872 the exchange value of the rupee has been falling, and men who have taken service under the Government of India have been well aware of the fact. They have gone out to India with that knowledge. On what principle, then, can it be said that they are entitled to compensation? Salaries in India are much higher than salaries paid to officers holding similar positions in the colonies. At one time, when the rupee was at 2s. 2d., the Government of India offered to pay official salaries in gold. The offer was declined. If the exchange-value of the rupee had gone up, what would have happened? Besides, the downward progress of the rupee touches Indians as well. The non-domiciled European officials are being compensated indiscriminately at the expense of fellow-sufferers. The principles of the arrangement are vicious, and its details are worse. Our revenue is not so elastic as the revenue of England. The principal source of our revenue is land, and the amount is fixed. It cannot be increased, and, in case of famine, it decreases. Could anything be more scandalous than the suspension of the Famine Insurance Fund?"

"One sometimes hears that India has grown lukewarm on the subject of Simultaneous Examinations."

"The statement is a libel. What is the use of holding public meetings now? The country has with one voice declared in favour of Simultaneous Examinations."

"What do you think of the reforms in the Legislative Councils?"

"It is noteworthy that, so far as members are elected, they are everywhere men of the reform party—supporters, that is to say, of the Indian National Congress. Indeed, there is not, I believe, an educated Indian in the service of the Government or out of it who is not, at heart, a Congress-wallah. But the Government of India discourages its servants from taking any part in the movement."

"Official critics suggest, of course, that the Congress is disloyal?"

"Yes, but they do not take the trouble to find out the facts as men like Sir Richard Garth, for example, have done. What the Congress party says in effect is: 'Given British rule for ever and ever, can it be so improved as to make the people contented with it and ready to give an active and intelligent support to it?' We want British rule and, founded on British rule, 'peace, retrenchment and reform.'"

"The Indians who have entered the Civil Service have distinguished themselves?"

"They have, without exception, proved themselves to be superior to the bulk of their English colleagues. Yet their position is extremely difficult. They are jealously watched—though with different kinds of jealousy—by their fellow-civilians and by the Indian people. They have to stand the test not only for themselves, but also for their country. When an Englishman in the Service fails we do not say that the English nation is good for nothing.

"One often sees in Indian newspapers complaints as to the administration of the criminal law."

"The administration of the criminal law in India is simply unspeakable. My experience does not extend beyond Bengal; but I do not hesitate to say that, however vehemently the authorities may disavow the practice in public, in private their theory is 'no conviction, no promotion.' Here is a single instance of the way in which justice is administered. A rich zemindar in the Patna district was accused of having gone with some 200 followers to the field of a poor man and cut his crops. At the time when the charge was made, the zemindar was at Benares. He returned eight days later, and voluntarily surrendered himself to the cantonment magistrate at Dinapur who had taken the complaint. He applied for bail, but it was refused. Thereupon application was made to the Sessions Judge at Patna. The judge consulted the magistrate, and again refused bail. Accordingly application was made to the High Court. Bail was again refused; and the zemindar, a high-caste man, remained in prison, greatly to the detriment of his health. The case was tried. He was acquitted, and it was found that, if the occurrence had ever taken place at all, the zemindar had had nothing to do with it. Yet he had been imprisoned for four weeks. Cases like this—and there are many of them—bring the whole criminal law into disrepute in India."

"As for the Royal Commission on Indian Expenditure," Mr. Bonnerjee continued, "I entertain no great hopes of substantial results from its investigations. Expenditure depends upon policy, and the Commission is prevented from enquiring into policy. In the case of the Opium Commission, the Government of India was determined to prove that opium was the greatest blessing conferred upon man by nature. I myself was opposed to the appointment of the Commission. My impression is that a vast majority of the Indian people, men and women, take a little opium in old age, and that the climate is such

that, often, they take it with beneficial results. But it struck me as singular that doctor after doctor came forward and spoke of beneficial effects being produced by opium, and yet not one of them ever prescribed it for his patients. The Commission ought to have examined the native physicians—*Kabirajes* and *Hakims*. These men are of the people, and know them best. The Commission went to India for the purpose of taking evidence, but the men who could have told it most were not called."

"You seem," I said, "to take a generally despondent view of the position and prospects of India."

"Yes, I am inclined to be despondent when I think how little effect public opinion in England has upon Indian policy. There is so much jealousy in Parliament between the 'ins' and the 'outs.' If the 'ins' do anything for India, the 'outs' attack it. Also, there is the new type of Anglo-Indian to reckon with, who captures the press at home and jeers at all native progress. For the rest, it is a case of 'out of sight, out of mind.' A fire in London, causing the death of a handful of people, would produce a greater sensation in England than a famine in India, causing the death of millions of people. It is this indifference which aids a bureaucratic policy, especially as retired Anglo-Indians and merchants and all their relatives are so well content with the *status quo*."

"But the Indian Parliamentary Committee is making its influence felt?"

"The work of the Indian Parliamentary Committee is most beneficial. It is likely to do a great deal of good. Nothing could be better for India than that there should be a vigilant party watching the interests of the country in the House of Commons. The hostile criticisms of bureaucrats like Lord Lansdowne show that the Committee is doing great good. If your policy is a wise policy, what have you to lose by having it thrashed out in the House of Commons? But it is important to get some portion, however small, of Indian expenditure charged upon the British Exchequer—not in order to secure financial aid, but in order to make the British public scrutinize the action of their agents, the Government of India. There is another reform which India needs—the generous extension of education, both primary and secondary. Let me add, in conclusion, that care must be taken to prevent higher education from being starved by primary education."

EMPIRE OF INDIA EXHIBITION. I.

(By our Special Correspondent.)

Even as India is the Koh-i-nur of the jewels of the Empire, so is the Exhibition which Mr. Imre Kiralfy has conceived, designed, and executed among all other exhibitions. "There has been nothing like it since the Crystal Palace was opened in 1851," said one who knows all about these great shows, and the public seem to agree with him, for on the Saturday in June previous to the visit of the representative of India 72,000 people were admitted to the grounds. The exhibition stands on a spot sacred to the memory of defunct exhibitions in the West of London. Phœnix-like, it has arisen out of their ashes, more beautiful and much larger than any of its predecessors. The acres of land which it covers number six-and-twenty; half of this extent is roofed in. It has cost £150,000 to build, a sum which does not include the price paid for leases of land extending to twenty-one years. There has been for many months an army of workmen engaged in constructing it, varying from 1,500 to 2,000. They have been brought from North, South, East and West. Britons, Belgians, Frenchmen, Germans, have worked at the great exhibition. It goes without saying that it is not yet finished. When was an exhibition ever finished, save when it was closed?

Mr. Imre Kiralfy has not evolved the exhibition from his head, as it were, in the way in which the immortal Beethoven produced a sonata. The great Hungarian organiser went to India, and under excellent direction travelled in our vast Empire. The result is undoubtedly fine, and increases Mr. Kiralfy's reputation for taste and enterprise. He is backed by a powerful ring of capitalists who have formed themselves into the London Exhibitions Company. Rájas and Máhárájas have helped, have found suitable Indian workers, lent valuable collections and done all in their power to forward Kiralfy's conception. The Máhárájas of Baroda, Kutch-Behar, Kolhapur and Travancore have especially given every kind of assistance.

One remarkable feature of the Exhibition is its situation, well-known of course to Londoners, but yet worth explaining to the readers of India who dwell in their own land. Earl's Court lies at a railway junction. The grounds are scattered, divided by the lines, so that three separate bridges have had to be constructed over the District, West London Extension, and Midland Railways. Now, London railways far surpass in their squalid ugliness anything that the mind of man ever before conceived. Together they form the nadir of civilisation, the Gehenna of London. It is to the honour of Mr. Imre Kiralfy, to the credit of his artistic taste, that he realised that no man could be happy in the Exhibition grounds if he still could be confronted by Gehenna, even with a band playing, and with a hundred thousand gas jets and electric bulbs disposed in fantastical devices. So they erected great poles, and painted gigantic canvases—but what matters it how it was done? The magician waved his wand, and on the one side lie snowy peaks, the peaks of Narkunda visible on a clear day at Simla, as you descend from Jaku by the path near Christ Church; on the other are the domes of mosques, the long minarets, the palms, the poepuls, the temples, all the features of an Eastern city. And the wicked outer world is utterly shut out for as many hours as visitors can spare. For this boon alone Mr. Kiralfy deserves a hymn of praise or something equivalent.

Passing through the Ducal Hall—which has nothing very ducal about it, unless pyramids of soaps and sauces, Bombay ducks and chutnee deserve this appellation—one comes to the Queen's Court, with its fine lake, fountain, bandstand, electric boats, shaped like craft on the Hughli, gliding round in silence. The two bridges crossing the lake remind

one a little of the bridge leading to the Golden Temple at Amritsar. The whole effect is fine, dazzling, white—perhaps the heat which the white buildings reflect on a hot day is more characteristic of India than the whiteness. Much the same may be said of the Imperial Court, with its imposing colonnade, oval in shape, charmingly decorated with parterres of palms and flowers. In it thousands of people can lounge and stroll, listening to the music of an excellent band.

The Queen's Palace deserves more than a passing word, for it contains the Fine Art and Loan Exhibits—interesting relics of the East India Company and a fairly good collection of pictures. Interesting as they are, the exhibits strike one as doing less than justice to the undoubted excellence of Indian Art. A good proportion of the articles exhibited, such as tablecloths, quilts, saris, men's coats, are more remarkable for the tremendous amount of minute hand-labour bestowed upon them than for genuine artistic effect. The writer has seen in Agra, Delhi, Bombay, in the shops of the merchants up creaking old stairs, more exquisite embroideries spread out on the floor for private inspection than are to be seen at the Exhibition, specimens of a taste so refined and delicate that one instantly acknowledged the reality of Indian Art. But it is more easy to cavil than to appreciate, and undoubtedly much remains here to be admired. In this case are the charters of the East India Company, the first one dated 1600, signed by Elizabeth. Its renewals by James I. and succeeding monarchs, not omitting our King of Kings, Cromwell, by William III., our next best modern king, dated 1698, are exhibited too. There are letters patent conferring rights and dignities on mighty personages, and a quaint old volume containing the names, with amounts against them, of those who held the stock of the East India Company—all serving to remind the student of history that England trades first, and governs as a result. Here is a ticket of admission to the trial of Warren Hastings. On the wall hangs his portrait. Unless the painter, Sir T. Lawrence, belied him, there was more than a touch of moral weakness visible on his face. Other cases contain relics of Tipu Sahib, such as his watch, hunting jacket, walking stick; a beautiful silver shield, in high relief, of Sir James Outram's; many fine specimens of jewellery and carving. Some models of temples and Indian palaces deserve mention.

"Where is the silver trumpet blown at Delhi, when the Queen was proclaimed Empress in 1878?" said I to a fine specimen of the Defenders of the Empire, dressed in khakee, a solar topee on his head.

"It wasn't in 1878, it was New Year's day, 1877," said the Defender. "I was there and heard it."

Then followed a few questions and much information on the soldier's part, who, after fourteen years of India and not a day's sickness, gave it as his opinion, the result of experience, that no man who regards his health should eat meat in the plains between April and October, that abstinence from liquor is a good thing, that the white soldier in India might easily do a little more work without injury to health, and that the men who go out nowadays are poor creatures compared with those of John Company, and the years immediately following its retirement from the political sphere. All this followed by enthusiastic praise of "Bobs, God bless him."

On the walls are some fine carpets made in Agra gaol, and some hangings which lose effect through being tacked flat on the wall, instead of being hung. There are also capital pictures by Mr. E. L. Weekes, formerly exhibited in the Paris Salon, and calling to mind many an Indian scene. The treatment of light, one of the greatest features of modern painting, deserves more than a passing word of praise, so vivid is the bright sunshine.

SCHOOLS FOR MARRIED INDIAN GIRLS.

Mrs. (Sowbhagyavati only means Mrs.) Nikambè's name and her appearance too are distinctly oriental. As I sat in a lofty London drawing-room talking to her, I wondered (writes a representative of INDIA) how any one so un-English-looking, with dark skin, coal-black hair and eyes, with a gracefully draped sari, altogether a typical oriental woman, could speak English almost without the faintest *nuance* of an accent. She soon explained, at least partially, how it was.

"I am a native of Bombay, but then for three generations my people have been Christian. When I was nine years old, my people placed me as a boarder in an English school at Bombay, where I was the only native girl. I remained till I was eighteen, and I think the complete severance between myself and my relatives explains why I became so English."

"Perhaps it does, but I have known people who have been twenty or thirty years in a foreign land, and yet retained a very strong flavour of their native tongue. Now will you tell me about your school for married Indian girls. Why did you begin it?"

"I was a teacher in the Students' Literary and Scientific Society's Schools at Bombay. There are four of them in different localities. I could not help noticing that when girls marry, and with us they often marry very young, at twelve, thirteen, fourteen, they leave school, and though their minds are quite unformed, their bodies too for that matter, they withdraw to a much greater degree of seclusion than they had before, the very sort of seclusion which needs a higher degree of education to make it endurable."

"Yet I have often seen married girls in Hindu schools. Why need they give up?"

"Our people do not yet quite see the necessity of educating women. It would be useless to reason on the subject; the ideas of my people are opposed to it, and they must be considered. Besides, the teachers in the schools are generally all men, and often not advanced enough. These teachers may have reached the seventh Marathi Standard or Fifth English, but that is not far enough. And then, the girls need special consideration, a curriculum that will suit their circumstances."

"Would it be right to say that the Hindu mother-in-law objects to education for the girls by men?"

"Quite correct, but then the men would also be

on her side, and all our habits and customs, so that she alone must not be blamed. For this reason in 1890 I opened a special school for married girls at Girgaun, in Bombay. I can take fifty, and as we now have that number, am wishful to enlarge it. I am thus able to ask for girls who are leaving the Society's and other schools, where education is elementary, and get them to continue their studies under me."

"I suppose that in a well-to-do family there is no need for a married girl to stay at home and work?"

"Not usually, though that depends upon the family. In a comfortable Hindu community there are only two chief daily meals, although, like you, we have minor meals between, chiefly milk, sweets, cake, peje (porridge) in the afternoon."

"How do they manage to pass the time?"

"They embroider. You may remember how much men wear small round embroidered caps in Bombay. Ladies embroider servants' caps, too, their own saris, and children's clothes. Gold embroidery is used for their own dress. Then they spend a long time on their toilet. They often wash their hair, aiming at having as much perfume and spice in it as possible. Then they string blossoms and wreathe them on their hair. They have a good deal of jewellery, too. A Hindu mother is always expected to spend almost all her time with her children. Even if there is a nurse, she only takes occasional duty."

"They say that is why Hindu children are so spoiled."

"They are spoiled in more ways than one. You see, the parents are often far too young and immature. The children are sickly, entrusted too much to the care of an inexperienced girl, inexperienced in every way. A girl with us is usually married at ten, and goes to live with her husband at 13, 14, 15. The young man may be 18 or upwards. Certainly we need reform here."

"Are Indian women happy in their secluded homes? You know some English people represent them as miserable, although well-informed people always contradict such statements."

"Mostly they are happy; a little dull, perhaps, but then our people must not be measured by your standard. Perhaps I ought to say they are contented rather than happy. Sometimes a girl enters a community (you know that we do not live in families as you do) where she is not well received, not welcome. Her *rôle* is then almost always to win her new relatives by submissiveness and gentleness."

"Her friends don't interfere to protect her against minor persecution?"

"No, it would only make her task longer and harder. She has to trust to herself."

"Won't education make your girls less submissive when relatives-in-law are unkind?"

Shevantibai mused a moment. "I don't think so. Patience and gentleness are largely national characteristics. Our present idea is not to give women a university education, but to make them more useful in their homes. The rest will follow. I think education will induce later marriages, and it probably would make women more tolerant to strangers who enter their community."

"Is it not true that Indian women are still the great upholders of child marriage?"

"I think so. Some men have ceased to believe in it, but you know, men must side with their women. It is the women who arrange the marriages; in general, they have more influence in such matters than the men."

"At what age did you marry?"

"Oh, I was twenty," said Shevantibai gaily. "It was considered a great age among my Hindu friends; almost improperly old. Yes," was the answer to another question, "I go a great deal to my pupils' houses and interest myself in their domestic affairs. They are only to be won gradually, and by establishing friendly relationships. It would be a great mistake not to cultivate the acquaintance of the older women; I should lose hold."

"Will you tell me now what you teach your girls?"

"English and Marathi of course. We always want them to make progress with English, because Marathi literature as a rule is not of a kind to be helpful, our aims being what they are. Much of it consists of astounding events which befel the gods, not very useful knowledge. History and geography are taught in both languages, according to the pupil's degree of advancement; literature, mathematics, domestic economy, sewing, music."

"Do they like mathematics?"

"Not much, and we don't push it where they are not likely to need it at present. Now the last three subjects I have named are directly useful in the life they will lead. We use a domestic economy text-book applicable to Indian life, and the girls quite enjoy the lessons."

"Does the mother-in-law ever show annoyance when a girl wants to come to school?"

"Oh yes, if she is of the old school. A favourite way of quenching enthusiasm is to pile as much housework on the scholar as possible. Among the more ignorant it is not respectable to come to school after you are grown up. Quite a young widow with a little boy has persisted in coming to us despite her parents' objections. She urges that her education will be useful to her boy afterwards. Then I have another girl whose mother-in-law discovered that her handwriting was better than her son's. It made her very angry. She removed the girl from school, saying that presently the boy would need to stay at home and mind the house and the girl go to business, which would be a disgrace to the family."

"Yes, we have often had these arguments in England," said I.

"Then the mothers-in-law tell the girls their husbands won't think so much of them if they are educated. Of course, but not as a direct retort to that, we show the girls how little time their husbands spend with them, a result of their inability to converse upon any subject of interest."

"I am told Hindu girls are very quick."

"It is true. I have rarely had a dull pupil; the average of intelligence is high."

"Is it not a disadvantage for you to be a Christian, Shevantibai. Does it not close many doors to you?"

"I don't think it does in Bombay because it is a cosmopolitan city. But it might in the Mofussil.

I, on the other hand, retain some Hindu customs in dress and living. It is useless to fly in the face of people in matters into which principle does not enter."

Shevantibai has now been ten months in England and shortly returns to her own land. She has written an Indian story called "Ratanbai," which she is even now seeing through the press. Lady Harris, wife of the late Governor of Bombay, has written the preface. During her absence the school is conducted by two ladies who are doing their utmost to induce women of the Gujarathi Hindu community to join in large numbers.

ROYAL COMMISSION ON INDIAN EXPENDITURE.

The following announcement of the Royal Commission on Indian Expenditure appeared in the *London Gazette* for May 31st:

Whitehall, May 30, 1895.

The Queen has been pleased to issue a Commission under Her Majesty's Royal Sign Manual to the following effect:

VICTORIA, R.I.

VICTORIA, by the Grace of God, of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland Queen, Defender of the Faith, Empress of India, etc., to—

Our right trusty and well-beloved Reginald Earle, Baron Welby, Knight Grand Cross of our Most Honourable Order of the Bath;

Our right trusty and well-beloved Councillor, Leonard Henry Courtney;

Our right trusty and well-beloved Councillor, William Lawies Jackson;

Our trusty and well-beloved George Nathaniel Curzon, Esquire, commonly called the Honourable George Nathaniel Curzon;

Our trusty and well-beloved Sir William Wedderburn, Baronet;

Our trusty and well-beloved Sir Donald Martin Stewart, Baronet, Knight Grand Cross of Our Most Honourable Order of the Bath, Knight Grand Commander of our Most Exalted Order of the Star of India, Companion of Our Most Eminent Order of the Indian Empire, Field Marshal of our Forces, Member of the Council of India;

Our trusty and well-beloved Sir Edward Walter Hamilton, Knight Commander of Our Most Honourable Order of the Bath, Assistant Secretary to the Commissioners of Our Treasury for Great Britain and Ireland;

Our trusty and well-beloved Sir James Braithwaite Peile, Knight Commander of Our Most Exalted Order of the Star of India, Member of the Council of India;

Our trusty and well-beloved Sir Andrew Richard Scoble, Knight Commander of Our Most Exalted Order of the Star of India, one of Our Counsel learned in the Law;

Our trusty and well-beloved Ralph Henry Knox, Esquire, Companion of Our Most Honourable Order of the Bath, Accountant-General of Our Army;

Our trusty and well-beloved George Lisle Ryder, Esquire, Companion of Our Most Honourable Order of the Bath;

Our trusty and well-beloved Thomas Ryburn Buchanan, Esquire, Barrister-at-Law;

Our trusty and well-beloved William Sproston Caine, Esquire; and

Our trusty and well-beloved Dadabhai Naoroji, Esquire; Greeting!

Whereas We have deemed it expedient that a Commission should forthwith issue to enquire into the administration and management of the Military and Civil expenditure incurred under the authority of the Secretary of State for India in Council, or of the Government of India, and the apportionment of charge between the Governments of the United Kingdom and of India for purposes in which both are interested;

Now know ye, that We, reposing great trust and confidence in your knowledge and ability, have authorised and appointed, and do by these Presents authorise and appoint, you, the said Reginald Earle, Baron Welby; Leonard Henry Courtney; William Lawies Jackson; George Nathaniel Curzon, commonly called the Honourable George Nathaniel Curzon; Sir William Wedderburn; Sir Donald Martin Stewart; Sir Edward Walter Hamilton; Sir James Braithwaite Peile; Sir Andrew Richard Scoble; Ralph Henry Knox; George Lisle Ryder; Thomas Ryburn Buchanan; William Sproston Caine; and Dadabhai Naoroji; to be Our Commissioners for the purposes of the said enquiry.

And for the better effecting the purposes of this Our Commission, We do by these Presents give and grant unto you, or any five or more of you, full power to call before you such persons as you shall judge likely to afford you any information upon the subject of this Our Commission; and also to call for, have access to, and examine, all such books, documents, registers, and records, as may afford you the fullest information on the subject; and to inquire of and concerning the premises by all other lawful ways and means whatsoever.

And We do by these Presents will and ordain that this Our Commission shall continue in full force and virtue; and that you, Our said Commissioners, or any five or more of you, may from time to time proceed in the execution thereof and of every matter and thing therein contained, although the same be not continued from time to time by adjournment.

And We do further ordain that you, or any five or more of you, have liberty to report your proceedings under this Our Commission from time to time, if you shall judge it expedient so to do.

And Our further will and pleasure is, that you do, with as little delay as possible, report to Us under your hands and seals, or under the hands and seals of any five or more of you, your opinion on the matters herein submitted for your consideration.

And for the purpose of aiding you in your induiries, We hereby appoint Our trusty and well-beloved Richmond Thackeray Willoughby Ritchie Esquire, to be Secretary to this Our Commission.

Given at Our Court at *Saint James's*, the twenty-fourth day of *May*, one thousand eight hundred and ninety-five, in the fifty-eighth year of Our reign.

By Her Majesty's Command,

Henry H. Fowler.

NOTICES.

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INDIA.

LONDON, JULY, 1895.

DEMOCRACY AND IMPERIALISM.

BY A. E. FLETCHER.
(Late Editor of the *Daily Chronicle*.)

"Are you not proud of this vast empire upon which the sun never sets?" This is a question which I am often asked by members of the great Jingo party who charge me with being a "little-England" man. "Yes," I reply, "I am very proud of it, but not for the same reason that you are. Your pride in British Imperialism is based upon its past history. Mine is aroused by the prospect of its future possibilities." Of the past I am not particularly proud, even after making due allowance for the splendid devotion, energy, and heroism displayed on various occasions by certain naval and military commanders and the brave men who served under them. I frankly own that I am no great admirer of the method of procedure adopted as a rule by our sovereigns and statesmen in promoting what the late Professor Seeley called "the expansion of England." By the way, how insular our imperialist devotees are. Why should they speak of the expansion of England, considering that Scotsmen and Irishmen and Welshmen have had their full share of the hard work in the expansive process?

Nothing disgusts me more than the arrogant assumption, the foolish boasting of the Imperialist party. Their perpetual pæans to "the flag that's braved a thousand years the battle and the breeze," their constant boast about the indomitable prowess of the British arms, their foolish adoration of the policy of gunpowder and glory are enough to make serious men ashamed of their species. As a matter of fact no nation has suffered greater military disasters than we have. We tried hard throughout a bloody struggle, lasting for over a hundred years, to expand our empire in Europe, with the result that notwithstanding the supposed glory of Crecy, Poictiers, and Agincourt, of which we still boast, we were thrust out of the Continent bag and baggage, with the loss of every inch of territory we possessed there. We not only lost an empire in France, but a still more splendid empire across the Atlantic, through a series of naval and military disasters. Militarism therefore has been responsible for the contraction of England even more than for her expansion. If our bitter experience of the past in Europe and in America is to be repeated in Asia—in other words, if we are ever to lose our empire in India—it will be through the folly and madness of excessive militarism.

"They that take the sword shall perish by the sword." No more statesmanlike utterance than that ever fell from human lips. The truth of it has been illustrated in the history of all the military empires of the past. Let us take care that it is not further illustrated in the history of our rule in India. You cannot conquer by the sword. You can found no enduring empire upon bayonets. Hence we are not yet masters of India, and we never shall be until we have won the hearts of the Indian people, and proved to them by wise and just administration, in which the flower of the native manhood must take their rightful share, that the object of our government there is not greed or imperial glorification but the happiness of the governed. It cannot honestly be said that this has been the object of British Imperialism in the past. We went to India for the same reason that we are now going to Africa, namely, for the lust of plunder and the lust of power; and we are repeating in Africa the barbarous methods we adopted in India.

Nothing, it seems to me, is more discreditable in the recent history of our Imperial expansion than the sanction which the Imperial Government has given to the proceedings of the Stock-exchange gamblers, land-grabbers and fillibusters, known as the Chartered Company of South Africa, organized and financed by Messrs. Cecil Rhodes and Co. There is no more pathetic story in our imperial annals than that of the unfortunate Lobengula. Yet the infamous proceedings by which that unhappy prince

was robbed of his territory and many thousands of the brave Matabele, who had nothing better to defend themselves with than assegais, were mown down by Mr. Rhodes's Maxims and seven-pounders were applauded by the yells of the whole Jingo press, approved by Her Most Gracious Majesty, who made Mr. Rhodes a Privy Councillor for his "services," and received the blessing of a bishop of the English Church, who had the temerity to defend the Matabele War in the national pulpit in Westminster Abbey. This right reverend prelate, it was afterwards discovered, was a shareholder in Mr. Rhodes's greedy company. A bishop booming the Chartered Company over the grave of David Livingstone in the national temple was surely a sight for gods and men. Everybody knows the real object of the Matabeleland invasion. The object was gold, and the pretence that it was undertaken in the interests of Christianity and civilisation is the most shameless hypocrisy of which even Englishmen have ever been guilty.

Besides, what right have we to assume that we have a monopoly of civilisation, and that it is our mission to subject alien races all over the world to its conditions? In India there is a far more ancient and in many respects a far better civilisation than our own. Even the native African tribes are in many respects more civilised than we are. They have neither gaols nor workhouses, nor gin shops, nor gambling hells, nor other dens of infamy which we consider necessary to our beautiful civilisation. Moreover they are Collectivists to a man, and sink the interests of the individual in the interests of the tribe. I do not mean to say that we should confine our energies within the limit of these small islands. I do not say that we have no right to seek to expand our empire by peaceful means. It seems to be a necessary condition in the evolution of mankind that the English-speaking people should spread themselves all over the world and I have no objection whatever to Great Britain's annexing the whole solar system, if it can be done by legitimate means, and without the assistance of violent methods which, however they may temporarily promote imperial aggrandisement, spell in the long run imperial ruin.

Diplomacy is more powerful than the sword. A remarkable instance of the way in which native races in Africa can be conciliated by diplomacy occurred a few years ago when we very nearly blundered into a second Ashantee war. We threatened the Ashantee King with a repetition of the invasion which had proved so disastrous to his father. He laughed at our threats of armies and navies and rather rejoiced in the prospect of having a chance of venging his father's defeat. Fortunately it suddenly occurred to the British representative on the West Coast—I think it was the late Sir William Rose—that this dusky monarch had a mortal dread of the electric telegraph. Sir William therefore went to his majesty to inform him that if he did not come to terms the Great White Queen had decided to put down a telegraph wire up to the borders of his dominions. He was so alarmed that he signed the treaty at once. This story was told at a public banquet of the Institute of Civil Engineers by Lord Kimberley himself, who was Colonial Secretary at the time of the incident. The story shows how much can be done by skilful diplomacy, and how very tractable the African races are if only you know how to get at them. I cannot help thinking that every one of the thirteen barbarous wars that we have waged in South Africa might have been prevented if we had paid as much attention to the training of skilled diplomatists as we have paid to the training of skilled murderers. There is too much reason to fear that since Mr. Rhodes's triumphs in South Africa the natives are being exploited much in the same way as that in which the natives of India were exploited by the English "Nabobs" after Clive had disposed of Surajah Dowlah. The story of the greed of these unscrupulous ruffians is a sad chapter in the history of the "expansion of England," and there are other equally sad chapters in that history which make me hesitate to own that I am very proud of it.

What has been the result of our occupation of India? For a hundred and fifty years we have held precarious sway there over various kindreds, races and tribes, peace-loving for the most part, destitute of the vices which degrade Europeans, and possessed of virtues which forced men like Outram to exclaim "I have loved the people of India." The vast territory which they inhabit, moreover, is full of natural resources and is one of the most fertile regions on the surface of this planet, and yet the majority of these vast millions of India are probably the poorest people on the face of the earth. Their average annual income is scarcely equal to the weekly wage of an average British workman. We have annually piled upon them a burden of taxation which is fast coming to the breaking point, and the enormous revenue derived from this colossal taxation is chiefly devoted to the maintenance of the most costly military system the world has ever known. So long as we keep up this vast military organisation we shall constantly be committed to a "spirited frontier policy," for it is inevitable that you cannot keep up a big army without occasionally giving it something to do, especially under the conditions of service in India.

But though I am not proud of the past history of British India as a whole, I yield to none in my admiration of the many brilliant episodes in that imperial drama. The past is gone and the future is

to come, and no man I think who has paid any attention to the signs of the times can look into the future without indulging in the hope that a brighter day will dawn for India and that much will be done in the hereafter to atone for the blunders and the crimes of the past. The English democracy is being awakened to a sense of the gravity of the Indian problem, and as the ranks of the more enlightened and progressive sections of the community are being constantly recruited by a new generation of voters trained in our public elementary schools and elsewhere, higher ideals of imperial duty will be fostered. As the new democracy grows in strength and power —a growth which seems to me inevitable unless our educational system is a failure—Liberalism must advance. Our mental horizon must be widened, our common human sympathies broadened; the old vulgar notions of patriotism which made that term synonymous with parochialism, or still worse with jingoism, will break down before those larger conceptions of international co-operation and good-will upon which the future happiness of the world depends. Similarly the old materialistic ideas which based imperial greatness upon violence, aggrandisement, and greed, will be abandoned in favour of the true imperial idea which is that empires, like individuals, should strive not to be envied and feared, but to be trusted and loved. Already the people of the United Kingdom are becoming more impressed with this idea. Already they are taking a more sympathetic interest in the questions affecting the welfare of their Indian fellow-subjects. The demand for Home Rule all round, the concession of which is becoming more and more regarded as the way out of the Irish difficulty, will soon also be regarded as the true evolution of the Indian difficulty. Home Rule for India will be the battle cry of general elections in the future. I believe the time is not distant when a contingent of intelligent natives of India, capable of voicing the aspirations of the democracy both of their own country and of ours, will sit in the House of Commons and when the administration of Indian affairs will be entrusted more and more to native ability and devotion. If to hold these views is to be regarded as a "little-England" man I gladly accept the title. I am conscious, however, that those who are seeking to carry out these views of our imperial duty are the true Imperialists, the true promoters of a great empire—an Empire great in its peaceful commerce and industrial enterprise; great in its literature, its science, its art; great in its efforts for the rightful distribution of wealth, and in its self-sacrificing energy in the realisation of high ideals of citizenship and duty; great, not by reason of the extension of its military frontier, but in the strength of its moral position—an empire great for toleration, for justice, and for humanity.

A. E. FLETCHER.

CHITRAL AND KABUL.

BY J. DACOSTA.

In reply to Sir W. Wedderburn's question whether the Government, before taking action as regards Chitral, would afford the House an opportunity of expressing its views on the subject, the Chancellor of the Exchequer said on the 30th May that, "when the policy is decided on, the House will certainly be informed of it." A leading article in the *Times* of the following morning, however, showed that action had already been taken for the retention of Chitral and the construction of a road thither, and it was added that surely "Lord Rosebery and Mr. Fowler would not refuse to endorse a policy already adopted by Lord Elgin and his advisers."

To the nation perhaps it will be manifest that those ministers would incur very grave responsibility, if, in direct opposition to the views recently declared by the highest military authorities in the British Empire, they sanctioned the suggested policy without consulting the representatives of the nation—a policy which is certain to involve us in further warfare with our tribal neighbours. The supporters of that policy urge that our duty to our allies in the late campaign and to the hostile tribesmen themselves forbids our retiring from Chitral. Who are these allies, and what permanent engagements have we contracted with them? What duty can call us to protect tribesmen who reject our proffered protection and only claim to be left alone?

The supporters of the policy also refer to Lord Roberts's letter to the *Times*, published in April last, and they deduce from the views expressed in it, that the permanent occupation of Chitral by a British garrison is essential to the safety of India against an eventual Russian attack from the North. In short, the policy is, to all intents and purposes, the "forward" or "scientific frontier" policy initiated in 1876, which no military authority, charged with the safety of our Indian Empire, ever came forward to endorse, and the adoption of which has resulted in failure, disasters, loss of prestige and national humiliation. While certain views expressed in Lord Roberts's letter are interpreted in support of that policy, we must not forget that other views, pointing in precisely the opposite direction, have also been expressed by his lordship; and that, when writing under official responsibility, he said:

> "The longer and more difficult the line of communication is, the more numerous and greater the obstacles which Russia would have to overcome; and far from shortening one mile of the road, I would let the web of difficulties extend to the very mouth of the Khyber. Should Russia in future years attempt to conquer Afghanistan or invade India through it, we should have a better chance of attaching the Afghans to our interests, if we avoid all interference with them in the meantime."

Again, speaking of the tribesmen, Lord Roberts, far from approving our occupation of their territories and our constructing roads through their country, said: "The best thing to do is to leave them as much as possible to themselves." These views have neither been revoked nor modified, and, as they completely apply to the present situation, it seems scarcely fair in those who appeal to his lordship's authority to ignore them in the present discussion.

If we now turn from conflicting opinions to the lessons of actual experience, and compare the situation at Chitral with the situation of the British army at Kabul in 1879-80, their similarity on important points cannot fail to strike those who have watched the vicissitudes of our trans-frontier wars in the regions in question. In September 1879, 10,000 British troops under General Roberts marched on Kabul to avenge the death of a British envoy. The perpetrators of the outrage were Afghan tribesmen from Herat, who, entering Kabul shortly after the arrival of Sir Louis Cavignari, traversed the city crying out insultingly—"why suffer this *Káfar elchi*" (infidel envoy)—and, a few days later ruthlessly massacred the British representative and every man belonging to his staff and his escort. On the arrival of the British army at Kabul on the 10th October, these tribesmen departed for their villages; and the mission intrusted to our army required that they should be pursued and punished; but experience had shown that to pursue hostile tribesmen dispersed in their mountains, was to court disappointment and disaster. At all events the Herati tribesmen were not pursued, and our vengeance for the death of our envoy was wreaked, not on the actual murderers, but on a number of men whom we arrested in and around Kabul, whom we charged with connivance at the outrage, and put to death, after convicting them on such evidence as we could procure. We imposed at the same time a fine on the inhabitants of Kabul for their assumed connivance and participation in the affair; and had that fine been levied and the British army then returned to India with the treasure it had seized, its mission would have been accomplished, so far as the accomplishment was practicable. But the British Cabinet, unduly elated at the early fall of Kabul and the dispersion of the tribesmen who had opposed our advance, resolved upon permanently occupying the country. Governors were appointed to certain provinces and the *Times* correspondent telegraphed in December that Afghanistan was to all intents and purposes a conquered country, which our troops could traverse from North to South without hindrance. While this gratifying but unwarrantable announcement was being read in London, General Roberts's army was in full retreat before an army of tribesmen, abandoning guns, treasure and the city of Kabul, and seeking safety in the cantonments at Sherpur, which were then suddenly put in a state of defence.

The similarity alluded to above does not at present extend beyond the facts that, on both occasions a British army invaded Afghan tribal territory to avenge the death or rescue the person of a British envoy; on both occasions the Indian Government heavily subsidised tribal chiefs for securing their aid against their own countrymen; on both occasions our Government, after loudly proclaiming the valour and endurance displayed by our soldiers, resolved on permanently holding the country. Let us hope that the similarity will not extend further; for in the case of Kabul onerous and humiliating conditions had to be submitted to before our troops could leave that city in August 1880. We renounced the fine imposed on the city for the murder of our envoy within its walls; we refunded the treasure seized by us; we paid a million of rupees to the Amír; we surrendered some thirty guns and we refrained, at the bidding of the Amír, from destroying the defensive works we had constructed round Kabul. Sir Lepel Griffin, who was an eye-witness and a principal agent in the affair, says in the *Nineteenth Century* for June:—"England has never known how nearly our Kabul force was lost and overwhelmed. It took twenty millions to bring it back. and in those days the Afghan army was armed, not like the Afridis are now with rifles, but with knives and matchlocks."

The *Times*, in an article published on the 15th June, once more advocates the retention of Chitral and the construction of a road across the Swat and Boneir territories, saying: "Our soldiers have done their work; it is now for our statesmen to see that we reap the full benefit of their valour and skill." This, as an argument in favour of the above policy, however, does not apply to the present case; seeing that the work of our soldiers was to rescue Dr. Robertson, while the permanent occupation of Chitral constitutes a vast undertaking, involving new responsibilities and requiring new resources in men and money. It is, in short, a scheme much too extensive and expensive to be entered on as an afterthought, and without full enquiry and mature consideration.

The inspiriting picture of the recent campaign presented in the *Times* is obviously imperfect, inasmuch as it omits a material feature of that campaign, namely, the powerful co-operation we received at the hands of the Khan of Dir, and the other chiefs who aided us in the rescue of our agent. It would be misleading, therefore, to look upon the success of that campaign as affording an earnest or a pledge of success for the campaign now suggested; unless, at all events, we secure, for the new undertaking, the fidelity of tribal chiefs equally powerful and who would, moreover, be willing to co-operate in the destruction of the ancient independence of their country. To believe that such fidelity and co-operation might be secured by diplomacy, promises and subsidies, would betray fatal ignorance of the Afghan character, of the nature of the country, and of its traditional laws and customs.

A solemn oath binds all Afghan tribesmen, when summoned by their priests, to join in expelling or exterminating *Káfars* (infidels) who may invade their territory; and they are likewise bound to put to death any of their leaders who may venture to jeopardise the independence of tribal territory. Of the latter ordeal we had an illustration last year in the persons of certain Waziri *máliks* (headmen) who accepted from us the mission of persuading their fellow-tribesmen to submit to British rule, and who forfeited their lives in consequence, when they returned from conferring with our political agent.

A feeling of solidarity cements the Afghan tribes in the defence of tribal territory, and strong hostility is excited in every tribe against the infidel power that threatens any part of such territory. Accordingly, the *Pioneer* of May 30th observes: "Whenever our troops are engaged across the North-West frontier, there are *ghazi* outrages on the borderland. This has been the case during the Chitral campaign.

A British soldier was badly wounded at Peshawur; Lieutenant Limond was killed in the Tochi valley, and there were further outrages of the same kind in the latter neighbourhood. Jamrud fort (at the mouth of the Khyber) was fired into the other night."

Have we, moreover, forgotten how Padsha Khan, whom we so liberally subsidised in the Afghan war, collected his men and attacked our troops in December, 1879, and again at Charasiâb in April, 1880, when we most needed his aid? Other instances also testified, in that unfortunate war, the worthlessness of subsidies and bribes, as means of achieving conquest in Afghanistan; and the Government of India, by systematically resorting to such means in the pursuit of its "forward policy," lowers the nation in the eyes of the world, and has raised hopes which have invariably proved delusive and, on certain occasions, have led to great humiliation and disasters. J. DACOSTA.

THE INDIA OF THE VEDA.[1]

BY PROFESSOR A. F. MURISON, LL.D.

The subject of this most interesting volume of "The Story of the Nations" series is overcast and permeated with the glamour and curiousness both of antiquity and of tentative indagations into the nature of the universe and the relations of man. The author very properly sets out with a suggestive sketch of "the wonderland of the East," confining the picture, however, mainly to Hindustan proper or India north of the Vindhya range of mountains. For "the beginnings of political and social life and the spiritual development in religion and philosophy, that are to be our theme, were perfected almost entirely within the northern half" of the country. The spiritual, no less than the physical, influences of the overshadowing Himalayas, with the issuing rivers, and the distinctive products of the soil, needed to be impressed in order to a just exposition of the governing ideas of the Vedic times. It is necessary also to say something of "the Aryas." The author invokes the aid of philology at the point where history fails, and presents a general view of the best conclusions of acknowledged authorities. The picture is largely vague, and might well have been left in a wider indefiniteness; for philology is an instrument of manifold imperfections, as well as of seductive charm. For the safe use of it there is required a firmly restrained caution, which is but too apt to be overborne by the mirage of eager fancy. We are gratified to observe that the author declines to fix "the primeval home" of the Aryas. From time to time there occur expressions of certainty regarding institutions or beliefs of the pre-Vedic periods. Of course, the principle of evolution must be frankly recognised, and sidelights are available for Indo-Eranian times; but on the whole, it will be prudent to hold convictions in suspense with regard to earlier conditions. The points of doubt are too numerous, and the evidence is too complicated and special, for any adequate treatment on such an occasion as the present.

There is perennial interest in the opening up of "the sources of our knowledge" of the earliest literature of India, and our author describes in appreciative terms the labours of Sir William Jones, Colebrooke, and Wilkins. The body of the work, as well as the list of illustrative books, also indicates a competent acquaintance with the studies of later investigators. The sketch of Vedic Literature, though concise, is lucid and sufficient for the purpose in hand. The author's summary view is as follows:

> "In a wider sense, all the literature of India may, theoretically, be said to come under that head, since the Veda—the Rig-Veda in the last instance—pervades and dominates her spiritual life, even as her own Himâlaya sways and regulates the conditions of her material existence. But the special and distinctive Vedic literature is that which follows directly from the Veda and revolves around it, treating only of such matters as it either contains or suggests. It naturally falls into three very obvious main divisions: (1) the Mantra period—the period of collecting the songs with no special object beyond that of preserving them; (2) the Brâhmana period—the period of commentary and a certain amount of exegesis, with the patent object of establishing the supremacy of the Brâhman caste; (3) the Sûtra period—the period of concise special treatises for practical use at school and sacrifice. Chronologically, these periods do not strictly succeed one another, any more than the so-called culture ages—of stone, of brass, of iron—but overlap both ways over and over. Thus, if the second period corresponds to a well-defined stage of the Aryas' conquest of India—that of their advance eastward and their establishment in the valleys of the Gangâ and Yamunâ—the third may be said to struggle down actually into modern times, since the monumental commentary on the Rig-Veda, the Brâhmans', standard authority, was written by Sâyana as late as the fourteenth century of our era."

The original mantras (hymns, sacred texts) collected in the Rig-Veda itself—"the oldest book of the Aryan family of nations"—may be dated between 1500 and 1000 B.C., or even in parts earlier, though the oldest known manuscripts do not date much before 1500 A.D. At the earliest and unalloyed stage of the mantras, "the religion which we see faithfully mirrored in them is *naturalism*, pure and simple, *i.e.*, the worship of the Powers of Nature as Beings." "The older Gods"—Dyâus, Váruna, Mitra, Agni, Soma, Yama, Vâyu—"whom we can trace with absolute certainty to an Indo-Eranian past and identify with corresponding divine beings in the Avesta," are successively dealt with. Then follows the Storm Myth of Indra, at once Storm-god and War-god (who is supposed to be evolved from Parjanya, the Storm-god, pure and simple), with his companions in battle, the warlike Maruts (or Storm-winds); and, in connexion with this, the Sun-and-Dawn Myth of Sûrya and Ushas, with the twin Ashvins and the friendly Pûshan. Next come "the Lesser and Later Gods," with personifications not properly entitled to godhead, but regarded with extreme reverence, such as waters and rivers, Vâch (speech) and Aranyâni (forest).

The Rig-Veda, though not directly historical, supplies a considerable amount of material for an historical reconstruction. The author briefly examines the original caste system, in order to found a basis for the conclusion that "castes, as a firmly established institution, were not as yet a feature of the Vedic period." The division, however, of the peoples of the Penjâb and (later) of the more

[1] "Vedic India; as embodied principally in the Rig-Veda." By Zénaide A. Ragozin. London: T. Fisher Unwin.

easterly portion of Hindustân into the two main classes of Aryas and Dasyus, recurs throughout the collection; and this leads to some account of the main stocks of the Dasyus, the Kolarians and the Dravidians, which we recently found treated in great amplitude by Mr. J. F. Hewitt. In the exceptionally sacred verse called Gâyatrî "we come on the thin end of a wedge, which, being inserted at this early time, sprung a cleft which runs through the entire epic and religious life of India—the schism between the two Brâhmanic schools which have their names from the two—probably real—Vedic Rishis, Vasishtha and Vishvâmitra." The story of the conflict engineered by these hostile Rishis, a conflict between the advancing Aryans and a confederacy of ten tribes formed to check them, is carefully reconstructed from the Rig-Veda. The story of the Flood in India, as set forth here, should be read in connexion with the account of the Deluge in "The Story of Chaldea."

There are points of deep interest in the chapter on "Early Culture." The treatment of the dead is described, and the idea of immortality is admitted, although we should have liked a more emphatic limitation of it to the latest Vedic times.

"The hope, the faith, are very firm and definite." But "*what* is this future life? What are its conditions, its occupations? Vague imaginings only give answer. . . . . The one belief of a materialistic character which is positively expressed and insisted on is that in a resurrection in the flesh, even while the body is supposed to be disintegrated and resolved into its elementary component parts. . . . . one thing appears certain: that the 'new body' with which the departed was to 'clothe himself' must have been imagined as a glorified, probably an unsubstantial, one. . . . . The most definite impression we receive, however, is that of a floating, a hovering, in infinite space, in a flood, a sea of light."

So much for "the God-fearing." For the rest, "in conformity with Aryan dualism, if the good live in eternal light, the wicked must be consigned to darkness everlasting, and that is about all." In the Atharva-Veda, however, we are "confronted by a thoroughly materialistic paradise and hell," and are "informed exactly of the pleasures which await the blessed dead and the torments which the wicked dead suffer." The domestic life on earth, and the treatment of women, afford a still keener test of the ethical culture of the times. On these points there is but scanty direct evidence in the Rig-Veda; "but it is quite sufficient to show that the position held by the Aryan woman in Vedic Penjâb was a most honourable, nay, exalted one, which later influences and developments changed by no means for the better, but rather, and very much, for the worse."

"Nor is only the later dire doom of widows meant by this—unknown, as we have seen, to the early Aryas—but also, and even chiefly, the woman's home life, as wife and mother. She appears to have been on a footing of perfect equality with her husband, subject absolutely to no one in his house, not even to his parents, let alone his brothers and sisters. What is more, she was a *willing* bride; and, though it was customary to make the official demand through third persons, it is more than probable that her consent was made sure of first, and indeed that she was frequently awarded the privilege of choosing out of many suitors. This fine old Aryan custom endured far into the classical Brâhmanic period. . . . . In her father's house the Aryan maiden enjoyed the usual shelter and cherishing, and her brothers were her born champions and protectors."

The vices of drinking and gambling are already, in these early days, but too familiar. A special chapter is devoted to sacrifice, on which the author adopts the conclusion of M. Abel Bergaigne, that it is "an imitation of the chief phenomena of the sky and the atmosphere"—a sort of beneficent conjuring. Human sacrifice is not expressly mentioned in the Rig-Veda; but "we cannot exonerate our Aryan ancestors from the blot which appears to rest on all races—that of having, at some time, practised the abomination of human sacrifices." The final chapter sums up the Cosmogony and the Philosophy of the Rig-Veda. As to the first:

"When it comes to details, three distinct conceptions crystallise out of hundreds of texts bearing on the subject: (1) The gods *built* the world, carpenter-fashion, as the Aryas built their houses; (2) the gods—this or that couple, especially Heaven and Earth or the gods generally—*gave birth* to the world, after the manner of living beings; (3) the world was created through Sacrifice, as by Sacrifice it is kept going. The first of these conceptions may be classed almost entirely under poetical imagery; the second in great part, with an evident but rather clumsy flight into symbolism; while the third, purely theological, soars into almost unattainable regions of abstruse mysticism. Although the progression from simple to complicated is manifest, and such a progression implies progress and evolution, implying in their turn a vast period of time, it does not follow that the transition from step to step can be followed, much less chronologically classified."

"The whole naturalism of the Rig-Veda," our author concludes, "its entire conception of the universe and its working, hinges on two sets of natural phenomena: those of Light (Heat is included, though not specially mentioned till late) and of Moisture, embodied in Agni and Soma."

"The mysticism of the Rig-Veda has its source: 1st, in the connection of Agni—as Brithaspati or Brahmanaspati—with the two great acts of worship, prayer and sacrifice; 2nd, in the belief in a supernal, hidden world, the source of light, and the 'highest abode' of all divine beings; 3rd, in the kinship men claim with Agni, and owing to which that world is their 'home, which cannot be taken from them,' to which they are 'restored' when they leave this world by 'the path of death' by which the Ancient Fathers preceded them, whom they go to join in that Abode of Light. . . .

"As religious mysticism develops into philosophical speculation, the same principle of Light-and-Heat in union with Moisture (the Waters) as the factor of Creation and the Supporter of the Worlds still holds good. . . .

"Agni, then—Light-and-Heat—is the Divine pre-existing and self-existing One, who (when manifested) fills and pervades the world, abides in and contains all things.

"In this way, in this sense, were the Aryas of India Fire-Worshippers. In this way, after repeatedly reaching out for Monotheism, they missed it at last and found instead Pantheism, which they held fast.

"And thus the transition from pure nature-worship to the transcendental metaphysical mysticism of Brahmanism is effected gradually, smoothly, within the Rig-Veda itself."

The style of the volume tends to turgidity, with too frequent looseness of texture; but the author has presented a substantial account of the main elements of the very complicated subject in an orderly and perspicuous exposition. As a popular first-book on the India of the Veda, it will be found attractive and stimulating. The pruning of extravagant optimism, the rectification of venturous speculation, and the filling out of the exposition—all of which processes occasionally seem to be called for—may well be left to further studies of the reader in the same department.

A. F. MURISON, LL.D.

THE INDIAN PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEE AND THE INDIAN BUDGET.

LETTER TO MR. FOWLER.

The following letter has been addressed to Mr. Fowler, together with the Note on Sir J. Westland's Budget, which forms a special Supplement to the present number of INDIA:—

To THE RIGHT HONOURABLE H. H. FOWLER, M.P., Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, India Office, S.W.

Sir,—On behalf of the Indian Parliamentary Committee I had the honour, on the 6th of July last, to address to you a letter on the subject of Indian finance, forwarding a detailed Note (now referred to as No. 1) upon Mr. (now Sir James) Westland's Budget of 1894-5. In that letter it was stated that, from an examination of the facts, the Committee had formed the following conclusions: (1) that the Government of India was in error in maintaining that exchange was the sole, or even the principal cause of the existing deficit; and (2) that the true cause of Indian financial difficulties was the overgrowth of military and civil expenditure.

2. In now forwarding herewith Note No. 2, on the Budget of 1895-6, the Committee feel it their duty to repeat and confirm the conclusions above recorded; and further to state that in their opinion recent events beyond the North-West Frontier, and the expense incurred in the Chitral expedition, make it clear that Indian finances cannot be placed on a sound basis so long as a frontier policy is pursued leading to such costly military operations.

3. Before referring to the figures for 1895-6 the Committee desire briefly to notice certain objections taken in the Viceroy's Council to the conclusions arrived at in Note No. 1. Speaking in the Budget debate, on the 28th of March last, Sir James Westland complained that in calculating the total loss by exchange we had not included the loss arising from the sterling payments to British soldiers. This was doubtless an important omission, and the correction will make a difference of about Rx. 750,000 in the total of the actual loss by exchange. But when this error has been corrected we do not find that the general conclusions of the Committee are materially affected. The total net increase of Military and Civil expenditure from 1883-4 to 1893-4, as shown in Note No. 1, was Rx. 8,854,346, the corresponding loss by exchange being Rx. 3,322,786. If Rx. 750,000 on account of British soldiers' sterling pay be transferred from the former to the latter total, there will still be left Rx. 8,104,346 net Military and Civil Expenditure, as against Rx. 4,072,786 loss by exchange; and this shows that out of the increased charge the portion arising from net Military and Civil expenditure is about double that caused by loss in exchange. Speaking, in somewhat forcible terms, of the error which has now been corrected, Sir James Westland calls it a "gigantic blunder." But he should bear in mind that in this matter we went astray by following the form in which the accounts of the Government of India are presented to Parliament. Moreover, in 1889, Sir James Westland himself produced in the Viceroy's Council a Table ("Financial Statement of the Government of India for 1888-9," p. 8) purporting to separate the exchange figures, and to show what the net expenditure would have been if there had been no alteration in exchange. In this Table the charge arising out of the sterling payments to the British soldier is not shown as loss by exchange. If therefore our omission constituted a serious mistake, it was one for which as Finance Minister he was himself in great measure responsible. Another item which he claims to include as loss by exchange is the exchange compensation granted to the services in 1893. But this claim is inadmissible, as the loss by exchange now in controversy represents the loss only so far as it is automatic and unavoidable, and should not include any expenditure, such as exchange compensation, separately and voluntarily incurred by the Government, even although the reason for incurring such expenditure may have been the loss suffered by individuals owing to the unfavourable exchange. If, however, exchange compensation were also included, as he desires, it would go but a little way (*vide* Note No. 2, para. 17) towards proving that loss by exchange is the sole cause of our embarrassments.

4. We now come to the figures of 1895-6; and in tracing the causes of the increased expenditure in recent years we have to consider what period should be selected for purposes of comparison. Sir James Westland desires to go back only seven years, to 1888-9. But that does not seem to be a fair period to take, excluding as it would, the large increase of military expenditure which was initiated just before 1888. In Note No. 1 we preferred to take a period of ten years, going back to the average of the years 1882-3 to 1884-5; and we still regard those years as a good starting point, because at that time the old standard of military expenditure still prevailed, and because, under the viceroyalty of Lord Ripon, and with Sir Evelyn Baring as Finance Minister, financial equilibrium then existed. But even taking the accounts of 1888-9 as a starting point, and comparing them with the Budget Estimate of 1895-6, the conclusions of this Committee will still be found to hold good. For Table III at para. 19 of Note No. 2, shows that during the seven years referred to the expenditure on the Military and Civil Services alone increased by Rx. 5,429,034, apart from any increase due to exchange. To this amount ought to be added the Rx. 848,769 due to loss by exchange on the increased sterling charges, an increase within the control of the Government of India; so that the total increased expenditure on the Services amounts to Rx. 6,277,803, while Rx. 4,195,628 represents loss by exchange. But in this calculation the sum of Rx. 1,307,200 on account of exchange compensation has (by way of illustration) been added to the latter instead of the former total. And it has already been shown that, for the purposes of the present argument, this charge cannot properly be included in loss by exchange, which purports to represent only automatic and unavoidable loss. With this correction, therefore, the real totals are Rx. 7,585,003, and Rx. 2,888,428, respectively. And these figures appear conclusively to prove that Sir J. Westland has altogether misapprehended the financial situation when he asserts

that the increased charge arising since 1888 is "due to exchange and to exchange alone."

5. The impossible conclusions into which the Indian Finance Minister has been betrayed in his endeavour to maintain an untenable position are illustrated by the Statement of Account which, during the Budget debate, he gravely presented to the Viceroy's Council as evidence that both income and expenditure have decreased since 1883-4. In that statement he converts the total net income and expenditure of India from rupees into pounds sterling; and as exchange has during the period in question fallen about 33 per cent., the natural result of this operation is to show that, stated in pounds sterling, both income and expenditure are less now than they were in 1883-4. But it is difficult to believe that he is serious when he argues from this result that the Government has practised most marvellous economy, and that the burden upon the Indian taxpayer, who pays all his taxes in rupees, has been materially lightened. A similar process of reasoning if applied to Imperial finance (*vide* Note No. 2, para. 10) would prove that our National Debt, instead of having been reduced by 80 millions, has been increased by over 100 millions, during the last ten years. Those interested in Indian finance naturally look to the Finance Minister, when bringing in the Budget, to occupy a position of scientific impartiality, and to place before the public a lucid and popular exposition of the facts. It becomes therefore a ground of grave complaint if instead of doing this, he deals in financial paradoxes, and imports additional confusion into a subject already intricate and obscure.

6. In conclusion, I am requested to refer to the Budget debate last year in the House of Commons. On that occasion this Committee observed with regret that you did not deem it necessary to furnish a definite reply to the contentions put forward by them in the interest of the Indian taxpayer. It is not presumed that the omission proceeded from intentional disrespect towards the large body of Members of Parliament by whom the representation was formally submitted to you. But a reference to the official report will show that this is the interpretation publicly placed upon the action of the Secretary of State by the Indian Finance Minister when speaking in the Viceroy's Council on the 28th of March last. The Committee also observe with surprise that Sir J. Westland at the same time permitted himself to refer to their representation in a tone of discourtesy[1] which seemed uncalled for, and peculiarly unsuited to the occasion. As regards the present communication I have the honour, on behalf of the Committee, to bespeak for it careful consideration on the part of Her Majesty's Government and to express a hope that when the Indian Revenue Accounts are brought before the House of Commons, the Committee may be favoured with a judgment on the points at issue between themselves and the Government of India.

7. Doubtless the Government of India will be able to show certain reasons for every increase of expenditure; it is probable that with regard to some of the items they will be able to show a supreme necessity; but the advisability of an increase here or the necessity of an increase there is not the question at issue. It may be admitted at once that a certain amount of increased expenditure by the Government of India in certain departments is not only necessary, but desirable in the interests of good government. The real point, however, is that the Government of India have not been content with a moderate increase of expenditure, but have continued, with insufficient regard for the capacity of the people to bear existing burdens, to increase expenditure on the Civil and Military Services at a rate which under all the circumstances is not justifiable nor compatible with the safety and prosperity of the Empire.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

(Signed) W. Wedderburn.

Chairman, Indian Parliamentary Committee.

House of Commons,

24th June, 1895.

[1] He stated that the Secretary of State had "passed the whole thing over with the contempt it deserved."

CHITRAL AND THE "FORWARD" POLICY.

The *Manchester Guardian*, commenting on the visit of his highness Nasrulla Khan to Manchester, wrote:—To some of us whose recollections go back some distance into the past this visit from an Afghan Prince cannot but be suggestive of events which happened years ago. The retrospect is not wholly gratifying. We are reminded of things which if we could we would willingly forget, and of memorable incidents which throw a melancholy shade upon some pages of our national history. The root of the misfortunes and disasters which we have experienced in connection with Afghanistan has been the supposed necessity of interfering in the internal affairs of the country. It was, no doubt, of great importance that the ruler of Afghanistan should be on friendly terms with us, but, instead of seeing that the likeliest way of securing this great object was to show a scrupulous desire to respect the independence of the country and to refrain alike from every infringement of its territories and from all intermeddling in its domestic affairs, we imagined that the best plan was out of a number of claimants to make our choice of the one who pleased us best, and to set him on the throne. This we could only do by force of arms. We had to invade the country and conduct our princely client to Kabul. But the mere fact that he was imposed upon the country by a foreign Power was quite enough to arouse the indignant patriotism of the warlike tribes and to ensure his fall. We did our utmost fifty or sixty years to defeat the claims of Dost Mahommed, the great-grandfather of our present visitor, and to force upon the Afghans the candidate whom we preferred; but the attempt ended in an ignominious failure, illustrated for all time by a signal catastrophe. History records how, of an army which set out but from Kabul on a retreat which had become inevitable, only a single person escaped to carry the tidings to the nearest British

garrison. Of course we traversed the country afresh and put down all resistance, but it was only to recognise the utter folly of what we had tried to do, and to leave the great chieftain who had been the life and soul of the opposition to our schemes in quiet possession of the throne. But a time came when the wisdom which experience should have taught us was forgotten. The hostile policy which Mr. Disraeli adopted as regards Russia led to some diplomatic incidents at Kabul which were seized upon as a pretext for aggression. Demands were made with which it was known that the Afghan ruler could not comply, and then we invaded his territories for the purpose of extorting from him a new boundary line, which we were pleased to call, in Mr. Disraeli's jargon, "a scientific frontier." Again we made a victorious march, we defeated the Amír, and set up a new one in his stead. Then came a massacre which we were bound to avenge. We deposed the new Amír, and then, in sheer embarrassment, had to make overtures to Abdur Ráhman Khan, the present Amír, who had been living for years under Russian protection, and whom till then we had held in great suspicion. The "scientific frontier" ended in smoke. We had spent many millions of money on the enterprise, and at last were glad to get away after having accomplished literally nothing. We have lived since then on tolerably good terms with the Amír. We have made a treaty with him, giving guarantees which, should an occasion ever arise for enforcing them, we shall certainly find much difficulty in making good. Our defensive approaches in the direction of Kandahar have more than once aroused his suspicions and led to grave remonstrances, but the difficulty seems to have been overcome. Of course the Indian Government pays the Amír a handsome subsidy, and this arrangement has a certain pacifying force. Afghanistan is now a "buffer State" interposed between our Indian territories and Russia.

It might be thought that our Afghan experiences had taught us the impolicy of basing our policy of frontier defence upon interference with the independence of the tribal communities on our borders. Yet at this very time, in sheer forgetfulness of past lessons, we are repeating at Chitral the blunders we formerly committed at Kabul. The clans who live in the valleys between our extreme northern frontier and the wastes of the Pamirs are warlike and strongly organised. Often quarrelling among themselves, they unite at once in resisting aggression. These wild races have never yet been in subjection to any superior power. Their mountains are their citadels, and their passion is to be free. Yet the project which finds support with the ruling military caste at Calcutta and Simla is to subjugate these people, to extend our authority over them, and to carry our "protected" territory up to the verge of that which is claimed by Russia. Here the theory of a "buffer" State seems to disappear. Nothing will satisfy us but to come within fighting distance of the rival Power which we always have in view. The intermediary tribes are to be vanquished and broken up and taught submission, the very lesson, one would imagine, which we ought to refrain from teaching them. The best and sufficient security of our frontier in that direction is found in the difficulties which nature throws in the way of an invader. The so-called passes are all but impassable. The mountain ranges send their spurs into the valleys, commanding every track by which troops can advance, while the defiles are blocked up with snow. The impracticable character of the country has been sufficiently shown by the almost insuperable obstacles with which the recent expeditions had to contend. It would seem that the best defensive arrangement we could make would be to leave things as they are. Instead of this, it is proposed to make an excellent road to Chitral, one along which our troops can pass and repass and be well provisioned at all seasons. In other words, at an immense delay we are proposing to remove the difficulties which nature has thrown like a vast rampart beyond our frontier, and to construct roads which would be as useful to an invader as they can ever be to ourselves. It is surely high time to abandon this absurd and mischievous policy and all that belongs to it. The military expedition to Chitral has cost the impoverished taxpayers of India two millions of money, and if the plans suggested in connexion with it are carried into effect the expenditure must be continued on a very large scale. It is time to reflect upon the prior obligations which we owe to the people of India. It is quite possible that they may not share in the excessive anxieties which are shown by the military authorities, and would much prefer that we trusted them a little more and taxed them a little less. A contented India is the best guarantee we could have for the loyalty of the people and the permanence of our rule. In the possession of that great dependency, with a population approaching to three hundred millions, we have a larger responsibility, a wider sphere of usefulness, a grander opportunity for advancing the civilisation of the world than have ever been thrown into the hands of any nation. In the light of our duties to the people of India and of the enduring results which it may be within our power to attain, all the aims of vulgar ambition, all the attractions of territorial aggrandisement, fade away. It is for us to realise what we may worthily deem our mission and strenuously labour to fulfil it. If the visit of the Afghan Prince should help to fasten such reflections on our minds and contribute in any measure to the forming of such resolutions as the task which is laid upon us demands, we shall have additional reasons for recalling it with satisfaction, and the results will be memorable.

The *Times* of June 10th printed a letter from General Sir Neville Chamberlain in reply to a leading article which appeared in the *Times* of May 31st, in support of the policy of occupying Chitral. We take the following from Sir N. Chamberlain's important letter:—

First, as regards the strategical value of the position of Chitral as a means of checking invasion from the north.

The advocates of the retention of this post at any cost base their demand upon the existence of the Baroghil and Dorah Passes, as also upon the circumstance that the Russian frontier line has of late years been geographically advanced to within twelve

miles of the borderland of Chitral. With this statement the argument as regards the facility of access from the north ends—for nothing is said as to the nature of the country that intervenes between the passes and the positions now occupied, or suitable for occupation, by Russian troops, and from which an advancing force must move to reach Chitral. It is, however, accepted as a well-established fact that this dividing distance is a network of barren mountains and small valleys, practically devoid of population or cultivation, and is only to be traversed at certain seasons of the year, consequent upon the rigour of the climate and the absence of forage for animals.

In proof of the opinion now held at army headquarters in India as to the physical obstacles of this highly-elevated region, and the difficulty that they must present to its being used as a base of operations for invasion, I have only to draw the attention of your readers to a paragraph in the same number of your journal[1] as that which contained the leading article to which my letter is a reply. In that paragraph information is given as to the arrangements made for the journey of the Commission appointed by the Government of India to assist in the demarcation of the Pamir border, in conjunction with representatives to be sent by the Governments of Russia and Kabul. Our Commission of five British officers is to advance by Chitral, and is to cross the Baroghil Pass; and it is stated that only ten native soldiers are to accompany the party, so that the transport and the difficulty of obtaining supplies may be reduced to a *minimum*.

It is true that small Russian outposts have been located in more advanced positions than was formerly the case, and that conflict has taken place between these detachments and the Amír's outposts on the grounds that the Afghans had trespassed on Russian soil. It is these little conflicts which have given rise to nervous anxiety at Simla; and, considering the generally unfriendly tone displayed in the English Press as to the expansion of Russia in Central Asia, there is probably little desire on the part of Russian officers to lessen the existing irritation. The old saying that one man may steal a horse whilst another may not look over the hedge is not altogether inapplicable to the region where three Empires meet.

Next, as to the danger which is anticipated should our garrison be withdrawn from Chitral. It is conjectured that a "diversion" may then be made on that place by a Russian detachment, to be shortly followed by three or four thousand more troops, who will thus be placed in the position of being able to command the three roads leading north, south, and east, by which they may at pleasure have access to either Kashmir, Jelalabad, or Peshawur. My reply to this suggestion is that the forecast is so extremely improbable, if not impracticable, as to call for no serious consideration. A sure and continuous supply of food is a first requisite for the advance of any body of troops. If that provision be not forthcoming the invading force could neither remain in Chitral nor could it advance; and in that case whence are they to obtain this first of necessities? The surrounding valleys could not produce them. It is the want of a sufficiency of food for the inhabitants that tends to drive these people into acts of violence against their neighbours and into going further afield as highway robbers.

The operations now taking place beyond the Peshawur border are the latest evidence of the difficulties attendant upon the feeding of troops employed in such regions. The force under General Low has its base at Peshawur. That place is the terminus of a railway in connection with the whole railway system of India, and the resources of all India as regards transport and supplies are at the disposal of a well-organized military commissariat department. With all these advantages, and after only one occasion of serious resistance on the part of the tribesmen, the advance of General Low's leading brigade was retarded consequent upon an insufficient flow of supplies to the front. Only a wing of infantry could, in the first instance, be pushed forward into Chitral; and this was all that could be done when it was desirable to have made an imposing demonstration on entering that place. Even Colonel Kelly was delayed in leading his gallant band back to Mastuj until arrangements could be made for feeding them.

In times of profound quiet, the victualling from Kashmir of the outposts at Hunza and Gilghit is an instance of the arrangements involved in such a matter. It is a business of some weeks, and requires the employment of numerous mules and hundreds of porters. But for forced labour and the fear of severe punishment for default I question if the operation could be carried out except at enormous cost. With the best exertions on the part of the British officers to prevent the native officials from tyrannizing over those employed under them in the transport, the suffering involved to man and beast must be great. England is so far responsible for what thus takes place, as it was under the orders of the Government of India that these places were occupied by British officers and troops, with the sole purpose of preventing possible future Russian aggression from the direction of the Pamirs.

I think I have said enough to disarm fear from most minds as to a possible diversion by way of Chitral towards Peshawur and Kashmir. It only remains to consider the route from Chitral to Jelalabad through Asmar, which is, in fact, the one assumed to be most likely to be taken by an invading force. I will suppose that the invaders bring with them a sufficiency of supplies to enable them to reach Jelalabad; there hemmed in they may be left to be disposed of by the Afghan and the numerous surrounding tribesmen.

Three reasons are assigned in the *Times* against the possibility of withdrawal, viz.:—1. Our duty to the Empire. 2. Our duty to prevent the hostile tribesmen from cherishing the idea of unlimited murder. 3. Our duty to our allies in the campaign.

I am unable to recognize the soundness of the reason assigned in No. 1. I hold to the very opposite opinion. As regards No. 2, I can see no call to remain in order that we may forcibly introduce a higher standard of morality. It could only be done

[1] The paragraph here referred to appeared in the *Times* of May 30th.

at considerable future risk and large additional outlay, and in addition to this would probably lead us on to a new series of difficulties with the Amír and people of Afghanistan; for in that neighbourhood the relations and politics of the adjacent tribes are so interwoven as to make it impossible to draw a distinct line of separation which would be equally agreeable to the views held at Simla and at Kabul. England is in no way responsible for the state of society which has existed in Chitral and amongst the neighbouring tribesmen for generations; whilst to introduce our penal code into those distant localities would certainly add one more difficulty to those that already exist, by driving the people to abhor the English name and every English interest. If retention of Chitral is to prevail on the strength of claim No. 2 then the English people are bound to undertake the Quixotic enterprise of redressing every evil with which its Eastern policy brings it into contact. Let English gold extracted from English pockets do the work. It would be injustice to require the Hindus and Mahomedans of India to provide the means for an object in which they have no interest, and to which they are in fact opposed.

As regards No. 3, I admit that it carries with it a moral obligation, though it must be taken for granted that neither the Khan of Dir nor any of his followers took up arms on our behalf from any devotion to the British cause. They acted from self-interest and in order to retaliate upon Umra Khan, who had injured them, and they were ready to take advantage of any opportunity which might have presented itself for wreaking their vengeance. Unfortunately, and to our discredit, we have had on two occasions when withdrawing from Afghanistan to leave behind us some who had befriended our cause. We were drawn into these dilemmas by the forward policy, and, now again, the problem has to be faced.

The frontier policy advocated by Herbert Edwardes, John Lawrence and others—and carried out by Lord Lawrence as Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, and subsequently as Viceroy—was intelligible and consistent. It was based upon the principle of maintaining friendly relations with the Amír of Kabul and the Afghan people, as also with all the independent tribesmen along the Indus border. It must be understood that it was at that time well recognized that peace with these people could not be looked for except on the condition of their being allowed to retain their independence, for it was clear that on no other basis could a friendly feeling exist between these tribes and the Government of India.

How can it now be reconcilable to give annually to the Amír £180,000 in order to secure his friendship and to enable him to increase the efficiency of his forces, and at the same time expend millions in harrying, fighting with, and making permanent enemies of the independent tribesmen? For continued internal and external peace, both Afghans and frontier men must be made to feel secure in their independence; and this can only be brought about, and be relied upon, by a rigid rejection by the Government of England of the policy which has been inaugurated within the last few years, and is being constantly developed by the Progressive party.

The *Spectator* wrote on June 8th:—We should not discuss the matter again just now, but that there are two arguments of high importance which we wish to bring before politicians, and which have been, in the Press at all events, unaccountably neglected. One, and perhaps the stronger, is that if we keep Chitral, that is, we repeat, if we assume the general suzerainty of all Pathanistan, we abandon a great policy hitherto accepted by the Cabinets of both parties, and acted upon by the Government of India. That policy is to keep a buffer-State alive between our Empire in Asia and that of the Czar. This idea, whether sound or unsound, has received the support of all Indian statesmen and most Indian generals for at least twenty years past, regulates our every action in Afghanistan, including the payment of £160,000 a year to the Amír, and dictates at this moment the unusual honours which we are paying to the Afghan Shahzada, Nasirullah Khan. If we take Chitral that policy is discarded; for thenceforward our frontiers march with those of Russia. The Russians, that is, can, whenever convenient, without warning and without having to march twenty miles out of their own territory, drag the British Army from its base to defend the slopes of the Hindu Kush from a rush which, even if it is only a feint, must, nevertheless, be driven back by bayonets and shells. This liability, serious in any case, is doubly serious because Russia is a Power which would not hesitate, if for any reason she wished to occupy our Army, to sacrifice twenty thousand soldiers and auxiliaries in doing it, knowing well that if her invading columns were defeated, they could not be pursued. The road from Peshawur to Chitral once made, the Czar could send a corps d'armée down it without crossing any intermediate territory; and we must defend it as we should defend Cornwall, or face the consequences that would follow a telegram announcing to India and the world that a Russian army had appeared at Peshawur. It may be wise to encounter that risk, or unavoidable—we are not discussing that—but clearly, if we encounter it, we are abandoning the policy of creating a buffer-State, which we have spent so much money and so many lives in maintaining hitherto. So clear is this, that if the change is accomplished, one of the best arguments against the favourite Russian scheme of the partition of Afghanistan will be gone, and the next Amír may well live in dread for his independence. We shall have rolled up at last to the Russian frontier, though only at a point; and our lateral extension east and west will be dictated of necessity mainly by military considerations, which, so far as we see, always compel us to guard our flanks by planting new outposts to the right and left. We are not military experts, and allow at once that this may be the wise course; but we are entitled to say that it is *not* the course hitherto dignified with the title of the "Indian frontier policy."

The second argument, hitherto undiscussed, or discussed but carelessly, is that we must not on this occasion pay too much deference to the opinion of the Indian Government. The retention of Chitral is not a purely Indian question. It is an English question of the first importance. . . . . It is only because of our relations with Russia that the question

of Afghanistan, or the question of Pathanistan, or the question of the Indian northern frontier, has any grave importance. And our relations with Russia must be managed by the Cabinet, which, if there is any collision, will have to provide the fleets, the troops, and the treasure demanded by the struggle. We cannot fight Nicholas II. in India alone as our grandsires fought Louis XV. in India alone, but must meet him in Europe, in the Caucasus, and in the Farthest East as well as in India. The responsibility for that terrible struggle, therefore, must rest with the Imperial Government; and to say that it shall not control acts which may bring such a struggle on, is to introduce administrative anarchy. It must control them, or fail in its duty; and as responsibility implies power, the right of deciding finally must remain with the Parliamentary Secretary,—that is, ultimately with the Cabinet as a whole. This seems to us to be merely a constitutional proposition wholly beyond reply; and if it is so, the announcement that the Government of India has formed a final opinion loses much of its meaning. No Secretary of State for India is fit for his place who does not give to the advice of that Government its fullest value, or who does not regret heartily an occasion for overriding it; but neither does a Secretary of State, who, on an Imperial question, treats that advice as an order, which he can only obey and defend, understand his responsibilities.

We shall not repeat to-day the old arguments which have convinced us . . . . that the attempt to extend British authority over Pathanistan is unwise; but the special correspondent of the *Times* at Chitral supplies us with a new one. It is quite clear from his fascinating letters, which, while minutely accurate, read more like a story by Mr. Stanley Weyman than a narrative of actual adventure, that he is inclined to favour the policy of retaining Chitral; but it is quite clear also that the conquest of Pathanistan will involve effort of no mean order. The Pathan tribes have advanced a half a century in the art of war since we last encountered them in the field. They are said to be "savages" still, and doubtless in some respects they are such; but they are getting civilised as to their special trade, which is, has been, and for the present will be, the killing of their enemies. They import the best rifles, they collect cartridges sufficient for days of rapid firing, and their markmanship is positively terrible. The garrison of Chitral could not even look out of their loop-holes, so heavy and so accurate was the enemies' fire. The Pathans have learned how to build formidable breast-works, they have learned how to lay mines, and they are specially skilled in devices for effecting the reduction of stone forts. It is perfectly clear from the whole narrative that while our success was mainly due to the courage of the officers engaged, and the splendid tenacity of the Sikhs and Kashmiris, who fought the harder the more hopeless they became, it was due also in part to the miraculous good fortune which often attends British expeditions. A little more resolution in the Pathans, a little less awe of the white men, a little more good fortune, and we should never have reached Chitral, and should probably have had to endure all that men can suffer in a retreat of a hundred miles.

Reviews.

MIRZA HAIDAR'S HISTORY.

The Tarikh-i-Rashidi of Mirza Muhammed Haidar, Dughlát: A History of the Moghuls of Central Asia. An English version, translated by E. Denison Ross, and edited with commentary, notes, and map, by N. Elias, H. M. Consul-General for Khorasan and Sistan. London: Sampson, Low, Marston and Co., Ltd.

Though the *Tarikh-i-Rashidi* has already been to some extent drawn upon by historical writers and had its value acknowleged in such indirect ways, the present volume is the first to furnish a practically full translation of the work to English readers. Mr. Denison Ross appears to have done his share of the labour most efficiently; and Mr. Elias, besides the duty of general editor, took the precautionary trouble of going through the translation in company with Mr. Ross, in particular discussing with him the many passages where uncertainty arose. The Introduction is substantially a treatise in itself. In it, Mr. Elias speaks critically of the author and his book, of the line of Chaghatai, of the land of the Moghuls, of the people, Moghul, Turk, and Uighur, of the Eastern Khánate, or Uighuristan, and of the *Tarikh-i-Rashidi* and after. The treatment is thoroughly workmanlike and capable. The numerous notes at the foot of the text are extremely useful—all the more so from the fact that Mr. Elias is "personally acquainted, more or less, with all the tribes and races Mirza Haidar introduces, and with most of the localities," as well as familar with the acknowledged authorities on the various points requiring elucidation. The map will be found especially serviceable. Its main purpose, of course, is to exhibit all the places mentioned in the *Tarikh-i-Rashidi* that can be identified with reasonable certainty; and Mr. Elias believes it to be "the only map which contains most of the names used in historical works relating to Central Asia during the Middle Ages."

Mirza Haidar lived in stirring times. He was a soldier of fortune; and, while he wrote the history of his race and family, he wove into his narrative an account of his personal adventures and experiences, in no undue proportions. He was cousin to Baber, the first of the Moghuls of India—a scion of the Dughlát tribe, a sub-division or sept of the true Moghuls of Chaghtatai's line, and one that was accounted about equal, in point of nobility, to the Turki Barlás. Mirza Haidar describes himself as the son of Muhammad Husain Kurkán, son of Amir-i-Kabir Said Ali, son of Amir Ahmad, son of Khudaidad, son of Amír Bulaji. The last-named four were all Amírs of Kashghar, and Bulaji was the first of the line to become Mussulman. Mirza Haidar was born in the year of the Hajra 905 (A.D. 1499-1500) at Tashkand, the capital of the province of Shásh, of which his father, Husain, had been made governor some six years before by Mahmud, the titular Khan of Moghulistan and Kashghar. His mother, Khub Nigár Khánim was a daughter of Yunus, Khan of the Moghuls, and a

younger sister of Kutlugh Nigár Khánim, the mother of Baber.

The times were troublous. "In the space of 120 years," writes Sir Henry Yule, "no less than thirty descendants or kinsmen of Chaghatai are counted to have occupied his throne; and indeed revolutions, depositions, murders, and usurpations seem to have succeeded each other with a frequency unusual even in Asiatic governments." Mirza Haidar's father, a treacherous and intriguing man, was put to death at Herat by emissaries of Shahi Bey Khan, the Uzbeg leader, when his son was but a child; and some of the retainers of the family, believing Mirza Haidar to be doomed to a similar fate, had him carried off to Bokhára and concealed. In 1508, at the age of nine, he was smuggled out of Bokhára by Maulána Muhammad, formerly his father's khálifa (religious guide), and taken, through hair-breadth escapes, into Badakhshán, where he was entertained kindly for a year by Khan Mirza, a cousin and dependent of Baber. Then Baber summoned him to Kabul, and treated him with much consideration. Mirza Haidar accompanied Baber in his subsequent expeditions against the Uzbegs, to Hisar and Samarkand, where he must have learnt a good deal of warfare as it was conducted in those days in Central Asia. About the beginning of 1514 he went to Andiján, at the request of his uncle, Sultan Ahmad, Khan of Moghulistan, and soon entered the service of Sultan Said Khan, the son of Sultan Ahmad. During some twenty years he served Sultan Said devotedly, for the most part in a military capacity. He not only took part in Sultan Said's wars against the Kirghiz and Uzbegs in Moghulistan and against other tribal enemies, but was entrusted with important commands on distant expeditions—in 1527, against the Bolor States (Hunza, Gilghit, Chitral, etc.); in 1529-30, against Badakhshán; in 1531—his most important service for Sultan Said—the invasion first of Ladak, then of Kashmir and Baltistan, and afterwards of Tibet proper. "The Holy War," the Mirza tells us, "is the main support and fortifier of Islam—the most efficient groundwork for the foundations of the Faith;" and these expeditions seem to have been undertaken mainly, if not wholly, on such pious grounds. The Tibetan enterprise was abandoned within eight marches of Lassa, owing to mortality among the horses, want of supplies, and the general distress caused by cold and the high elevation.

Meantime Sultan Said had died, and Rashid Sultan had begun his reign at Kashghar by putting to death many of his own relations, and among them the Mirza's uncle, Sayyid Muhammad Mirza, who had also done much faithful and arduous work for Sultan Said. The Mirza speaks of these events with much bitterness. Finding it impossible to remain longer in Ladak, whither he had retired from Tibet, he desperately dashed through some passes, with a score of followers, into Badakhshán, where he spent the winter of 1536-7. Next summer he repaired to Kabul, and soon afterwards to Lahore, where he was received by Baber's son, Kámrán Mirza, "with every mark of respect." "From the depths of distress and hardship," he writes, "I found myself raised to honour and dignity. The princely patronage and attention of Kámrán Mirza acted as an antidote to the numerous sufferings and griefs which had made the sweetness of life bitter on the palate of my soul." On Kámrán's proceeding to the relief of Kandahar, the Mirza was left at Lahore for a year as Governor of the Punjab, "collecting taxes, suppressing revolt, protecting the frontiers, and establishing Islam." In 1538, on Kámrán's return, his brother the Emperor Humayun was defeated in Bengal by Shir Sháh Sur, the Afghan leader, and called to his assistance Kámrán and his other brothers. The brothers fell out at Agra, and Kámrán returned to Lahore. Mirza Haidar, however, patriotically stood by Humayun then and thereafter, and Humayun treated him with great honour and called him "*brother*, after the Moghul fashion." At the disastrous battle of Kanauj, the Mirza acted as chief of the Emperor's staff, and also led the centre division. The final section of the Mirza's career is mainly occupied with his invasion and administration of Kashmir as regent for Humayun, 1540-1551. He found the province "in a state of ruin and desolation, and raised it to a land abounding in cultivation and flourishing towns; he extended the frontiers also, and ruled with moderation and justice." He was killed, apparently by accident, in putting down an obscure disturbance somewhere near Báramula on the Jhilam.

"What right have I," asks the Mirza, "with my poor learning and my want of capacity, to attempt to make my styleless reed flow upon the white sheet of literature?" "My justification," he answers, "lies in the fact that I have, during my life, collected many authentic facts concerning those Moghul Khákáns who were Mussulmans, and have also myself played a part in their history. At the present time there is no one but myself who knows these traditions. . . . . My object is not to extol my own merit, but simply to write a memoir, that the history of the Moghuls may not be entirely forgotten." Mr. Elias, partially following Dr. Charles Rieu, thus summarises the scope and character of the *Tarikh-i-Rashidi*:

"It may be regarded as the history of that branch of the Moghul Khans who separated themselves about the year 1321 from the main stem of the Chaghatai, which was then the ruling dynasty in Transoxiana: and it is the only history known to exist of this branch of the Moghuls. The original or western line—that of Transoxiana—was at that time declining in power, and through internal dissensions and administrative decay, was rapidly approaching a final dissolution. The princes of the branch then thrown off became masters of Moghulistan (or Jatah, as it was called at that period) and of all Eastern Turkistan, and continued as a ruling dynasty for more than two and a half centuries. The book is divided into two parts, called *Daftar*, the first of which is entirely historical, while the second contains reminiscences of the author's life and notices of Chaghatai, Uzbeg, and other princes with whom he was acquainted."

The first part, or history proper, was written in Kashmir in 1544-45, and was completed about February, 1546, or five years after the Mirza's installation as regent of that country.

"It includes, however, a later addition, in which 953 of the Hajra (4th March, 1546, to 21st February, 1547,) is mentioned as the current year. For the earlier periods it deals with, it is based on the traditions handed down to the author chiefly by his older relatives, combined with the statements of Sharaf-ud-Din Ali Yazdi in the prolegomena of the *Zafar-Náma*;

and, for the later periods, on his personal recollections. It contains a record of two distinct and parallel dynasties: (1) that of the Khans of Moghulistan, beginning with Tughluk Timur, who reigned from 1347 to 1362, and whose father, Isán Bugha, was the first to separate from the main Chagatai stem; and (2) of their vassals, the Dughlát Amírs of Eastern Turkistan, one of the earliest of whom, Amír Bulaji, the author's ancestor, had raised Tughluk Timur to the Khanship. In the second period, the family of the Khans divided into two branches, one of which superseding the Amírs of Kashgar (or Eastern Turkistan) continued to rule over Moghulistan proper and Eastern Turkistan, with their capital at Kashgar, while the other became rulers of the provinces eastward of Aksu (known as Uighuristan) and had their seat of Government usually at Turfán. The author concludes his account of each with a short sketch of their reigning representatives at the time of writing."

The second part, which has more than twice the extent of the first, and contains Mirza Haidar's record of his life and times, was the first in point of date.

"The author wrote it in 1541-42, and, as he states in the *Prologue*, with a view to preparing himself for the more arduous task of historical composition. It begins with his birth and concludes with an account of his invasion of Kashmir, when by a battle fought on the 2nd August, 1541, he became master of the country. This part includes also some rules of conduct for kings, drawn up at the request of the author, by his spiritual guide, Maulána Muhammad Kázi, whose death in 1515 is recorded in the preceding passage; while another moral treatise by a holy Shaikh, Shaháb-ud-Din Mahmud, styled Kwája Nura, is inserted in full."

These two last-mentioned documents have been excluded from this translation, as not belonging properly to the history. The Mirza wrote in Persian, to him a foreign tongue. His work is a thoroughly serious one, intended, before everything else, to be a complete and trustworthy chronicle of the times. Considering the complications and obscurities of the period, he must be admitted to have been remarkably successful. His descriptive power is excellent, and his rhetorical flights are not seriously disconcerting. His weakness in chronology and his looseness in the expression of numbers generally and of measurements are ordinary Eastern failings, and much to be regretted. The chronological faults are, happily, partly remediable by reference to Chinese and other annals; but, unfortunately, "many interesting passages relating to military operations, the tribes, cities, ruins, and curiosities are greatly diminished in value, from the want of accuracy in the figures recorded. The tendency, generally, is to exaggerate freely." The absence of systematic arrangement involves frequent repetition and the involution of one subject with another. The portraits of the more eminent men, though no doubt touched up with characteristic exaggerations, are exceedingly interesting.

At the same time it must in fairness be noted that the Mirza seems to have tried steadily to keep in view the very truth of facts. "It is the practice of historians," he says (p. 129), "to recount everything as they find it, whether worthy or unworthy of mention. For it is not their object to write down the good qualities of princes, and to omit all their bad actions, but rather to reproduce all facts without discrimination, in order that they may leave behind them a record of the people of this world." Yet he hesitates to overdo a picture already sufficiently marked in outline and detail. "On consideration," he states (p. 258), "I have decided to withhold my pen from further details" of the savage cruelties of Mirzá Abâ Bakr, "for I do not wish the honourable mind of the reader of this Epitome to be clouded by the darkness of that black nature." On his invasion of Tibet, he indicates limits to his means of knowledge of the customs of the people. "I had much conversation with the Lámas," he tells us (p. 414), "with the help of an interpreter. But when it came to nice distinctions, the interpreter was at a loss both to understand and to explain, so that the conversation was incomplete." As to the vast idol-temple at Ursáng, "as what I heard concerning this temple," he declares (p. 411), "is incredible, I have not written it. There are many false stories told of it." As to Kashmir, "now that I . . . . have seen all that is notable in it, whatever I shall write will be what I have witnessed" (p. 424); and the Mirza notes the inaccuracy of the *Zafar-Námar* on the facts of Kashmir, for the author "had never been there himself, but derived his information from travellers who had not a proper regard for accuracy" (p. 430). Finally, "up to this point," he says (p. 146), "I have heard the story of Rashid Sultán from reliable sources in Hindustán and Kashmir, and have committed it to writing. After his victory over the Uzbeg, he marched on Andiján and Turfán. But the sources from which I derived the details of this matter not being trustworthy, I have not thought fit to enter them, and have therefore drawn in the reins of my pen from writing of these things." The Mirza's purpose was absolutely earnest, and it is plain that he did his best to ascertain and sift the facts, and to record them in reasonable fulness, good and bad. How far his judgment is to be trusted is another question. He was at any rate, as Mr. W. Erskine estimates, "a man of worth, of talent, and of learning," and, we may add on the Mirza's own *naïve* statement, a man of many accomplishments. He was also "a bigoted Mussulman and a fanatical Sunni." In short, as Mr. Elias puts it, "he belonged to his times, and herein lies the chief value of all that he has left on record."

THE MARQUESS OF WELLESLEY.

Life of the Marquess of Wellesley, K.G. By COLONEL G. B. MALLESON, C.S.I. Statesmen Series. (London: W. H. Allen and Co., Limited.)

THE present volume is one of a series of reprints. The original publication was made in 1889. The edition is a cheaper one, and Colonel Malleson has added a new preface in which he seeks briefly to justify his high opinion of the brilliant Marquess. Lord Wellesley began his public career in the English Parliament in 1780. He distinguished himself at once as an eloquent speaker, and rapidly rose to a position of importance. In 1793 he became a member of the English Privy Council and of the Indian Board of Control, in which latter capacity he obtained "a thorough knowledge of all the details of Indian government, and of the dangers which might threaten the stability of British interests from the independent action of Native Princes in the very centre of the peninsula at a time when Great Britain was engaged in a war

conducted with more than ordinary bitterness with a revolutionary power." In 1797 he was appointed by Pitt to succeed Sir John Shore as Governor-General of India. With the views of his predecessor Lord Mornington was far from concurring. Sir John Shore had previously been a civil servant of the East India Company, and his experience in that capacity, no less probably than his natural temperament, inclined him to a policy of peace. His conciliatory attitude had resulted in some loss of British power, and the Native Princes exhibited a tendency to combine against the English. The state of affairs when Lord Mornington reached India was indeed alarming. English relations with France were such as to give colour to the belief that any intrigue on the part of a native power would be welcomed and furthered by that country. On his passage outwards Lord Mornington received ample proof that Tipu Sultan was even then negotiating with the French, and in spite of professions of friendship the negotiations were carried on after the arrival of the new Governor-General. Lord Mornington was too diplomatic to show his hand before he had prepared for the extreme result of interference. But he began without delay to set his house in order. He arranged for the increase of the military forces, in spite of the objections of the Company's servants, who dreaded, in view of past disaster, to provoke a war. He entered into a new treaty with the Nizam, who agreed to dismiss the French contingent in his employ and to ally himself more closely with the English. When the action of Tipu rendered war necessary, it was brief and decisive. Seringapatam fell, and Tipu himself died. "Thus," says Colonel Malleson, "within three months of his arrival in India, Lord Mornington had settled two important, I might say indeed with truth, two vital questions."

The important services he thus rendered were awarded by an Irish Marquisate and the public thanks of both Houses of Parliament. Pitt wrote a letter of affectionate congratulation, but Wellesley could not conceal his disappointment. He felt that the reward was inadequate, and said so. Pitt's reply pointed out that any idea of inadequacy in the minds of others arose in his opinion from the Marquess's own view of the question, and no doubt there was much truth in the statement. Disappointment of this kind did not, however, lead to any lack of vigour in his policy. In the following autumn he proceeded to deal with the case of Tanjur. This State had been reduced to a condition of extreme wretchedness by a usurper. Unwilling to allow it to pass into the hands of a mere boy—the rightful heir —Wellesley arranged a treaty by which a suitable income was allowed to him, while the civil and military arrangements passed into the hands of the English. This line of policy he followed up in the case of Sarat, the Karnatik, and Oudh. If the arrangement was, to some extent at least, beneficial to England, it was probably not without advantage to the States concerned, for it is believed to have rendered the Government more stable, and the likelihood of petty warfare much less. Having now dispatched the question of a French invasion, and strengthened his position with the Native States, Wellesley turned to that fruitful source of mistrust —Afghanistan. The Shah of Persia was persuaded through the instrumentality of Captain, afterwards Sir John, Malcolm to renew his attack on the frontier of Afghanistan, and being thus engaged the ruler of Kabul had no time for an Indian campaign. The domestic administration was also the object of the Governor-General's attention. In financial matters various reforms were introduced, the army was more carefully organised and Lord Wellesley passed on to recommend a means of abiding improvement in the foundation of a college at Fort William. In the last instance, however, the disapproval of the Directors was at once expressed. The work was far too costly —a consideration for which the Marquess had the profoundest contempt. Their interference in other matters, chiefly of financial interest, provoked the resignation of the Governor in 1802. But it was not accepted, and in 1803, when he renewed his application to be released, the Maratha War was imminent, and he felt bound to keep his post. Before the war had reached its successful termination, the Marquess had quited India, his position being assumed by Lord Cornwallis.

Whatever view may be taken of some particular acts under his administration, it cannot be doubted that he did carry out in a marvellous manner the policy, such as it was, of extension of Empire which was common to him and his great friend and master. He was ably supported during his Indian career by Generals Harris and Lake, and the brother whose fame in subsequent years was to outshine his own. But this autocratic position in India had had its effects upon his character, and the manner of his reception in England was a bitter disappointment to a man of such haughty temper. Pitt had died immediately after his return, and it was not till 1809 that Wellesley received a Government appointment, as ambassador in Spain, from whence he was recalled at the end of the year to take office as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Once again Wellesley found himself in a position to carry out his own high-handed course of policy. And he did not hesitate to do so. In spite of much criticism he strenuously urged the continuance of the war. "For my part," said he in reply to Lord Lansdowne, "as an adviser to the Crown, I shall not cease to recommend to my Sovereign to continue to assist Spain to the latest moment of her existence. In the cause of Spain, the cause of honour and interest is equally involved and inseparably allied." The result of this policy was such as Lord Wellesley had foreseen. "The perseverance and resolution of the two brothers, the one at the Foreign Office, the other at the head of the Army, had, it was becoming every day more apparent to the clearer-sighted, effected the marvel which had been pronounced impossible; they had succeeded in inserting into the Imperial Tree the wedge which was to lay it low." In 1812 disagreement with his colleague with regard to the Catholic Disabilities, which Lord Wellesley wished to be removed, led to his resignation. The attempt on his part later in the year to form a ministry which should undertake this reform, together with a vigorous war policy was unsuccessful, and until 1822 he remained outside the ministry. In the latter year he was sent as Lord Lieutenant to Ireland, a country which at that time

was described as "a tempestuous scene of violence, iniquity, and disorder." The grievances of the people were "undisguised, open, and palpable, and there seemed but small chance that any of them would be redressed." Lord Wellesley did what he could to further reform, but the vital reform was impossible, and in 1827 he returned to England to work again in the cause of Catholic Emancipation. The success of this measure was delayed by the action of Wellington's Government till 1829. From 1830-1834 he was again Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, after which time save for the post of Lord Chamberlain, held for a few days, he retired into private life, and seven years later died at the age of eighty-three. Colonel Malleson's profound admiration of this great statesman leaves its impress on every page of his book. That he was a great administrator, a man of brilliant genius and consummate energy, is certain. But he seems to have been qualified by disposition rather to adorn an elevated and isolated position than to work in harmony with colleagues of equal rank towards a common end. The present volume is well printed, and ought in this cheap form to find its way to a very large number of readers.

ANGLO-URDU MEDICAL HANDBOOK.

Anglo-Urdu Medical Handbook, or Hindustani Guide; for the use of Medical Practitioners (Male and Female) in Northern India. Compiled by the Rev. GEORGE SMALL, M.A., with the aid of Surgeon-General C. R. FRANCIS, and of Mrs. FRASER NASH, L.R.C.P. and S. (Calcutta: Thacker, Spink and Co., 1895.)

The medical handbook compiled by the Rev. G. Small is a book which has long been needed. Anglo-vernacular grammars, dictionaries, and reading-books have been overdone, and until somebody takes the trouble to do something more than rearrange kaleidoscopically the material which has long been before the public no useful purpose can be served by their publication. The vernaculars of India are yet an almost virgin soil for linguistic research. Many of the commonest expressions and inflections still await exposition in the text-books. But replicas and permutations of what has gone before may be dispensed with. Aids to the acquisition of real knowledge are certainly in demand, and an increasingly large field is opening for scientific, historical, and other practically useful books connected with Indian vernaculars. Mr. Small has essayed to fill a void by offering lists of words in Urdu connected with the medical profession, such as the names of the minutest parts of the body, various diseases and accidents, surgical and dispensary appliances, hospital and kitchen furniture and utensils, clothes, medicines, metals, fabrics, tools, etc. Some fifty pages are devoted to common native medicines, arranged according to their operations on the human system. Their nature and names, both scientific and popular, are stated, and a set of diagnostic tables is supplied suited to various kinds of diseases and different parts of the body. This information, together with a specially arranged series of dialogues, must greatly facilitate communication between doctors and their patients. The plan of the book is to be commended, and it contains a great deal of useful information. The compiler might have supplemented the matter he gives without much difficulty from such books as Platts' and Fallon's dictionaries. These books will, in many cases, supply him with single words for terms which he now renders by a description; for instance, the aorta is called *shahrag*, a bicuspidate tooth is known as *jarh*, a dimple is *pichak*, the eye-ball is *dhela*, hydrophobia is *harak*, a gun-shot wound is *zakhm-i-banduq*, the sting of an insect is *zakhm-i-nesh*, and so on. There are also mistakes which require ratification. Thus the crystalline lens is *ankh-ka-tal*; the eye-lid is *papota* or *parda-i-chashm*. There are many such mistakes, and a plentiful crop in the dialogues, besides misprints in abundance. The book fails somewhat in execution, but will nevertheless be really useful in its present condition, and will form a good stock on which carefully selected material can be grafted.

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VOL. VI. Supplement No. 5. JULY, 1895.

This Supplement consists of a VERBATIM Report, specially drawn up for "India," of the Debates on Indian subjects in both Houses of Parliament, and questions put on such subjects and the answers given to them, arranged chronologically, from May 24th to June 20th.

Imperial Parliament.

May 24th.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

THE OPIUM COMMISSION.

At the evening sitting, on the motion to go into Committee of Supply,

Sir JOSEPH PEASE rose to call attention to the Report of the Royal Commission on Opium; and to move: "That this House, having had before it its Resolution of the 30th June, 1893, pressing on the Government of India to continue their policy of greatly diminishing the cultivation of the poppy and the production and sale of opium, and having had presented to it the Report of the Royal Commission, appointed 2nd September, 1893, to enquire into various matters connected with the cultivation of the poppy in India, is of opinion that the system by which the Indian Opium Revenue is raised is morally indefensible, and would urge upon the Indian Government that they should cease to grant licences for the cultivation of the poppy and sale of opium in British India, except to supply the legitimate demand for medical purposes, and that they should at the same time take measures to arrest the transit of Malwa opium through British territory." He admitted that it was somewhat inconvenient on a Friday evening to bring before the House a subject of such importance as that which he brought before it this evening. But he felt that he must seize the earliest possible opportunity of endeavouring in the House to contradict what had been mentioned in so many journals of the day—namely, the idea that this Commission which had sat on the opium question in India had terminated for ever the question of the trade in opium, and that it met the views of those who had been opposed to this trade, and who had for many years fought against its continuance in our Indian empire. They still held that the system by which this revenue was raised was morally indefensible. He asserted, moreover, that the Report confirmed the view that this trade was morally indefensible, and that the Commission proposed action, having that proposition in view. In 1893 the hon. member for West Waterford (Mr. Webb) moved for a Royal Commission—(1) To report on the possibilities of retrenchment in India; (2) on the development of its resources; and (3) what temporary aid India would require consequent upon putting down the poppy cultivation except for medicinal purposes. That Commission was refused. A Commission was now appointed to look into the finances of the Indian empire; but they could not look into the question without also looking at the other two points—retrenchment of expenditure and the development of the resources of India. They had got now, as nearly as possible, back to the position in which his hon. friend left it *minus* the opium question. It was a singular fact that the hon. member for North Bedfordshire (Mr. George Russell), then Under Secretary of State for India, placed resolutions on the Paper; but the whole question was taken out of the hands of the Under Secretary by the right hon. member for Midlothian, whose perfervid speech carried the House. The anti-opium party in the House objected to that Commission, and voted against its appointment. They thought that the moral question had already been settled by the House; that there was ample evidence as to China and India in the Blue Book of Lord Cross, and that there was no occasion for further enquiry into this matter in India. The great source of revenue was not in India itself, where the revenue was comparatively small, but ninety per cent. of the whole of the Indian revenue was derived from trade with China and from the Straits Settlements, especially from Singapore. But the Government got their own Commission—composed of Lord Brassey, chairman; Sir James Lyall and Mr. Fanshawe, Indian officials; Sir W. Roberts, a physician; Mr. Mowbray, M.P. South-East Lancashire, who voted against the anti-opium party in 1891; the Máháràja of Durbhanga Sir Lachhmeswary Singh. and Mr. Haridas Veharidas, Natives of India; Mr. Arthur Pease, and Mr. Henry J. Wilson, M.P. On the appointment of the two last alone was he consulted. It was not the free, fair enquiry that he understood Lord Kimberley to promise. Having obtained their Commission, the Government proceeded to "dry-nurse" it. They provided it with three consecutive secretaries, Sir C. Bernard (temporary), Mr. Hewett, and Mr. Baines, all in their pay. It proceeded in its enquiry more like an excursion party. There were five ladies and the usual retinue of Indian servants. The "Sunbeam" flew her colours; at Calcutta they all lived at the Residency except Mr. Wilson; a review of troops was held. A nautch dance was provided to indoctrinate these gentlemen, who had come on a moral enquiry into the higher line of Indian morals. His hon. friend, the member for Holmfirth, was absent on that occasion. A highly competent official, Mr. Dane, was appointed to take charge of the Commission. The evidence was collated and arranged, and that which was not wanted was declined. The collectors of evidence which was to be given on the other side were watched by the police. The witnesses were drilled. The evidence of the Commission was collected by Mr. Dane, and a large quantity of it passed through the hands of the Calcutta Government. The anti-opium section was not aided to bring up a single witness. The whole power and the money of the Indian Government were against the few subscribers of the anti-opium movement. He was much struck by the manner and the style—the Old Bailey style (he said it without offence)—of Sir James Lyall in putting his interrogations. Sir James Lyall's questions were entirely directed to preserving the revenue, and they were put in a tone that would not have been tolerated at a similar enquiry in this country. He at once expostulated with Lord Kimberley, and pointed out to him that, instead of a fair and free enquiry, it was the whole force of the Indian Government against the Christian churches at home. No fair man who read that evidence and report but must be

struck by the character of the pro-opium evidence—its want of experience, its want of facts, its hearsay tone and character: "We have heard," "We suppose," and "We believe," "long custom and habit," were all favourite phrases, and the extracts were garbled, partial, and unfair. This was diffused through nearly every paragraph of the Report; there was no grasp, and there was little or no positive recommendation, except on opium smoking. The Commission thought that the "use should be restricted," but they added they had not time to say in what manner it should be restricted. The Commissioners had been at home one year before this Report was laid before Parliament, and yet there had not been time to come to a conclusion. With regard to China, they left aside the whole of the China question, which was not committed to them in any of the references by saying that China would supply herself if we did not; therefore they could do nothing. No one could look at the Report without seeing who drew it up and for what purpose. The Government of India thanked the Commission for their trouble in strengthening the hands of the Government. The Commission also thanked the two paid officers who were their secretaries for having drafted their Report. No doubt the secretaries ought to have drafted the Report, but ought they to have been in the pay of the Indian Government, or ought they not rather to have been independent secretaries? He asserted that the Report was settled in the India Office. Was that a fair way of conducting the Commission? The officers of the Commission ought to have been independent officers. They did not wait, before issuing their Report, till the memorandum of the Mahárájá of Darbhanga had arrived. Did they know it was coming? The Mahárájá of Darbhanga who was on the Commission and whose memorandum was only circulated a few days ago, stated that he would put down opium smoking at once by law, that he would label every piece of opium "poison," and that he would mark on bottles containing it the minimum dose which was likely to prove fatal. The paid officers of the Indian Government occupied 240 pages of the report out of 392.

Sir ANDREW SCOBLE: Sir James Lyall is not a paid officer of the Indian Government.

Sir JOSEPH PEASE replied that Sir J. Lyall was in receipt of a pension from the Indian Government. (Hear, hear). Continuing, he said, that the decidedly partisan reports occupied 240 pages, while the actual and independent portion covered only 126 pages. 130 medical men were examined. Of these, 82 were official, 14 missionary, and 34 independent. Of the officials, 44 were favourable, 18 indifferent, and 20 unfavourable. All the missionaries were unfavourable to the use of opium, half the independent medical men—17 out thus of 34—and 20 officials. There were thus 57 medical on the one side, against 51 on the other. A sample of the one sidedness was shown in the report dealing with Burma (p. 92). The Commission said: "We have no suggestions to make as to the administration of the measures sanctioned by the Government of India in November, 1893, and we recommend that they be maintained unaltered till they be fairly tested by experience." Sir Charles Aitchison reported in 1880. The Indian Government held out till 1893. Sir Charles said: "Here the question is not one of better or worse morality, but the salvation of a whole people from a vice which we have introduced among them, and from ruin, which it is to a great extent in our power to retard, if not prevent." There was no time here for experiments if the people were to be saved. The Indian Government still retarded Sir Charles Aitchison's ecommendations, and this Commission called it, in fact a experiment. Another example was as to the drugging infants (p. 16). The arguments put forward in support of he practice was to prevent diarrhœa, to correct the mother's milk nd to keep the child quiet. "It was impossible to believe that this custom should have been handed down for many centuries amongst a people whose general fondness for their children was well known, if it were as injurious as some witnesses seemed to think." The evidence as to the drugging of infants was as follows: "Surgeon Lieut.-Col. Hendly puts in summaries of replies from 55 persons at Jeypore, on the use of opium. The answers referring to children concludes; 'Baneful custom, as it causes atrophy, constipation, fever, etc., the principle cause of infantile mortality here.' Witness adds, 'The opinions of all are much the same.' In the municipal report of Lucknow for 1891, Dr. Cleghorn wrote, 'Another cause of mortality among children is the almost universal practice of giving infants opium.' Dr. Huntly states, 'I know that I have come across many deaths in children owing to an overdose of opium, and still more die from the continuance of the habit. Within a radius of half-a-mile of Jodhpore hospital I certainly can produce 20 cases.' Miss Rose Greenfield of the Charlotte Hospital, Ludhiana, said, 'Many children's lives are lost just by an overdose of opium.' She had no doubt a certain number of girls are still killed by opium intentionally. Miss Carlton, M.D., definitely confirmed this. A native witness stated 'girls are more generally drugged than boys.' Surgeon Lieut.-Col. Mayne said, 'I continually saw children given opium, and I have seen some deaths among them from its injudicious use.'" To go as fast as he could through the great Indian points. They were told that the drug was used as a prophylactic and as a febrifuge; that it was essential to cultivation; that it was difficult to arrange matters with the Native States; and that our native soldiers required it. What was the character of opium? Gloss it over as they liked, it was a poisonous drug. The great difference between alcohol and opium was this: Thousands took beer, wine, and spirits—took alcohol one day, but did not, perhaps, touch it the next, or take it to excess; whereas an opium smoker or eater must have it, or he failed in his daily task; and the evidence showed conclusively that in almost every case he must have more and more of the drug. No one objected to the use of opium purely as a drug. As to the allegations that opium was a prophylactic and a febrifuge, Rai Lal Bahadur, L.M.S., graduate in medicine and surgery, president of Calcutta Medical School, lecturer on ophthalmic medicine, and for thirty years in Government employ, examined as to its being a prophylactic, stated: "It is to my mind a new theory. It is not a theory I ever heard as a student or as a practioner;" and added, "I do not think it a remedy in fever." Moreover, a memorandum of the Government of Madras was as follows: "The Government is aware that the opium traffic is carefully watched by the agents and their assistants, and that, so far from 'teaching the people to rely on opium as a febrifuge, we are doing all we can to gradually wean them from their hereditary habit of using it on all occasions." Dr. J. R. Wallace, M.D., who had had 14 years' experience in Calcutta, both in Government service and private practice, said: "I have never seen or heard of any physician in Calcutta or elsewhere who prescribes the use of opium for the prevention or cure of malarial fever. I have recently read of the good effect of opium in preventing and even curing malarial fever. I have given the theory a fair and honest trial during the past ten or twelve months, and I am thoroughly convinced that beyond relieving the bodily pains and aches of malarial fever, it in no way prevents or shortens its paroxysms. I firmly believe that the action of opium in malarial disorders, in which there is a strong tendency to congestion of the liver, spleen, and kidneys, is not only distinctly contra-indicated, but its administration in many such cases would be undoubtedly harmful. I have frequently found serious complications follow the use of opium when given as a sedative in cases where the liver had undergone inflammatory or degenerative change from any cause. I base this opinion further upon the teaching and practice of many able and experienced Indian physicians, such men as Norman Chevers, David B. Smith, Coates, Harvey, and M'Connell, men whose lectures and practice I have attended and seen, and from whom I never heard a word of commendation for the use of opium in malarial fever; men who, as far as my recollection serves me, have always condemned the use of opium in congested conditions of the liver—a condition which, sooner or later, complicates every case of malarial fever." Then as to the cultivation and character of the opium crop and its necessity to the cultivator. It was universally admitted throughout the Blue Books, and in the Report on the "Moral and Material Progress of India," which was laid on the Table of the House of Commons in May, 1892, that the cultivation of the poppy was being reduced on account of other crops turning the poppy out of the market. It was giving place to better paying crops. From the Report on the "Moral and Material Progress of India," page 89, he quoted: "It is reported that cultivators of opium have lost heart, after experiencing three bad seasons in succession; that new cultivators are gradually withdrawing from the industry, while there is a tendency on the part of older cultivators to lessen the poppy area cultivated by them in favour of the more robust and less precarious cereals." The Behar opium agent adds: "The opium department have difficulty in maintaining their position; they cannot drop cultivation at will without losing it per-

manently." The problem was how to get the land back to cultivation, and that was the difficulty of the Government in 1891. In 1894, in a copy of the Resolution of the Indian Revenue Department it was stated that: "the decrease in the area of poppy cultivation was accounted for by the following reasons: (1) The policy of the Government was not to take any measures for increasing the area of cultivation; (2) a series of bad seasons, which had disheartened the opium cultivators; and (3) the cultivation of other crops." The end of that was that the Indian Government, since the Commission left India, in order to produce a crop at all, had to make an advance of 1s. per seer, or at the rate of 10s. 6d. per acre, to the cultivator. While it was confessed that in many places the production of the poppy was an advantage to the cultivator, yet there was perfectly clear evidence to show that in other places the crop was being rapidly superseded by crops of other articles far more beneficial to humanity; and he could not help thinking that if the Government of India would turn their attention less to the production of opium and more to that of other crops, it would be to the benefit of the cultivator and mankind at large. The next point was the argument that the cultivation of the poppy was required by the Native States. Now the number of chests from those States had gradually fallen away since 1886. In 1886-7 the number of chests on which duty was paid was 39,745, and in 1894-5 the figures fell to 27,750. Thus, in spite of all the encouragement that had been given to the Native States, the quantity of opium that passed out of them for duty fell by 33 per cent. Baroda, which used to send 2,000 chests, now sent no opium at all. But granting for a moment that the Native States went on with the cultivation of the poppy, he admitted that the Government was not responsible for the deeds of those States to the same extent as for those of India proper. The Government were able to leave the States to take their own course, but if, by the Government giving up the cultivation, the demand and price of the opium of the Native States were increased they could restrain the increase as at present by raising the transit duties. The Indian Government reduced them from 750 rupees to 600 rupees, and had now again raised the duties to 650, at which figure they could keep them if they desired to wash their hands of the trade. Another argument on this question: what was termed the soldier argument—that opium was essential to the native soldier—altogether failed before the Commission. The evidence showed that there were no fewer than 23 native regiments—16 regiments of the Bengal Infantry, 5 of the Punjab Infantry, and 2 of the Sikh Infantry—which never touch opium at all, and in those in which it was taken the practice was condemned and its effects were shown to be prejudicial both morally and phsically. "'In the 15th Bengal Infantry each man took opium with him according to his requirements; in the 23rd Bengal Infantry three pounds taken up by the Commissariat Department sufficed for two years; in the 32nd Bengal Infantry one pound was taken regimentally, to be issued when ordered, but was brought back unused; and in the 3rd Sikh Infantry a small quantity was taken up by the regimental chowdhri for use if required, but was brought back untouched.' Major-General Sir Robert Low, who held the important military command of the Oudh district, said that the native troops under him were both Hindus and Muhammadans living in the North-West Provinces. In his evidence the opening questions and replies [14,108 to 14,112] ran as follows: 'As a rule are these men opium-eaters?' 'No.' 'I presume there are exceptions in almost every regiment?' 'Yes.' 'What is the highest number of opium-eaters reported in any one regiment under your command?' 'Twenty.' 'And the lowest?' 'Two, that is in the Ghoorka regiment.' 'Is there any regiment in which none are reported?' 'There is one.' General Low said when he was in the 10th Bengal Lancers twelve years ago all the Sikhs took opium habitually in small quantities. The exact amounts he could not remember. Referring to a servant of his who had taken opium for a long time, the General said: 'I did not know that he used it to excess until up in the hills we found ourselves without it. Then he became perfectly useless, and we had to send many miles to get some.' Resaldar Major Nur-ul-Hasan said that in the 6th Bengal Cavalry, in which he had 'served for thirty-six years, about three per cent. used opium.'" It was further proved (Q. 16,952) that of 240 Sikhs in the 10th Bengal Lancers "only eight or nine took it all the year round." Of the 2nd Punjab Infantry, Colonel Turner said that "only two or three per cent. take opium regularly," and the Surgeon in charge said: "He had no doubt that it had a prejudicial effect in cases of pneumonia." Colonel Briscoe, 19th Bengal Lancers, said he gave no numbers because the numbers varied so greatly. "It is also fallacious," he said, "to take a percentage of Sikhs, because it is very unusual for a young Sikh to take opium at all. The habit is chiefly amongst middle-aged and old men." This evidence was confirmed by most of the witnesses. The last of the Sikh regiments enquired into at Delhi was the 29th Punjab Infantry. Lieut.-Colonel Reid said the general tone of the regiment "is against its use;" that "the habitual opium-eater's appearance was against him, for he seemed to have deteriorated physically." The Colonel said further in his evidence: "'Nine men, that is one per cent. of the regiment, habitually eat opium . . . . of whom three men, or one-third per cent. of the regiment, eat in excess; and six men, or two-thirds per cent., eat in moderation.' 'Morally the results are bad. The habitual opium-eaters are marked men in the regiment, and are not trusted like the rest. I would not enlist an opium-eater if I knew it.' Only one commanding officer of Rajputs appears to have given evidence, viz., Colonel Jamieson, 7th Bengal Infantry. He stated that in his regiment twelve men used opium in moderation and one in excess. The general evidence from the Sikh States show that taking opium before forty is considered objectionable, and a species of licentiousness." Then, with regard to China and the practice of opium-smoking in that country, Consul Allan, Chefoo, had said (vol. v.): "I expect that the civil and military officials would indignantly deny that men under their orders smoked opium. In fact, the Brigadier-General in charge of the troops told me that he dismissed at once any soldier caught smoking opium." In the same volume, Consul Bullock, of New Chang, said: "Ask a Chinese which would win in a fight, a regiment of men allowed to smoke opium or one of similar men who were prevented from doing so, and he will laugh at the simplicity of the question. . . . . Opium-smoking is condemned in Chinese opinion as degrading, because injurious. The public voice cries out against it as a great evil to the nation." Again, Consul Hurst, of Tainan (p. 323), declared: "As long as China remains a nation of opium-smokers there is not the least reason to fear that she will become a military power of any importance, as the habit saps the energies and vitality of the nation." Therefore, so far as malarial disease was concerned, so far as the native soldier, the cultivator, and the Native States were concerned, it was shown by the evidence that there was no force in the argument that the cultivation of the drug was essential to or required by any of them. He now came to what was perhaps, after all, the crucial part of the position he took, and that was opium-smoking. He had never, in any speech he had made on the question, and he was not aware that any of his hon. friends had done so, gone deeply into the habits of taking opium pills or small quantities of the drug. What he and his friends had always gone steadily against was the trade in opium for smoking and the practice of opium-smoking in China, the Straits Settlements, and in India itself. On this point he was at one with the Commissioners, for he was glad to say they all went straight against opium-smoking in India. In paragraph 80 of the Report the Commissioners said: "On the other hand, it was clearly shown before us that native public opinion generally condemns the habit as disreputable, mainly, perhaps, from its associations, and this opinion is shared by the great mass of European witnesses, official and private, including the medical practitioners." Again, on page 118, the Medical report says: "The practice of opium-smoking is generally looked down upon in India as a low and vicious habit. Several of the witnesses thought the practice—and especially that of madak smoking—injurious to health. Others thought that the injurious effects were not due directly to the smoking, but were due to the associations and surroundings of the habit. These are certainly very bad. The practice of smoking seems to require that it shall be carried on in company, and the premises or 'dens' in which opium-smokers meet in India are of a squalid and insanitary character." This view was confirmed in the memorandum of Mr. Haridas Veharidas, one of the native members of the Commission, which was attached to the Report. He said: "The practice of opium-smoking is generally condemned, but nothing short of its abolition by law will, in my humble opinion, put an end to it. It is most desirable that it should be made penal. . . . . A strict law should be made prohibiting opium-smoking in any form and under

any circumstances." The Máháraja Bahadur of Darbhanga stated in a note supplementary to the Report that while he thought it was impossible to make any suggestions that could apply to the whole of India, and therefore hesitated to lay down any hard-and-fast line, yet "he would urge that opium should be sold in bottles or phials labelled 'poison,' and the minimum dose which was likely to be fatal should also be legibly printed in the vernacular on these labels. . . . . The habit of opium-smoking is generally looked upon as a degrading habit. Mr. Haridas Veharidas has entered into the subject very fully; and I find myself in agreement with his views on the subject." Other native gentlemen in various parts of India took a similar view. Further, among English officials who gave evidence, Mr. H. E. M. James, "of the Northern Division, B.B.," said: "In India it is a degrading vice, the mark of a debauchee, and 99 out of 100 who practise it are degraded and worthless, perhaps criminal, persons." Mr. J. M. Campbell, Bombay, said: "Though the description under review may be overdrawn and misleading, the practice of opium smoking is evil and wasteful. It would be well if it did not exist." The collector at Satara said: "The vice of opium smoking evidently possesses a fearful fascination when once it is acquired, and its effects are deadly, depriving the victim of all moral resolution. With these facts made palpable, it is a serious thing for Government to offer any facility for acquiring the vice by licensing a shop, where anyone is at liberty to make a trial." To the same effect he might quote many other witnesses. Now as to the prevention of the evil, the Commissioners stated that though they were unable to recommend the adoption of measures of restrictive legislation, yet they did recommend that the licensing of shops in the provinces for the manufacture and sale of opium should be abandoned. On page 72 of the Report the Commissioners said: "While we are not prepared to recommend measures of restrictive legislation, we are in favour of making it difficult for smokers of *Chandu* and *Madak* to indulge in the habit. We recommend that the Government should abandon in all provinces the licensing of shops for the manufacture and sale of these preparations, showing thereby that they are in sympathy with public opinion. In the Punjab, Bombay, North-Western Provinces, and Oudh, this has already been done, and in those provinces, individuals, though they may manufacture the preparations for their own use, are not permitted to possess a larger amount than 180 grains weight. We recommend that these provisions be extended to the other provinces of British India. The manufacture of small quantities by private persons is wasteful, and the process tedious. Only confirmed smokers therefore are likely to incur the expense and trouble. The general adoption of this system, which is undoubtedly repressive, so far as it can be enforced will tend to prevent the spread of the habit, and lead, it may be hoped, to its ultimate extinction." The Commissioners came up to his standard in dealing with the question so far as opium smoking in India was concerned, whether they took the recommendation of the English gentleman and Indian officials who proposed to take away the licences of shops for the manufacture and sale of opium, or whether they adopted the advice of the two native Indian gentlemen on the Commission, who knew the country intimately, and who suggested that opium smoking should be put down by law. The trade in opium was falling away. The revenue from it in 1880-81 was Rx. 8,451,382, and in 1894-95 it had fallen to Rx. 4,138,300. He had proved that as a febrifuge and prophylactic, opium was not wanted, that the cultivator could do without it, that we could arrange with the Native States, that the native soldiers were better without it, that opium-smoking was condemned in India as a low and vicious habit, and he would also prove that in China it was undermining society, while from its effects the people were surely deteriorating. Mr. E. Starkey, who had been for 27 years a merchant in China, said: "There are many smokers in moderation, but usually after ten years or so of indulgence they suffer in health and require increased doses. The opium habit is undermining society in this province (Chinkiang); the moral standard of non-smokers is affected by it, and the people are surely deteriorating." This gentleman was formerly an importer of opium. Our Vice-Consul at Canton, Mr. Bourne, said: It is correct to say that there can be no moderation: excessive habit is condemned as degrading and injurious, but the moderate habit only as likely to lead to excess." Mr. Williamson, Acting Vice-Consul in Corea, quoted Dr. Landes as saying: "It ruins morally and physically at least 90 per cent. of the Koreans who use it." Mr. Frank Trench, of Chung-king, in China, said: "Opium smoking is an unmitigated evil. It has enormously added to the sin and misery of this country. It weakens every physical power before long, and makes wreck of the man or woman eventually for certain. Sir George Staunton, who was the representative of the East India Company at Canton, said, many years ago: "It is mere trifling to place the abuse of opium on the same level with the abuse of spirituous liquors. It is (*i.e.*, the abuse) the main purpose in the former case; but in the latter it is only the exception." Miss Geraldine Guinness, who wrote "Four Years' Sojourn in China," had travelled through six of its provinces, and was also personally acquainted with the opium question in Tonquin, the Straits Settlements, Colombo and Aden. She gave a graphic account of some of her opium experiences in China. She spoke of how her heart ached and bled during the painful hours in which she had worked by the bedside of women and girls who had poisoned themselves by opium to save themselves from fates worse than death, to which they had been sold because their fathers and husbands wanted opium. "The opium vice," she said, "are not one crime simply, but a concentration of all crimes." She spoke of the great opium palaces of lust in Shanghai that she had visited, where hundreds of women were held in bitter bondage. "Crimes of the blackest dye," she affirmed, "are directly traceable to opium in China." Archdeacon Wolfe, in 1888, wrote: "The devil could not have invented a more pernicious vice for the destruction of soul and body than this of opium-smoking, and woe to the man who by word or deed gives any support or encouragement to the hell-born traffic! Men openly and without shame prostitute their wives, in order to procure for themselves the means of indulging in opium-smoking. Little children are sold as slaves and turned away from the embrace of their helpless mothers in order that their degraded fathers may have money to buy opium. All this and much more may be told of the effects of opium-smoking on the miserable people; yet professing Christians in England see no harm in it, and openly advocate the abominable traffic, which makes it possible and comparatively easy for the Chinese people to ruin themselves and their wives and children for time and for eternity!" There were varying estimates of the proportions of opium smokers who suffered more or less injury from the habit. The medical missionaries said 71 per cent.; other missionaries, 74 per cent.; medical officials, 55 per cent.; sundry medical men, 61 per cent.; consuls, 58 per cent.; other officials, 40 per cent.; one merchant, 80 per cent.; and the Sassoons, who were importers, 10 per cent. An LL.D. of Oxford, who was now in the pay of the Chinese Government, in sending a contribution to the Anti-Opium Society, wrote: "Having lived among the Chinese for 34 years, and seen the disastrous results of the fast-increasing consumption of opium, it has long been my wish to aid in any reasonable scheme that may be started to remove this enormous evil which has undermined and almost destroyed the very life and strength of the nation. Japan, with her total exemption from the use of the drug, is proving more than a match for China, now almost overpowered by it. I fear that China has to go through a dreadful course of humiliation and suffering before she can be driven to free herself from the baneful effects of opium by using the strong and drastic remedies that are now necessary. Japan is a most dangerous enemy, but even if China can withstand a Japanese invasion she can never survive unless this soul and body destroying poison is completely exterminated." He had proved that a large portion of the revenue derived from the sale of opium to our soldiers deteriorated them and was immoral in its character. Certainly that derived from the sale of opium for the drugging of infants was immoral, and as certainly that derived from facilitating suicide and murder. No fewer than 53 witnesses admitted that opium was continually used in the promotion of sensuality. A gentleman living in Singapore who had studied the question carefully, said: "The more I investigate the subject the more plain and clear is the ultimate connexion between opium and sensual vice." Surely this was an immoral revenue. In India, smoking was condemned on all hands—by our own Commission, by the native Commissioners especially, and by our intelligent officials. All called out for the abolition of the habit and the destruction of this portion of our immoral revenue. When we turned to our customer China, the evidence was stronger still that our opium and her own were causing her destruction as a nation. Ninety

per cent. of our revenue came from China, and we were ruining China by making her participate in the trade. We could not get over the fact that, although China might supply herself, and did supply herself, we were participators in that which was immoral; and this was the ground on which he asked the House to vote for the Resolution. The argument that if we were not to supply China with opium, China would supply herself is one which was very well met in John Dymond's "Essays on Morality." He said: "I have no right to do that which is wrong, if it is wrong, because somebody else is going to do wrong. If I were to sell a man arsenic, or a pistol, knowing that the buyer wanted to commit murder, should I not be a bad man? If I let a house knowing that the renter wanted it for purposes of wickedness, am I an innocent man? Upon such reasoning you might rob a traveller on the road if you knew that at the next turning a footpad was waiting to plunder him. To sell property or goods for bad purposes, because if you do not do it some one else will, is like a man selling his slaves because he thought it criminal to keep them in bondage." This was their position: it was not that we supplied the whole of China, but that we supplied China with that which was immoral in its character and consequences, and was deteriorating to China. The hon. member for Central Finsbury (Mr. Naoroji) purposed to make an addition to the Resolution; and that Amendment expressed views which he held; but he had not touched upon the question of finance, which was referred to a Commission. There were many who believed that our Frontier Policy in India was a policy which was of an expensive and unknown character, and required placing on a more permanent basis. Since the Afghan war we had had 10,000 more English troops and 20,000 more native troops in India. Whether we required them or not, Parliament had not the means of knowing: but the cost of them was largely eating up the increase in the revenue of India. In 1891 Mr. Smith declared, as Leader of the House and of the Government, that the policy of the Government was to diminish the area of poppy cultivation and that it would be persevered in in the future. Mr. Gladstone put pressure upon the Government to pursue that policy, and the House carried the Resolution in favour of greatly diminishing the cultivation of the poppy and the production and sale of opium. What was the Government going to do or say now? In 1891 six members of the present Cabinet and 12 of the rank and file of the Government declared their conviction of the immorality of the opium trade; and in 1893 the majority of their supporters voted against the appointment of these Commissions, believing that the House had settled the moral question involved. Were the Government now going to put an end to making opium for smoking in India as recommended by the Commission? Were they going to make smoking penal as proposed by the two Native Commissioners and Mr. Wilson? Were they going to repudiate or to fulfil Mr. Smith's pledges of 1891? Were they going to withdraw or add to Mr. Gladstone's pressure of 1893? Was their policy one of continuing to draw a portion of their revenue from this foul source or would they endeavour to abandon it? He had proved that a great portion of a comparatively small revenue was a revenue immoral in its origin, that the Chinese and Singapore trade was an immoral trade, and that we were making profit by debasing our neighbours. Some of them had laboured hard believing that the good name of this country was at stake. Opium might be capable of being used in old age or for medical purposes with advantage; but the trade in it was an immoral trade. The Christian Churches said so, political economy said so, morality and ethics said so; and all these forces would ultimately unite to say that the country should not carry on a trade which was so debasing and demoralising in its character. He concluded by moving the Amendment.

Mr. JOHN ELLIS, in seconding the amendment, said that he proposed to confine his remarks to the attitude of the authorities in India with respect to this Commission and to the procedure of the Commission itself. On November 20, 1893, two days after the Commission met, there was laid before it a very important document—a letter from the Governor-General of India—and it was not to be found anywhere in the report of the Commission's proceedings. As that contained a statement in support of the existing system, and a warning as to the serious political consequences that might ensue from interfering with it, it looked like an attempt to influence unduly the course of the enquiry. It was an extraordinary proceeding on the part of the Governor-General. It would not be tolerated on the part of a high political executive officer in this country, and he would not dream of it. He hoped his right hon. friend the Secretary for India would give his opinion as to that letter and produce the document, which came from the Governor-General, was laid before the Committee at almost its earliest stage, and was intended to influence its proceedings. Hon. members who studied the seven volumes of the proceedings of the Commission carefully would find here and there not very carefully arranged—nothing was carefully arranged in those volumes—communications from the Central Government to the subordinate governments in Madras, Bengal, Central India, North-West Provinces, and the Resident of Haidarabad, giving instructions as to the manner in which evidence was to be collected, and indicating the kind of evidence, and requiring that lists of witnesses, with their evidence, should be sent to the Central Government. That was a proceeding not calculated in any respect to aid the Commission in finding out the truth. This want of trust in subordinate governments was very much misplaced under the circumstances. Their excise regulations and other characteristics being different, they ought to have been left to take their own course in relation to the Royal Commission as to witnesses and their evidence. What was the course likely to be pursued, following on this, by the subordinate government? Precisely what he believed was followed by the Government of the North-West Provinces. They issued instructions that none of their officials should communicate direct with the Secretary of the Royal Commission. He wondered what would be thought if, when a Commission or a Select Committee was appointed in this country, executive officers were found interposing to prevent any of their subordinates dealing direct with the Secretary of the Commission or the Clerk of the Committee. What had been the action of the authorities with respect to the collection of evidence and towards witnesses? But before he dealt with that he should like to point out that there was one great omission with respect to this matter. The hon. baronet who moved this motion had alluded to the soldier argument. They often heard that the Rajputs and regiments drawn from certain parts of the country could not live without opium; that it was their daily stimulant and they must have it. A circular was issued to the officers commanding every regiment and battalion in the native army asking them for numerical returns as to the numbers of opium smokers, etc. But he had looked in the Blue Books in vain for any of these figures. Where were the replies to these circulars? Parliament should have been furnished with them, whether they upheld the action of the authorities on the opium traffic or were against it. Then when the House came to the issue of circulars to persons who desired to give evidence there were strong illustrations of what he would almost venture to call the perversion of terms of reference to the Commission. All would agree that when a document was quoted it should be quoted accurately, and if it was said that the Government had resolved on a certain policy the exact words should be given in which that policy was laid down. He had great complaint with respect to this. One official of the Indian Government—Mr. Lyall by name—issued a circular, and by no means in that circular quoted the terms of the resolution of the House of Commons appointing that Commission accurately or textually. It was quite true that two days afterwards corrected copies were sent out. Whether Mr. Lyall's attention had been called to it or not he did not know, but in his first circular the terms of the reference were misquoted and the circular was misleading. Let him now turn to the witnesses. A certain medical practitioner, Isau Chandra Roy, M.B., received a circular desiring him to give evidence on certain points. Surely when evidence was asked for, it was not usual to prescribe in the first instance to a person the points on which it was desired he should give evidence. He was usually asked the points on which he desired to give evidence, and then it was seen whether or not they fell within the terms of the reference. On 4th December a letter was sent to this gentlemen, who sent in evidence unfavourable to the existing system. A date was fixed for his examination, and on 3rd January the officer who asked him to give evidence and suggested points on which he should give it, wrote to him that: "Under instructions received from the Government you are not required to attend to give evidence before the Royal Commission on Opium." The same treatment was meted out to others whose evidence was not favourable to the Central Government. Mr. Roy attended on the Commission after he had been told he need not, and stated

that not only had he received that treatment, but others had been treated in the same way. The evidence of Rai Bahadur Jai Prakishlal, C.I.E., a chief officer and gentleman of high position, was not favourable to the Government, and though present at the Commission he was not called as a witness. The list of witnesses at Lucknow contained a large number of names of persons who were not called. There were twenty-four called, twenty-three were called for, but were not produced, and seventeen were rejected. Among those not called were a large number who were opposed to the cultivation of poppies, and it turned out that two of them were actually officers of the Indian Government, who were prepared to say that the suppression of that cultivation would have no injurious effect either upon the revenue or rents. The most striking illustration of the way in which the case was worked up and engineered by the Indian authorities was afforded by the fact that on the 9th September the Government of India directed the Agent-General of Rajputana to give instructions for the appointment of witnesses and the nomination of a representative European officer, and that an abstract of the evidence should be lent to the Central Government. Upon the 22nd September Colonel Trevor, the Agent-General, issued a circular to all political officers in Rajputana, and on 13th of October Colonel Abbott was appointed to give evidence and to produce witnesses. The circular that Colonel Abbott drew up was of a most extraordinary character. It filled two or three pages of the Blue Book, and certainly he had never seen before such leading questions as it contained, which showed a surprising want of fairness of mind and of judicial temper on the part of those who were supposed to be impartial in getting up evidence to be laid before a Commission. It should have been the duty of the Indian Government to take care that the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, should be laid before the Commission, but instead of that, the manner in which the questions to the witnesses were framed was such as to suggest the answers that it was desired should be given. The witnesses were assembled a week beforehand, in order that Colonel Abbott might have interviews with all of them before they were examined. Apparently the evidence so obtained did not satisfy the Government, because after they received the report of Colonel Abbott as to what he had done, Mr. Bayley, Assistant Agent to the Governor-General, wrote a long letter on the 29th September, in which he pointed out that on looking over what Colonel Abbott had stated, he was afraid that the subject of the loss that the revenue would sustain by the suppression of the cultivation of poppies had not been put forward with sufficient clearness, and directed Colonel Abbott to take further steps in order that the Commission might be fully informed upon that head. Speaking on his responsibility as a member of Parliament, he could say he had given the House only a slight and fragmentary illustration of what he could lay before them under this head of witnesses and evidence. The whole thing was the most complete inversion of the ordinary rule to which we were accustomed in this country when it was desired to elicit the truth upon any question. It was clear that in this case the Central Government of India had suggested the kind of evidence that should be given, and had taken care that the Commission should have not the whole truth, but only a part of it laid before them. The result of all this it was easy to foresee. He did not think that anyone could sum up the case more clearly than had been done by one of the witnesses, who, after giving his opinion on the matter, added: "That is the general opinion, but whatever the Government thinks is right." Nothing could bring home to the English people more clearly the character of the evidence that had been given before the Commission than those words, and nothing more contradictory to our English ideas of getting at the truth than the course that had been adopted by the Indian Government in this matter could be conceived. Hon. members would not have been addressing that House that night on that subject if the people of this country thought that whatever the Government thought was right. He protested against the idea that had got into the minds of these poor people that they were bound to think as the Government did upon this subject. He should like to conclude his portion of this aspect of the matter by alluding to the behaviour of the authorities to the Royal Commissioners. At Bankipur, on 3rd January, 1894, the hon. member for Holmfirth laid before the Commission particulars of the police of the district of Gya having been round enquiring of the people into his (Mr. Wilson's) movements, whom he had seen, and what had been said by and to him by the inhabitants, etc. On the 4th January, 1894, Mr. Macpherson, collector of revenue at Calcutta, said: "I had heard in Calcutta from Mr. Dane that anti-opium people had been over our district hunting up evidence they seemed to think of importance." He had, therefore, spoken to the local superintendent of police, who had set his men to work. Those who were engaged in endeavouring to elicit the truth on this question ought not to have been pressed by the police in this way or spoken of in this manner, nor should Mr. Harris, the superintendent of police, and his myrmidons have been permitted to track out the movements of the hon. gentleman and his friends, who were engaged in the work. They could not expect fair evidence to be given to the Commission if the police were set to work like that. Turning to the second part of his subject, the procedure of the Commission itself, his hon. friend (the mover) had dwelt upon the fact that the two secretaries were Indian officials. He did not suppose they would have any contradiction from the other side of the House with regard to that, as they had in regard to another matter. Mr. Hewett and Mr. Baines represented that enormous despotic bureaucracy which governed, and, to his thinking, on the whole so well the Indian Empire. He endorsed what had been said by his hon. friend that this Commission ought to have been supplied with a secretary from among the many competent men to be found in London who was not imbued with the traditions of the Indian Government, and who was acquainted with English standards of justice and fairplay. Such a man would have taken care that the Commission should be treated with respect, and that the witnesses should be summoned and dealt with in a fair way. Then there was the special agent, Mr. Dane, who was one of those who committed himself very strongly in 1890 to an opinion on this opium question. He (Mr. Ellis) endorsed what his hon. friend had said with regard to the questioning of certain members of the Commission. Sir James Lyall, undoubtedly, had been in the service of the Indian Government, and there was no question as to the position of Mr. Fanshawe, who was a Postmaster-General in the Indian service. He had read with a feeling of almost shame and indignation the manner in which these two gentlemen had thought fit to examine witnesses. They had asked them with regard to their private affairs and their income; persons of the humblest class were asked questions of a character which one would expect only from an Old Bailey practitioner. The majority of that House who voted for the Commission—he himself voted against it—would certainly not have had our fellow-subjects in India treated as some of them had been by some of the members of the Royal Commission. He ventured to say that any hon. gentleman filling the position of chairman of a Select Committee of that House would have at once called any of his colleagues to order who so treated witnesses coming before the Committee. The humbler the position of the witness, and the more nervous he was, the more kindly should be his treatment, and the more also should the chairman and the members endeavour to set him at his ease. One of the witnesses seemed to have been asked with reference to his pay. The witness did not know if it would affect the character of his evidence, but said of course he had no objection to say if the question was pressed. Mr. Fanshawe at once said: "I must press the question." He wished to pay his tribute of respect to his hon. friend the member for the Prestwich Division of Lancashire, who conducted his examination in a very different way; and who, when a witness demurred to answering questions of rather a private nature, said that certainly he would not press them. There was the greatest contrast between the conduct of the hon. member for the Prestwich Division of Lancashire and that of Sir James Lyall and Mr. Fanshawe in this respect. Passing from that he called attention to the very different treatment which was accorded to the memorials of various bodies, and pointed out that while all the pro-opium memorials were allowed to go into the appendices without a word of comment, an official, charged with the collection of evidence, was set to work by the Indian Government to tear to pieces the anti-opium memorial, especially one from Calcutta. Surely this Commission ought to have been above that sort of thing. With regard to evidence as to our opium policy with China, the Chairman of the Commission, Lord Brassey, actually stopped two witnesses of great competency from giving evidence as to this, and said: "We may take it that we all regret that policy of the past, that we accept the

statement that was made on behalf of the late Government by Sir James Fergusson that such a course of policy as that would never be permitted again; that, I think, is agreed." Would it be believed, however, that after this the Commission allowed 150 pages of the most controversial matter upon this opium policy with China to appear in their Report? If Mr. Dane, who wrote this, had been examined before a Committee of that House, half his statements would have been made mincemeat of. It would not have been allowed by a single Private Bill Committee upstairs. These 150 pages were saturated with misstatements and inaccurate particulars, and altogether it was not worth the paper on which it was written, and he deprecated even the cost of printing such a document, which had not formed the subject of any cross-examination. Then in the Majority Report he regretted to say there were the most misleading quotations which it had ever been his lot to see in any public document. There were two missionaries named Ashmore and Bones, and in the case of Mr. Ashmore the statement put into his mouth by the majority in their Report was not borne out in the least degree by his evidence. In the case of Mr. Bones something worse had been done. They pretended to give his words, but they absolutely left out two or three sentences which had a vital bearing on the issue without any indication of the omission. He never saw such a specimen of misleading quotation. Such things deprived the Report of the Commission of any real value. Then there was a table given on page 12 of volume 6 of the Report of certain figures in which a large number of years were left out. The whole argument based on these figures disappeared when they supplied the figures which were left out. He could fill pages of the *Times* newspaper with the inaccuracies contained in the Report; the time they had had to examine into the matter had been all too short. Turning to the unauthorised papers appended to the Report, he said he had inquired as to how these precious documents came to be there. He had had a correspondence with Lord Brassey, who informed him that no request was made to either Mr. Dane or Mr. Baines to write these papers, but when they appeared it was thought desirable to put them in. He (Mr. Ellis) believed their insertion was never brought before the Commission at all. There was a Supplemental Historical Note by Mr. Dane occupying 35 pages, an account of the recent action of the Government of India with regard to poppy cultivation, and a history of the movement in England against opium. They might as well ask the Secretary of the Licensed Victualler Association to write a history of the temperance movement. He would now come to the last feature in the proceedings of the Commission. The Royal Commission, on the last page of their Report, referred to his hon. friend the member for the Holmfirth Division. They say: "We desire to make a special reference to the Report which we understood to be in preparation by our colleague, Mr. Wilson. The criticism or suggestions which it may contain have not been submitted for our consideration. We regret that in the discussion which took place during the preparation of our Report we were not placed in possession of the views of our colleague." Why not? What right had the Commissioners to use that language? Lord Brassey, the Chairman of the Commission, wrote two letters to his hon. friend on the 2nd and 7th of January of this year, enclosing a copy of a letter that he addressed to Sir James Lyall. Lord Brassey told his hon. friend that it would be unprofitable to enter into a prolonged discussion, and that he did not anticipate that their further deliberations round the Table would occupy many days. In his letter to Sir James Lyall Lord Brassey said: "I strongly insist that the completion of our work has become of extreme urgency, and having received two communications within the last few days, I feel my duty calls for some decided course of action. . . . I shall in any case relieve the Commission from further collecting work on the 26th." That was a proceeding for a Chairman! Giving notice that in three weeks' time the closure would be applied! Having thus closed the mouth of his hon. friend, the Commissioners thought fit to reproach him for not having his assistance in discussing the Report. His hon. friend would have been extremely ill-advised if, after receiving the Chairman's letter, he had in any way obtruded his advice on the Commission. It was not a case of closure by compartments: it was the guillotine all at once. That method of conducting a Royal Commission was, he believed, unprecedented. He did not wonder that there was some little impatience on the part of the Secretary of State for India, for the Commission had been dragging on for three months in India and twelve months in this country, and during that time the Chairman of the Commission did not think it inconsistent with his duty to be out of the country a good many months. There was at the time no effort being made to prepare a Report or to bring the enquiry within reasonable distance of a conclusion. He must say one or two words on the action of the Secretary. Mr. Baines had in two particulars shown that he was utterly wanting in the discretion necessary in an office of that kind. In the first place, he deliberately, and of his own motion, suppressed a note which the hon. member for the Holmfirth division desired him to insert if certain correspondence was put in. In the next place there was the conduct of the Secretary in prematurely disclosing the Report of the Commission. It was a most extraordinary thing that an officer of the Indian Government should have disclosed this Report on Saturday the 20th April to a particular newspaper, and that one a powerful friend of the existing system. It appeared in that newspaper on the 22nd, and it was not in the hands of members till May 7th. The Secretary of State said he had reasons to believe that the Report would be laid on the Table on the 22nd, but if it had there was no reason why it should have been given out to a particular paper on the 20th. He said that on both these two aspects of the question—on the conduct of the authorities and the procedure of the Commission—the illustrations he had given, and which could be supplemented by the score, had gone far to vitiate and weaken the claim of the Report of this Commission to their respect. From the first letter of the Viceroy, that most extraordinary document, which was laid before the Commission on the 20th November, down to the closuring of the hon. member for the Holmfirth division, and the other incident he had mentioned, there was one persistent intention on the part of the authorities of India to regard this, not as a free enquiry, but as a defence of the Indian opium policy of the Government. He acquitted the Government as a whole, and particularly the right hon. gentleman the Secretary of State for India, from the slightest complicity in, or approval of, the proceedings. He was quite aware they could not have this kind of procedure in this country. The procedure adopted was one ill-becoming the reputation and the dignity of a Royal Commission. A Royal Commission had great functions and powers, and it ought to pursue an even tenour. It ought, on the one hand, to resist, as the judicial bench would resist, all pressure of the Executive Government, and on the other hand ought not to listen to words of untruth, but freely admit all evidence, without fear or favour, and without a partial hand; whilst, above all, it should be guiltless of any suppressions of testimony. This movement, however, depended, not upon Royal Commissions and their Reports. Those of them who took some part in trying to get off the Statute Book certain Acts of Parliament some years ago, knew they had against them more than one Royal Commission, more than one Select Committee of the House of Commons, with a majority against them, and yet these Acts of Parliament disappeared by almost universal consent in 1886. So it would be in this matter. Those great moral forces on which this movement rested were, to a large extent, independent of their action in this House, even independent of the lives of particular Governments, and he was convinced that they would, in time, sweep away that system which he declared—which six members of the present Cabinet and several other members of the Administration declared in 1891—to be morally indefensible. He begged to second the Resolution.

MR. H. H. FOWLER said: Mr. Speaker, If the Amendment which you have put from the Chair had been one of censure on the recent Royal Commission, of censure upon the individual members, of censure on the mode in which that Commission conducted its proceedings, of censure upon its officers; and calling for the strict action of this House and the Government of India with reference to these officers, I could have understood the present debate. But, Sir, my hon. friends, for whose motives I have the greatest possible respect, must pardon me if I say I can see little or no connexion between the startling Resolution which they ask the House to pass and the unprecedented personal attack they have made upon the gentlemen who have composed that Royal Commission, and upon those who have aided them in carrying out its work. I do not care to waste the time of this House with reference to what I call irrelevant matter, but I have a duty to perform to my absent friend Lord Brassey and to the other members of that Commis-

sion, and I have also a duty to perform to those servants of the Indian Government who have no means of defending themselves against the attacks made upon them to-night. (Cheers.) And, Sir, I venture to say the most experienced member of this House, the man who has known most of Royal Commissions, perhaps the man who has sat most frequently upon them, has never heard a Royal Commission attacked in the way and to the extent, and, as I venture to say, so groundlessly as has been this Royal Commission. (Cheers.) I will say a word or two to the House about this Commission. If one knew nothing of what it had done one would suppose this had been an idle, one-sided excursion of pleasure to India. The hon. baronet the member for Barnard Castle Division went so far as to hold up to the ridicule of the House the hospitality which gentlemen residing in India had offered to this Royal Commission, and generally left upon the House the impression that it was a Commission which had done no work, that it was entirely in the hands of officials, that it was perfectly one-sided and prejudiced, that its decisions were in no way worthy of respect. I ask the House to remember the date of this attack. My hon. friend said that perhaps it was unfortunate this question should come on on Friday evening. Yes, Sir, and I think it is unfortunate it should come on on Friday evening, the 24th of May. This Commission was passed in accordance with a resolution of this House of June 30th, 1893. The Commission was constituted, and constituted, I believe, with the greatest care, by my noble friend Lord Kimberley, and in communication, as I shall show directly, with some of those gentlemen who have taken a prominent part in censuring the Commission. The Commission was formed on September 2. On September 8 this idle Commission commenced its sittings London. It sat six days in London; it closed its sittings here on the 16th, and then adjourned to meet in Calcutta on November 15. They went to India. They visited Burma, Upper India, Patna, Benares, Lucknow, Umbala, Lahore, Delhi, and Agra. A certain section went to Indore; the other members proceeded to Ahmedabad to pursue their enquiries, and then the whole of them went to Bombay. They sat almost daily during the whole of that winter. The House will have been led to believe that they examined a very small section of packed and selected witnesses. They examined 723 witnesses. They examined every witness offered by the Anti-Opium Society. They put something like 29,000 questions. They sent interrogatories to China, to the Straits, and to Hong Kong. Of course the answers to those interrogatories were not subjected to cross-examination. But they were not placed in the Blue Book as evidence; they were placed there as statements in reply to interrogatories. Well, the Commission then came back to London. They prepared their Report, a document of enormous length. It is quite true that I pressed them for their Report, and the member of this House who urged me most frequently to press them for their Report was my hon. friend the member for the Rushcliffe Division. I did think the delay was too long, and I pressed on Lord Brassey that the Report should be presented in time for the opening of Parliament. That Report was signed on April 16 of this year. It was placed on the Table of the House on April 25, and it became public property on the day it was placed on the Table of the House; it was delivered to members of the House on May 4, and—I call the particular attention of the House to this date—it was sent to India by the mail of May 10; and now, on May 24, not three weeks from the date it was first placed in the hands of members, and while it is absolutely impossible for the Government of India to have read it—and the minority report contains a very serious censure on the Government of India—you are asked to-night to declare that it is a prejudiced document; you are asked to declare that all the Commissioners save one were wrong, that one only was right, and between the hours of 9 and 12 o'clock on a Friday night you are asked to pass this Resolution of censure of the greatest magnitude. I say that such a course is not fair to the Commissioners. I say it is not fair to the people of India; it is not fair to the Government of India; and it is not fair to the members of this House themselves. I ask how many members of this House have read this huge pile of papers—these 2,200 pages? Only two members have read it, and those are, I must presume, the mover and seconder of the Resolution. They are bound to have read every word of the evidence before they brought such charges as they have formulated in this House to-night. No other man has read it. I have not read it. I plead guilty to it. I am responsible for this matter to the House; but I say frankly that, with the enormous amount of Administrative work I have to do at the present moment, and not being quite so strong as I once was, I have found it quite impossible for me to read the evidence and report so as to pronounce an opinion. And yet we are asked to-night, sitting as a final Court of Appeal, to decide a case of this magnitude when there is no man in the House who has gone into the evidence. Now, what was the origin of this Commission? The hon. members told us that they voted against it. But the House, by a majority of 79 declared the Commission should issue. The House was dealing with a grave question in a grave spirit when, on the instigation of my right hon. friend the member for Midlothian, it appointed the Commission. The points referred to the Commission for investigation were these:—"I. Whether the growth of the poppy and the manufacture and sale of opium in British India should be prohibited except for medical purposes, and whether this prohibition could be extended to the Native States. II. The nature of the existing arrangements with the Native States in respect of the transit of opium through British territory: and on what terms, if any, those arrangements could be with justice terminated. III. The effect on the finances of India of the prohibition of the sale and export of opium, taking into consideration (*a*) the compensation payable; (*b*) the cost of the necessary preventive measures; (*c*) the loss of the revenue. IV. Whether any change short of total prohibition should be made in the system at present followed for regulating and restricting the opium traffic, and for raising a revenue therefrom. V. The consumption of opium by the different races and in the different districts in India, and the effect of such consumption on the moral and physical condition of the people. VI. The disposition of the people of India in regard to (*a*) the use of opium for non-medical purposes; and (*b*) their willingness to bear in whole or in part the cost of prohibitive measures." I have seen in an organ of public opinion, which represents the views of my hon. friends, that this Commission was packed by Indian officials. (Hear, hear.) My hon. friends cheer that. There was another criticism of the Commission published in another organ of my hon. friends immediately after the Commission was formed, and written by my hon. friend the member for Bradford (Mr. Caine), who, if he will allow me to say so, is always fair to his opponents and never indulges in personal attack. Let me read what my hon. friend wrote of the Commission in the quarterly organ of the Anti-Opium Society.

MR. W. S. CAINE: It is not the organ of the Anti-Opium Society.

MR. FOWLER: At all events, my hon. friend wrote what I am now about to quote. It is said that the members of the Commission have been selected "with great care and deliberation;" that the president, Lord Brassey, is "a man of wide sympathies," and that both sides in the controversy might repose confidence in "his great impartiality, his sound judgment, and his rectitude." Well, I never heard a public man of impartiality, judgment, and rectitude attacked as Lord Brassey has been attacked to-night. Of the medical member of the Commission, Sir William Roberts, it is said that no better qualified member of the medical profession could be selected.

MR. CAINE: Is there not something more about Sir William Roberts?

MR. FOWLER: Well, that he is of "the old school," and that "his writings show a strong belief in alcohol." Mr. Mowbray, another member of the Commission, is described as the son of one of the most popular members of the House of Commons, and "a young man of great promise in the Conservative party." As to Mr. Haridas Veharidas, the hon. member says he does not know what that gentleman knows about opium, but he knows he will bring to the inquiry great knowledge and experience. My hon. friend then speaks in the highest terms both of the hon. member for Holmfirth and of Mr. Arthur Pease. He then refers to Sir James Lyall and Mr. Fanshawe, and they are the two who formed the official element—two out of nine. And that is a Commission packed with Indian officials. Sir James Lyall's career is one of the many most honourable careers to be found in the Indian Civil Service. He has been there thirty-four years, has risen to a high position in the Indian Civil Service, closing his career with the Lieutenant-Governorship of the Punjab. We are told that because he now receives a pen-

sion he is incapable of forming an independent judgment. Will anyone tell the Chancellor of the Exchequer that Sir Algernon West is unable to form a proper judgment upon the question of the English revenue because he has retired on a pension? Mr. James Fanshawe, another of these distinguished servants of the Indian Government, has risen to a high position. Such is the Commission whose conclusions you are to treat with perfect contempt, and whose decisions you are to overrule, simply upon the *ex parte* statements of two honourable and able advocates who opposed the appointment of the Commission, who differ from its conclusions, and who remain perfectly unconvinced, notwithstanding the overwhelming character of the evidence. No; it is too bad to impugn gentlemen like this. The discharge of these public duties involved a great amount of physical and mental labour. It is a thankless duty, but, after all, Englishmen are in the habit of treating public men who do a public duty with the greatest generosity, and with the greatest consideration. When we are told that because they were asked out to dinner they could not deal with this case impartially, I must protest against this mode of dealing with a Commission of this character. There is an end of Royal Commissions, which have hitherto been one of the most powerful and most convenient modes of enquiry, if gentlemen discharging the duties of commissioners are to be treated as these men have been treated. These commissioners arrived at a series of distinct conclusions. We all admit that the report of the Commission conflicts with many preconceived opinions. There is a new light thrown upon the whole of this case by the Report. I am not going to say that my hon. friends are wrong, and the commissioners are right; I will not say the eight are right and the hon. member for Holmfirth is wrong; but questions have been raised affecting the opium consumption, affecting the opinions of medical men, and I maintain that before the House of Commons gives a decision, the question must be argued out. Public opinion must be informed on the question; scientific opinion must be ascertained. My hon. friend quoted the opinion of the Churches. There is a difference of opinion even there. The Church of England and the Church of Rome do not take the same view on this question that the overwhelming bulk of the Nonconformist churches take. This question must be decided not by personal attacks upon the commissioners, but by the weight and value of the evidence. Take Sir William Roberts. He has written a most able memorandum upon this question. That has to stand the test of medical examination in this country, and we cannot take the opinion of any one hon. member as sufficient. The evidence on which Sir William Roberts has founded his statement and which has guided the opinions of the majority of the Commission is now before the medical world, and they will have to deal with it. I have a great many quotations from this Report, but I will abstain from reading them. I shall simply say that there are strong differences of opinion in the missionary view. The Bishop of Calcutta and the Bishop of Lucknow with their clergy addressed two powerful memoranda to the Royal Commission expressing their views that: "while there are evils in the abuse of opium, they are not sufficiently great to justify us in restricting the liberty which all men should be permitted to exercise in these matters, medical testimony seeming to show that opium, used in moderation, is in this country harmless, and under certain conditions of life distinctly beneficial." The Roman Catholic Archbishop of Calcutta said: "It has been urged by some that the use of opium is a serious obstacle to the success of missionary work. Looking back with an experience of more than fifteen years of missionary life, and having consulted priests of longer standing in the country, I have been forced to the conclusion, as far as Catholic missions are concerned, that facts do not tally with this assertion." I do not say that there is not strong evidence on the other side. I admit that there is. But what I am pleading for is the investigation of that evidence, and not a decision hurriedly reached under such excitement as my hon. friend's. If two members of the House cannot agree on a simple statement which is in the Report, how can we accept a statement in the nature of indirect evidence? My hon. friend says that the medical evidence was nearly equally divided. There were 146 medical witnesses examined, and of these only 20 were against the use of opium, and 126 were the other way. (Sir J. PEASE dissented.) My hon. friend says "No." That proves my point, for the House must investigate this thing for itself. We cannot ask the House to come to a grave decision without such independent investigation. The House is the ultimate court of appeal, and its decision must be given on the evidence. If we are going to decide a question affecting the Government of India, its revenue, its administration, and its expenditure, I say that the Government of India have a right to be heard on the question before a decision is arrived at. You would not treat any Parish Council in the manner in which my hon. friend proposes to treat the Government of 300 millions of people. I will leave this question, as Lord Beaconsfield said, "to the instinctive justice of the House," and I am sure that the House of Commons will not decide in such a manner. But I have to deal with the motion which my hon. friend has proposed. He asks us to declare that, after having had presented to it the Report of the Royal Commission, this House is of opinion that the system by which the Indian Opium Revenue is collected is morally indefensible; and to pass a motion calling upon the Government of India to stop the cultivation of the poppy and sale of opium in British India, except to supply the legitimate demand for medical purposes, and at the same time to take measures to arrest the transit of Malwa opium through British territory. What would be the effect on the Indian Government of passing this resolution? I will quote what the late Prime Minister, the right hon. member for Midlothian, said: "The first duty in governing India, before we commit ourselves to a broad declaration, is to learn the mode in which we can carry that declaration into effect. Nothing could be more ruinous, and few things could be more discreditable, than for you to pass a vote which, on the one side, must remain an idle expression of opinion, without practical result, or else, if acted on, must simply have the effect of throwing the finances of India into confusion, and of greatly compromising the position, the welfare, and even the peace and security of that country." Remember it is upon the terms of this motion that the House is going to vote to-night. It is not upon the question whether one witness was fairly cross-examined or not, or whether one police officer was judicious or injudicious. I know the cases to which my hon. friend has referred, and I agree with much of what he said in reference to some of those cases. But as to the question of general unfairness in dealing with witnesses, that was investigated by the Commission; the Commission has given a distinct ruling on the question, and has acquitted the Government of India on every one of the charges brought against it. I am not at this moment arguing the question whether the sale of opium is morally defensible. Remember that it is a revenue arising from restriction and regulation, and a revenue which so affects the price, if opium is a most deadly stimulant, as to make the obtaining of that opium a much more difficult thing than it would otherwise be. The revenue raised from opium in British India is 180 per cent. over the cost price, and the duty raises the price of Malwa opium 118 per cent. There is a long string of findings by the Commission in which they call attention to the various uses for which opium is raised. They admit that there is no doubt the excessive use of opium is a very great evil and a great vice. They point to the fact, which my hon. friend has not discussed, that there is a very large moderate use of opium in India, and so far as medical exception is concerned—my hon. friend makes that exception—they deal with it very clearly. They say in paragraph 177:—"It must be borne in mind that the population of the British provinces is over 220 millions. The number of hospitals and dispensaries under European supervision in those provinces in 1893 was only 1,800, with an average daily attendance of patients numbering 94,000. European non-official practitioners are only found in the Presidency and provincial capitals. The supply of native medical men trained under the European system, though much increased of late years, is still confined to the larger towns or to the district headquarters." Another witness stated that three-fourths of the deaths occur without the invocation of any professional advice of any sort. The Commission go on to show that the idea of medical exception is an absolute impossibility. Where are you to draw the line between medical consumption and general consumption, and who are to be the men who are to lay down the rules to guide this exception? With reference to crime, I do not think my hon. friend stated that crime was in any way promoted in India by the use of this drug. That is something to be said in its favour. With reference to the note of the Maharajah of Darbhanga, my hon. friend quoted simply his

objection to opium smoking. I think, however, he rather left on the House the impression that a member of the Commission was in favour of the general restriction of opium. Now, what Darbhanga says in this memorandum just circulated is this:—"To stop the use of opium in cases like these would not only be an unnecessary restriction on the freedom of the subject, but it would also lead to the increased consumption of alcohol." And this view is expressed by a large number of witnesses. My hon. friend says that it is morally indefensible to raise revenue from a stimulant the excessive use of which produces the terrible results which in his view flow from opium. I would like to know what my hon. friend's answer would be to a very keen logical Hindoo who asked him and us whether when we proposed to deprive the Indian Government of their opium revenue we were prepared to adopt the same rules for ourselves. My hon. friend the member for Bradford says "Certainly"; but I do not hear the Chancellor of the Exchequer say "Certainly." The imaginary opponent of my hon. friend on this ground of moral indefensiblity might say to him, "I hear from statements in your Legislature, from the statements of your judges, medical men, and philanthropists, that crime, lunacy, pauperism, disease, the desolated homes, and the ruined lives in your country are all owing to the results of the excessive use of other stimulants, which excessive use one of your greatest Prime Ministers declared, amid the cheers of the House of Commons, inflicted on the nation more terrible evils than war, pestilence, and famine combined. Is it true, when you say it is morally indefensible to raise money from the restriction and regulation of the sale of opium in India, that you are rising between £30,000,000 and £40,000,000 a year revenue from a similar source?" (A voice: "Shameful.") "Shameful," says my hon. friend. Well, then, stop it here first. Go to India with clean hands. You, the wealthy country with your £30,000,000 to £40,000,000 from the Drink Duty—deal with that before you ask India to plunge itself into financial embarrassment on account of the excessive use of a drug which not one of the witnesses before this Commission, no matter how strong his opinions, declared produced anything like the results which the excessive use of alcohol produce in this country. My hon. friend proposes to stop the growth of the poppy. How is it to be done? It is easy to pass a resolution of the House of Commons; but the references show that the average area under poppy is held by $1\frac{1}{4}$ million of cultivators under the licensing system, with an enormous proportion below a third of an acre. In the event of Prohibition, all this must come under inspection. I ask the House of Commons to conceive the stopping of the cultivation, carried on by a million or a million and a-half of people, of this plant, which has been grown by them for centuries, which is a chief source from which these poor peasants derive their income and pay their rent. Where is the army of inspectors to come from? Who is to pay the cost? Where is the limit to be put to the extortion, tyranny, and oppression that would arise from putting down this sort of cultivation? But this is a question which most seriously affects the finances of India. From 1887-8 to 1893-4 the average net revenue arising from it amounted to Rx. 6,965,000; in 1893-4 it was Rx. 5,746,000, and in 1894-5 it was Rx. 6,661,000. If the cultivation is stopped, where is the deficit to come from? The House of Commons is always practical especially in matters of finance. The House of Commons never takes off a tax unless it is certain that there can be a corresponding reduction of expenditure. (Hear, hear, from several Radical members.) My hon. friends say,, "Hear, hear." Where are they going to get this reduction of expenditure?

Mr. Caine: Reduce the Army.

Mr. H. H. Fowler: Apart from exchange, there has been no great increase in the army expenditure in India for a number of years. The Army expenditure, excluding the loss on exchange, was in 1887 19 millions, in 1888 $18\frac{3}{4}$ millions, in 1889 19 millions, in 1890 $19\frac{1}{2}$ millions, in 1891 $20\frac{1}{2}$ millions, in 1892 $20\frac{1}{2}$ millions, and in 1893 considerably under 20 millions. There is, of course, an enormous increase in exchange, for whereas in 1887 the loss on exchange cost the Government of India six millions, this year it is estimated to cost 15 millions. That is where the real increase of expenditure on the army lies. It does not lie in increased military expenditure. We have appointed a Commission to enquire into the military expenditure, but it is nonsense to talk about reducing the military expenditure by five or six millions. There is, however, a still more serious difficulty than the financial difficulty. It is suggested that we should arrest the transit of Malwa opium across British India. Malwa opium is cultivated in the Native States, and passes through our territory to reach the seaside, and we levy on it the enormous duty of Rx. 650 per chest. What would be the effect of stopping that? The effect would be to raise a serious question between ourselves and the Native States. It would mean the stopping of the cultivation of the poppy to the extent of the present export; and it would entail consequent serious injury and loss on the people in those Native States. The average revenue in the Native States derived from opium is 27 per cent. of the whole revenue, and you cannot be prepared to go to the native rulers of those States and say to them: "We will cut off more than a quarter of your revenue at one fell swoop, and will prevent you from sending out of your countries a staple article of your industry." My hon. friend quoted from the representative of one of the little States. Why did he not quote the great ones, who stated that they would regard such a measure as an act of hostility on the part of the British Government? He could not help quoting one of them: "In view of the relations existing between the paramount Power and my State, the former would not be justified in calling upon me to prohibit the cultivation of opium in my State." There is another question to be considered. How are you going to prevent this opium passing the frontier? And, assuming you stop the transit, how are you going to guard the frontier from smuggling? Remember that this opium would be a profitable commodity to get across the frontier. The duty is more than two-thirds of its cost. Some of my friends opposite know a great deal more than I do as to the extent of the frontier line that would have to be guarded, but I am told by experts that it would be at least 5,000 miles. [Sir R. Temple: "Hear, hear!"] Some put it even higher than that. You would have to establish a line of Custom houses over that great length of territory. We once had a custom line from the Indus to the north border of Madras, 2,500 miles—as long as from Moscow to Gibraltar—and it took 12,000 officers and men to guard that frontier; and when afterwards it was reduced to 1,500 miles it still took 8,000 men to guard it. Therefore, you would have to raise an enormous army of officials to be added to the already too numerous army that exists. And the cost of all this is to be paid by the people of India! I put this to my hon. friend as one of the practical difficulties of the case so far as the Native States are concerned. But there are political consequences also to be considered. Nobody who has any acquaintance with India can be unaware of the fact that there is a disloyal section of people in India—a small section I admit—who are ready to take every opportunity of holding up the British Government and the Indian Government also to the dislike of the people. I am not prepared, as the Minister for India, to do anything which may tend to reinforce that class by the alienation of the Native States. When my hon. friend talks about army expenditure he can hardly realise what the policy he advocates would lead to; for by adopting it we should embark on a course which would make it necessary to increase rather than decrease the army of India. I must apologise to the House for the length of my speech, and I can only plead that I have left out three-fourths of what I meant and desired to say. Now, the Government object to this motion of my hon. friend because it is premature and because it is immature; because it involves a flagrant injustice on the one hand, and because it is impracticable on the other. We are asked as a Parliament to reject the deliberate judgment of a competent Commission appointed by this House, and we are asked to reject that judgment without the slightest opportunity of examining, much less testing, the evidence on which that judgment is founded. We are asked to deprive the Government of India of a large portion of its revenue without making any provision for the inevitable deficit which must follow, and thereby involving one of two things—either disabling the Indian Government from meeting its engagements, or necessitating the imposition of heavy extra taxation. Perhaps the House will allow me to say that all Governments, whether they be despotic or constitutional, have long ago learnt the lesson, and learnt it by bitter experience, that the most arduous, the most difficult task which any Government can undertake is to constantly interfere with the daily habits and daily customs of the masses of the people. This resolution pledges the House to make sweeping changes which would affect the social and the personal life of a very large number of her Majesty's Indian subjects, and you are asked

to do this in the teeth of the opinion not only of a majority of the Commission, but in the teeth of the opinion of the two distinguished natives who were put upon the Commission to represent native opinion, and in the teeth of what I do not hesitate to say is the overwhelming preponderance of native opinion. At the same time, while this resolution proposes to destroy the industry, the livelihood, of vast masses of the Indian people, it also menaces our relations with those native States with whom it is our duty and our interest to be on the most friendly terms. The resolution my hon. friend has proposed is not a mere shadowy expression of opinion on some theoretical question with which we may while away a Friday night, and totally outside the range of practical politics, but it sanctions a policy of such magnitude and of such far-reaching extent that the House of Commons must be satisfied upon the clearest evidence—satisfied beyond all doubt that that policy is necessary, is practicable, and is safe, before it attempts to impose it, and impose it by force, on our Indian empire.

MR. R. G. C. MOWBRAY, as a member of the Commission, ventured to say that anybody who carefully studied the evidence would believe that the Report which they had given was a fair and impartial report, and the only report which they could possibly have published. His hon. friend, the member for the Rushcliffe Division, was exceedingly polite to him personally with regard to his conduct, but he could only say that he did not wish, in the smallest degree, to separate himself from Sir James Lyall or Mr. Fanshawe, and he could not allow the language which had been used with regard to those two gentlemen to go uncontradicted in this House, because he was perfectly certain that not only could they not have got two more able representatives of the Indian officials, but he believed it would be impossible to have got two men who were more generously disposed and more kind-hearted in everything they had to do in connexion with the Commission. The Secretary of State had spoken with regard to Sir J. Lyall, and not more warmly than his public services deserved; but he should like to state that when the Commission were on tour in the Punjab Sir J. Lyall, as an ex-governor, was greeted by all classes of the community in the Punjab, not as an ex-governor, but as a man who had been their personal friend and whom they were delighted to come and welcome. That fact at once demonstrated the kind of man Sir J. Lyall was. Nearly every point which had been raised was brought before the Commission by the hon. member for Holmfirth, and the Commission came to the conclusions upon them embodied in the appendix and also in the Report. The hon. member for the Rushcliffe Division had talked about the attitude of the Government of India towards witnesses, and said that he understood that all the evidence passed through the hands of the Central Government. That did not agree with his own recollection of what happened. There were certain heads of evidence for the presentation of which to the Commission the Government of India held itself responsible, but the rest of the witnesses were selected by the local governments because they were supposed to know best what persons were likely to give good evidence. The Government of India, instructing the local governments as to the selection of the independent and non-official witnesses, said: "It is desirable that they should be gentlemen of some social standing, of independence of character, and of good general intelligence, and so completely in touch with public feeling in their respective provinces as to command the respect and confidence alike of the people of India and of the members of the Commission." The local governments, he believed, did their work honestly in that way, and he also believed that the witnesses who were examined supplied a fair representation of the views of the people of India. He had joined the Commission with a perfectly open mind. It was true that in 1891 he voted against the resolution which was then carried in favour of the abolition of the opium trade, but his chief reason for so voting was that he did not feel disposed to revolutionise the finances of India after a debate lasting three hours only. The evidence laid before the Commission in England, which dealt chiefly with the question as affecting China, was of very much stronger character than anything that they heard in India. Therefore when he landed in India he expected that an infinitely stronger case would be made out against opium in that country than was made out. As witness after witness came before the Commission, it became clearer and clearer to his mind that there was no case whatever against opium in India from a really national point of view. The witnesses on the anti-opium side seemed to him to be the representatives of local and sectiona interests, of temperance and missionary societies, and similar associations. A man would come forward saying that he represented an association, and when he was asked how many members it comprised he would reply 20. Five people came from an association at Lucknow, and it appeared that there were only 175 members in the association out of a population of over 273,000. He had seen it suggested that the evidence had been garbled by the Government of India. On that he would like to say that the Government of India only undertook to suggest witnesses to the Commission at the request of the Commission itself, and they telegraphed to the Secretary of State that they would not be responsible for special searches for anti-opium evidence. Commenting on that, the hon. member opposite said that, as anti-opium evidence was easily available without any special search, the official statement seemed to show that the officials were taking up a partisan attitude. All he could say was, that he condoled with his hon. friend and his associates, because after considerable search very little evidence seemed to be available to them; and, as the Secretary of State had said, in no single case did the Commissioners refuse the evidence of any witness put forward by the Anti-Opium Society. On the other hand they were obliged to put off numberless witnesses on the other side. The Appendices to the Report were full of abstracts of the evidence of witnesses who could not be examined from want of time. The result was that he felt that no numerical comparison between the number of witnesses on one side and the other could be a fair test. The Commission could have had numbers of additional witnesses in favour of opium if they had had more time at their disposal; but on the other hand, and he thought this was a very material fact, not a single witness put forward by his hon. friend opposite and his associates was declined by the Commission. It was impossible to go into details as to these witnesses at that time of the night, though he would be glad to go through them. He would now only ask the House to accept the conclusion at which the Commission had arrived. There might be some slight difference of opinion displayed in some of the details of the reports of their native colleagues, but they were present when the conclusions of the Commission were discussed at Bombay, they joined in those conclusions and signed the Report now before Parliament. He felt it was impossible to detain the House any longer, but he would ask the House to believe this that the Commission had as good an opportunity of getting at the truth of this question as any body of men could have, and he believed they had done the best they could to lay the truth before the people of this country. It would have been a pleasanter and an easier task if they had been able to join with those people who claimed for themselves a monopoly in the cause of righteousness and to have made a milk-and-water report which would have settled nothing; but the Commissioners did not think that if they had done that they would have been doing their duty to the country that sent them out. He certainly did hope, on behalf of the millions of people in India who were consumers of this drug, and still more on behalf of the millions of people who would have to pay additional taxation if this source of revenue were destroyed—he did hope on behalf of the Government and on behalf of the good faith of the English people, that this motion would be rejected.

MR. H. J. WILSON said the House would recognise at once that it was not possible in the two minutes that remained to say anything material on this subject, but having listened with the utmost attention to the speech of the right hon. gentleman the Secretary of State, he would venture to say that if opportunity offered there was scarcely one of the statements the right hon. gentleman had made that could not be satisfactorily replied to.

SIR R. TEMPLE claimed to move "That the question be now put."

MR. SPEAKER withheld his assent, and declined then to put that motion.

MR. H. J. WILSON, continuing, said the one question he would like to put was to ask the right hon. gentleman if he was at least going to carry out the recommendations of the Commission with regard to smoking. The right hon. gentleman had said a good deal about the native members, but was he going to listen in this question to men who knew the feeling of the people of India? If he would not go as far as they and he (Mr. Wilson) desired to go, would he at least listen to

the recommendations in the Report of the majority on the question of opium-smoking?

Mr. C. J. DARLING claimed to move, "That the question be now put."

The House divided, and the numbers were:

For the Resolution	59
Against	176
Majority against the Resolution	117

May 28th.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

BRITISH INDIAN SUBJECTS IN THE TRANSVAAL.

Sir ELLIS ASHMEAD BARTLETT asked the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies whether Her Majesty's Government had received a petition from Her Majesty's Indian subjects in the Transvaal, praying for justice and protection;

Whether the Boer Government had claimed and exercised the right of forcibly ejecting British Indian residents in the Transvaal from their homes and businesses, to their serious loss; and what steps Her Majesty's Government proposed to take to protect the rights of Her Majesty's Indian subjects?

Mr. SYDNEY BUXTON: I stated the other day that I was about to lay papers on this subject, which will give in the best form the information required by the hon. gentleman.

May 30th.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

BRITISH INDIAN SUBJECTS IN THE TRANSVAAL.

Mr. ARNOLD FORSTER asked the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies, when he proposed to lay upon the Table of the House the correspondence and other documents relating to the punishment, without trial, of British Indian subjects resident in the Transvaal?

Mr. SYDNEY BUXTON: I propose shortly to lay the papers relating to the position of British Indian subjects in the South African Republic. They are not yet quite complete. I must, however, demur to the inference put upon the matter in question by the hon. gentleman.

Mr. ARNOLD FORSTER: I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he has yet received any information with regard to the case of the Indians in the employment of Messrs. Harvey, stated to have been "cleared out" of the town of Krugersdorp in January last by a Boer field cornet of the name of Rodinstein;

Whether he is aware that the British subjects in question have just received verbal notice to quit;

And whether such notice to quit, served without trial or evidence of an offence committed, is in accordance with Boer law?

Mr. SYDNEY BUXTON: We have now received a dispatch on the subject in reply to our enquiry. The case referred to appears to be that of Ibrahim Mahomed Patel, who attempted to open a store at Krugersdorp. The trader was instructed by the Magistrates to remove his goods—and this he did. The proceedings were, no doubt, taken under a law of the South African Republic of 1885, amended in 1886, in virtue of which the South African Republic claim the right to prohibit Asiatics from trading, except in locations set aside for that special purpose. The hon. member is aware that I am about to lay papers relating to the case of the Indians, and the dispatch just received will be included in the Blue Book.

THE FUTURE OF CHITRAL.

Sir WILLIAM WEDDERBURN asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether, before taking action as regards Chitral affairs, Her Majesty's Government would afford the House an opportunity of expressing its views on the subject?

The CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: Of course the question with reference to Chitral is a very grave one. The Government are not able at present to make a statement on the subject, but when a policy is decided on the House will certainly be informed of it.

June 11th.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

THE ARMY MEDICAL STAFF.

Mr. ALPHEUS MORTON asked the Secretary of State for India whether his attention had been called to the condition of the Army Medical Staff in India:

Whether the Medical Department was terribly undermanned:

And whether adequate arrangements were made for a reserve in case of emergencies like the Chitral Expedition.

Mr. H. H. FOWLER: The establishment of the Army Medical Staff in India is considered sufficient for the requirements of the army in peace and war, and there is no reason to suppose that it is "terribly undermanned" as assumed by my hon. friend.

THE MAHARAJA OF BHARTPUR.

Mr. SEYMOUR KEAY asked the Secretary of State for India whether the Government of India had the power to set aside the rulers of Native States in alliance with Her Majesty, without having first obtained the consent of the Home Government, as appeared to have been done in the case of the Mâhárája of Bhartpur:

And whether he would lay upon the Table papers relating to the setting aside of this Prince.

Mr. H. H. FOWLER: In their dealings with the rulers of Native States, as in other matters, the Government of India use their discretion whether or not to obtain the approval of the Secretary of State in Council before taking action.

It is not for the public interest that the papers relating to the Bhartpur succession should be laid on the Table.

June 13th.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

ARMING OF THE KASHMIR CONTINGENT.

MAJOR RASCH asked the Secretary of State for India, when Imperial Service troops, the Kashmir Na ive Contingent, who were still armed with obsolete Sniders were to receive the the Martini.

Mr. H. H. FOWLER: Martini-Henry rifles have been issued to the infantry, which forms the great majority of the Kashmir Imperial service force. I am not able to say at what date they will be issued to the Cavalry, whose numbers are relatively very small.

EXTENSION OF "HER MAJESTY'S INDIAN POSSESSIONS."

Sir WILLIAM WEDDERBURN asked the Secretary of State for India, what extensions had been made of Her Majesty's Indian Possessions subsequent to the passing of the Act for the better government of India (1858):

In what years were such extensions made:

And, what was the name and area of each such extension.

Mr. H. H. FOWLER: In 1886 the province of Upper Burma was added to Her Majesty's Indian possessions; its area is about 83,500 square miles. In 1887 the frontier districts of Pishin and Sibi with their dependencies which had been under our administration under the treaty of Gandamak since 1879, were incorporated with British India. Besides these a considerable number of acquisitions of territory, including numerous exchanges with native Princes, have taken place in various ways since 1858, the area in most cases being comparatively small. The information necessary for giving a complete answer to the hon. member's question does not exist in this country.

EXPENSES OF THE SHAHZADA'S VISIT.

Mr. WEBB asked the Secretary of State for India, was the United Kingdom or India to bear the expenses incident to the Shahzada's visit to this country.

Mr. H. H. FOWLER: The cost of the entertainment of the Shahzada will be defrayed by the Indian Government.

Mr. HANBURY: Will the Indian Government bear the entire cost—every penny of it?

Mr. H. H. FOWLER: Yes; but we shall be glad to receive any contribution from the hon. member.

FLOGGING IN THE INDIAN ARMY.

Mr. HANBURY asked the Secretary of State for India, whether since the India Office communicated with the Government of India more than 12 months ago on the subject of flogging in the native army of the Crown, any decision had been arrived at with reference to its continuance or abolition:

And, whether he would lay the correspondence upon the Table.

Mr. H. H. FOWLER: No decision has yet been arrived at on the subject of flogging in the Native Army in India. Until the correspondence is completed, it cannot be laid upon the Table.

STATEMENT OF MORAL AND MATERIAL PROGRESS.

Copy was presented of the Statement exhibiting the moral and material Progress and Condition of India during 1893-4; to lie upon the Table, and to be printed.

RETURN OF INCOME AND EXPENDITURE.

On the motion of Mr. Fowler, an address was granted for a return of the net income and expenditure of British India, under certain specified heads, for the ten years from 1884-5 to 1893-4.

June 17th.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

STATEMENT OF MORAL AND MATERIAL PROGRESS.

The statement exhibiting the moral and material progress and condition of India during the year 1893-4 was presented.

June 18th.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

THE FUTURE OF CHITRAL.

The MARQUIS of LANSDOWNE: I beg to ask the Under-Secretary for India a question of which I have given him private notice—namely, whether Her Majesty's Government intend to lay on the Table any papers relating to Chitral, and, if so, what papers, and when.

LORD REAY: Her Majesty's Government are not at present in a position to make any statement on the subject of the noble lord's question or to lay any papers on the Table.

The MARQUIS of LANSDOWNE: Is my noble friend able to tell us whether we shall have an opportunity of discussing the question before any final decision is arrived at by Her Majesty's Government?

LORD REAY: I am not prepared to answer my noble friend's question without notice.

The MARQUIS of LANSDOWNE: In consequence of the answer I have just received, I beg to give notice that on an early day I shall call attention to the situation in Chitral and ask whether an opportunity will be given to the House to consider any papers there may be on the subject before any decision is arrived at by Her Majesty's Government.

June 20th.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON EXPENDITURE.

Mr. SEYMOUR KEAY asked the Secretary of State for India, whether he was aware that an intimation had been conveyed to a representative of the Indian Press to the effect that the proceedings of the Royal Commission on Indian Financial Expenditure would be private:

Whether this decision had been arrived at by the Commissioners themselves, or had been imposed upon them by Her Majesty's Government:

Whether he was aware that the principal Indian newspapers had already made arrangements for publishing full reports of the proceedings:

Whether there existed any special reason why the Press should not be admitted, as had been done in the case of the Anglo-Irish Financial Relations Commission, the Welsh Land Commission, the Labour Commission, and the Opium Commission:

And, whether, in view of the great interest taken in India in the proceedings of the Commission on Indian Financial Expenditure, Her Majesty's Government would take steps to secure that the Press should be admitted.

Mr. H. H. FOWLER: The question as to the publicity of the proceedings of the Royal Commission on Indian Expenditure is one for the Commissioners themselves to decide. The Secretary of State is informed that as yet no decision has been arrived at. Any intimation on the subject must, therefore, have been made without authority.

The first meeting of the Commission will be held on the 26th inst.